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Abstract 
Non-Intrusive Continuous User Authentication for Mobile Devices 
Sevasti Karatzouni 
The modern mobile device has become an everyday tool for users and business. 
Technological advancements in the device itself and the networks that connect them 
have enabled a range of services and data access which have introduced a 
subsequent increased security risk. Given the latter, the security requirements need 
to be re-evaluated and authentication is a key countermeasure in this regard. 
However, it has traditionally been poorly served and would benefit from research to 
better understand how authentication can be provided to establish sufficient trust.  
This thesis investigates the security requirements of mobile devices through 
literature as well as acquiring the user’s perspectives. Given the findings it proposes 
biometric authentication as a means to establish a more trustworthy approach to 
user authentication and considers the applicability and topology considerations. 
Given the different risk and requirements, an authentication framework that 
offers transparent and continuous is developed. A thorough end-user evaluation 
of the model demonstrates many positive aspects of transparent 
authentication. The technical evaluation however, does raise a number of 
operational challenges that are difficult to achieve in a practical deployment. 
The research continues to model and simulate the operation of the framework in 
an controlled environment seeking to identify and correlate the key attributes of 
the system. Based upon these results and a number of novel adaptations are 
proposed to overcome the operational challenges and improve upon the impostor 
detection rate. The new approach to the framework simplifies the approach 
significantly and improves upon the security of the system, whilst maintaining an 
acceptable level of usability. 
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Introduction 
 
1 Introduction  
This thesis is concerned with the investigation into flexible and robust authentication 
for mobile devices. The latter aspect has experienced an enormous evolution over 
the past decade not only regarding hardware features but also a significant number 
of applications and services for both the personal and business user – establishing a 
new role in life and business. Whereas the evolution of the hardware has added 
much value for the storage and processing of information, the evolution of mobile 
networking enables this data to be communicated, shared and accessed with almost 
seamless overhead. Given current use of the mobile device and the nature of the 
information stored and accessed it is likely to contain personal and private 
information. As such there is a higher risk with misuse of these devices as potential 
exists for several impact factors to an individual as well as an organisation linked to 
loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability.  
Within this context the security provision on mobile devices needs to address the 
increasing requirements for protection in order to sufficiently safeguard the device 
and ensure that only a legitimate and authorised user has the ability to access their 
data. For this to be addressed there needs to be a robust way to verify the user’s 
identity. Traditionally user authentication on mobile devices has been provided 
through the use of a Personal Identification Number (PIN) and later on with 
passphrases. However it has been established that secret-based knowledge 
techniques have inherent weaknesses as means to verifying someone’s identity as 
they are based on secrets that can be shared, stolen, forgotten or written down. In 
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the contrast authentication approaches like biometrics that are based on unique 
characteristics or behaviour tied to the individual can offer a more confident trust to 
the user as these traits cannot be shared, lost or forgotten and removing the 
inconvenience of all the latter. Biometric authentication has been seen as alternative, 
convenient and trusted means, with devices using techniques like fingerprint and 
face recognition. However the way that even biometric authentication is applied only 
addressed principally one issue and that is the initial verification of the user that 
switches on the phone or unlocks at some point. However after initial verification 
there is no further verification to who is using the device while the use has access to 
any operation on the device. Safeguards like screen locks provide some further 
security support if they have been activated however a lot of users seem not to 
utilise PINs in the first place due to inconvenience.  
To address the aforementioned issues this research has investigated the objectives 
and the currently imposed security requirements for mobile devices and presents a 
means of addressing those in a convenient but also more secure manner for the 
user. It proposes a framework for continuous and transparent authentication and 
evaluates it for its effectiveness and user experience. Through recognising the 
pitfalls of the evaluated framework, the research continues to seek to improve upon 
it, by looking into the use of multi-biometric fusion to provide a more robust 
approach. Furthermore it considers a new approach to the operation of the 
framework and evaluates its improved effectiveness. 
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1.1 Background 
Recent years have experienced a significant transformation of mobile devices from a 
communication device to an everyday personal gadget or business tool. Mobile 
devices have transformed to a necessity of everyday life for the individual and 
businesses offering a range of applications, service and data storage for the user. 
With currently more than 6 billion mobile subscribers in the world these type of 
devices play a significant role in today’s world driving a communications market of 
$398.0 billion in 2012 (MobiThinking, 2012; Sideco, 2012). Given the type of use that 
is enabled through the use of mobile devices it is imperative to consider the security 
of the information stored and accessed through them.  Business and personal 
records, emails, spreadsheets and other documents, electronic wallets are all 
examples of potentially sensitive information that could be stored or access from a 
mobile device. Given the amount of loss and misuse reported today the risk factor 
formed in a mobile environment has grown significantly. 60 % of survey respondents 
said they are using their personal devices to access work email or the company’s 
network making this access the “newest and largest vulnerability in corporate 
America now” (Confidenttechnologies.com, 2011). At the same time cell phone theft 
comprises the 40% of all theft in major American cities and close to 314 phones are 
subject of theft every day only in London (Wirelessindustrynews, 2013). A mobile 
device unlike the traditional desktop is far more prone to misuse due to the lack of 
physical borders and control where default security mechanism that can be used to 
protect assets physically are not applicable in a mobile environment. 
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Traditional safeguards for mobile devices have been PINs and passwords which 
research has shown are poorly used as they are considered inconvenient. 
(Confidenttechnologies, 2011).  Furthermore, the mere use of secret knowledge 
techniques has been suggested as an insufficient means to authenticate, as a secret 
can be easily shared or stolen. As such newer authentication protection mechanisms 
have been subsequently researched with biometrics being one alternative 
authentication technique that has been traditionally seen as a more secure approach 
to user authentication. Unlike a secret, biometrics which are based on the 
physiological or behavioural traits of a person are tied to the individual and can more 
strongly be used in an identity verification process whilst at the same time removing 
the inconvenience of remembering or carrying a secret. In the realisation that 
biometrics can offer a more secure alternative to current authentication schemes the 
market of biometric-based security products and services for mobile phones is 
growing expected to generate over $161 million revenue by 2015 ( Goode 
Intelligence, 2011). Products like Google’s FaceLock and Apple’s Touch ID 
fingerprint sensor show that an investment towards biometrics in mobile devices are 
currently a reality that companies are investing into given the requirements of more 
robust security (Facelock, 2013; Apple, 2013). 
1.2 Aim & Objectives 
The overall aim of this research is to investigate user authentication alternatives for 
mobile devices 1 . This research directly builds upon a previous research study 
1 Although in this report with the term we primarily to mobile phones, any device with 
mobility capabilities such as small laptops and tablets are considered. 
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undertaken that initially proposed a transparent and continuous authentication 
approach (Clarke, 2004). This research starts where the last study ended, through 
developing and building upon the proposed framework. Upon completion of an 
operational prototype, the system was fully evaluated, both technically and by end-
users. Building upon the findings, the research continued to propose a number of 
novel approaches to improve upon operational performance and user convenience. 
The research was partly funded by the EduServ Foundation and a series of white 
papers were published (see Appendix A). 
The specific objectives of this research are: 
• Review the current security provision within mobile devices and better 
understand the risks associated with a mobile environment 
 
• Undertake a requirements analysis on user perspectives and practical 
implementations of a biometric-based authentication mechanism 
 
• Develop an operational prototype of the NICA framework – a proposed user 
authentication system that operates in a transparent and continuous fashion.  
 
• Perform a practical evaluation though the use of the prototype in an end-user 
trial to assess its operation and acquire the user’s perspective and 
acceptance on such an approach 
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• Perform a further investigation using simulation to model the different 
scenarios and parameters of the framework and its performance under those. 
 
• Investigate the use of multi-modal/multi-instance biometric fusion within the 
framework and evaluate whether the operation of the framework improves. 
 
• Propose and evaluate a new approach in the operation of the authentication 
mechanism to incorporate the best operating attributes of the framework and 
the outputs of prior evaluations 
1.3 Thesis Overview 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the current mobile device usage and the security 
issues that surrounds it as well as available safeguards. It looks at user 
authentication and presents an overview of biometric authentication with a particular 
focus upon identifying techniques that are applicable in the concept of transparent 
authentication and offer cost-free deployment in current devices. 
Chapter 3 presents the requirements analysis stage of this research. A focus group 
activity was undertaken to explore user views in current authentication as well to 
assess their receptiveness in the use of biometrics and transparent and continuous 
authentication. This complemented and built upon a prior quantitative survey that 
was undertaken (Clarke & Furnell, 2002) A further analysis has been completed to 
address the risk as currently perceived and handled within the current security 
provision and how to understand how this needs to further addressed given current 
usage. The chapter continues to propose a novel approaches to risk assessment 
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and concludes with an overview of the conceptual architectural issues that would be 
envisaged. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the framework under evaluation – NICA, 
presenting its basic operations and concepts. A short discussion on the developed 
prototype follows and the methodology and evaluation results of a practical user trial. 
The trial involved 27 participants who enrolled and utilised the system both as an 
authorised user and as an impostor given a particular set of tasks while at the end of 
the practical scenario the users filled a questionnaire evaluating their experience. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with presenting the methodology and results of the modelling 
and simulation of the NICA framework. Whilst the model has a number of merits, a 
significant number of operational considerations need to be defined. The chapter 
proceeds to discuss the impact of these upon security and user acceptability. 
Chapter 6 seeks to address the issues highlighted by the user trial and modelling by 
proposing a number of modifications to the framework decision making processes to 
incorporate fusion. An evaluation of these proposals is presented focussing upon its 
effectiveness and the added value it brings.  
Whilst the improvements proposed in Chapter 6 do improve upon the existing 
research, they still present a number of challenges. Chapter 7 seeks to re-design the 
“intelligent” mechanisms that provide transparent and continuous authentication. The 
new seeks to simplify some of the complexities of the original framework.  
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The conclusions are presented in Chapter 8. The chapter begins by presenting the 
achievements of the research and its limitations before finishing with future research 
directions. 
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2 Mobile Devices – Security & Risks 
2.1  Mobile Devices Usage 
The evolution and change on the mobile landscape is close to simulate much of what 
a traditional computer had to offer. By providing functionality that extends beyond 
telephony, the mobile device has evolved from being a cumbersome telephone to 
become a necessity people utilise every day, for a variety of applications. This level 
of functionality can be seen to be significantly expanding, with devices today having 
similar processing and memory capabilities to PCs of a few years ago. Indeed, their 
combination of portability and capability means that handsets such as smartphones 
and PDAs are starting to have an increasingly significant role as mobile computing 
and network access devices. The increase in processing power and storage 
capabilities provides even better options for the advancement of these devices. The 
majority of the mobile devices at present, offer the ability of organizing and 
scheduling work, storing and processing documents, connecting to wireless 
networks, accessing emails, making m-payments,  and a number of other functions 
that the past devices could not support. 
Mobile devices have a huge market penetration over the last few years, experiencing 
a world-wide adoption with currently counting 6.8 billion mobile-cellular subscribers 
worldwide (ITU, 2013). Given their enhanced capabilities for data store, application 
and service use compared to their original and traditional phone and SMS facility, 
mobile devices have taken a significant merit on a market that previously only 
personal desktops were entitled to. A Google study over US, UK, French, Dutch and 
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China markets showed that more consumers now have an internet-enabled device 
than a desktop or laptop computer (Education Stormfront, 2012).   
Further to the functionality of the device itself, the number of services that can be 
accessed through them have evolved too. The major contribution for this evolution of 
mobile handsets was the evolution of mobile networking. The introduction of Third 
Generation (3G) technologies and now moving towards Fourth Generation (4G) has 
provided the underlying mechanism for a wide variety of innovative data orientated 
services. Currently, the 3GPP family of 3G networks with a 3G/3.5G market being 
projected to reach 4.27 billion subscribers by 2017 (PRWeb, 2012). 
Mobile networking began in the early 80’s with the introduction of analogue cellular 
networks and met its first change in the mid 90’s when 2nd generation networks(2G) 
and the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) technology was 
introduced (Vriendt, 2002). GSM phones brought a boost in mobile usage as the 
digital factor was introduced giving the option of data transfer and also cheaper 
communication solutions such as text messaging. With 2G a move towards data-
centric services took place and the need for better throughput brought further 
advancement to the 2G technology, such as General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) 
or 2.5G and Enhanced Data rates for GSM (EDGE) or 2.75G, offering 8-92 Kb/s and 
8-384 Kb/s respectively – almost 3 times the data capacity of GPRS (Mohr & 
Konhauser, 2000; GSMA, 2012a). With the arrival of 3rd generation technologies that 
enabled bandwidth of up to 2Mb/s, with Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System (UTMS), mobile networks improved even more in terms of what they were 
able to offer to mobile subscribers. Now with Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology 
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being used by GSM and CDMA (– another competing for 3G) operators are looking 
for data transfers of 100Mbps and 50Mbps for downlink and uplink respectively 
(GSMA, 2012b).  The 4G/LTE-Advanced technology which has recently been 
standardised by ITU and has theoretical peak data rates in the region of 1 Gigabit/s 
further enabling new features and higher quality services with expectations of 30 
times faster connections than 3G (CellularNews, 2012; Practical Ecommerce, 2010). 
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of technologies while Figure 2.2  illustrates the 
change that these advanced technologies have enabled in each step for the service 
to the user. 
. 
 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of GSM technologies towards 3G/4G (Source: 3GPP,2012) 
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Figure 2.2: The change of services through the evolution of technology. (Adapted from 
QualComm, 2007) 
 
Following an incline in potential on every step of this evolution, a realization of the 
role that mobile handsets have to play in the future can be made. Nowadays, GSM 
and 3GSM accounts for close to 5.37 Billion subscriptions globally (GSAcom, 2012). 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the increase on the adoption of the mobile solution, and its 
leading position in relation to other types, having a significant incline in the last few 
years.   
GSM/GPRS 
Simple 
Communication 
WCDMA/ 
HSDPA  
 
HSUPA 
 
HSPA+ LTE 
 
Downloads Downloads & 
Uploads 
Real-Time 
Communication 
Seamless Fixed- 
Mobile 
Convergence  
 
Improvement of services 
 
12 
 
Mobile Devices – Security & Risks 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Global ICT developments (Source:  ITU World Telecommunication, n.d.)  
 
Modern mobile handsets are not only catching up to the functionality with traditional 
computers but also are taking the lead in adoption in relation to feature devices, with 
people increasingly integrating the mobile environment into their lifestyle (Comscore, 
2012). With smartphones prices dropping significantly over the years the technology 
becomes far more widespread and accessible (Frommer, 2010). Deloitte reports an 
increase in smartphone use in the UK  up to 72% of UK consumers ( aged 16-64) an 
increase of 14% within 10 months) while a basic mobile phone represents only 30% 
of the device ownership (Delloite, 2013). The introduction of smartphones and 
devices such as tablets make mobility of operation appears as the future element of 
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outpacing any adoption of standard computers of the past. Tablets took less than 
two years to reach nearly 40 million in use in the US and outpacing smartphones 
which took 7 years to reach the same (Comscore, 2012). At the same time it is 
estimated that tablets will reach 760 million by 2016 rendering an annual growth of 
46% while by 2015 will reach the 36% of total PC sales (Forrester Research, 2012; 
Computer Industry Almanac Inc, 2012). 
The need for compatibility with desktop applications and the need of working on the 
road and remotely have early on set a requirement of having an ‘always on’ 
computing facility (Lindgren et al, 2002; Mobile Operators Association, 2006). As the 
market indicates the role that mobile devices started and will continue to play in the 
future is getting more and more important and the capitalization on mobile devices 
further to personal use is also occurring in businesses which are incorporating 
mobile networking into their operations in order to improve their agility. Even as early 
as 2006 close to 44% of companies surveyed across different countries, were 
investing in remote working, while already 64% were using PDA’s, 43% Blackberry 
devices and 34% Smartphones for several functions of their business (Ranger, 
2006). Virgin Media Business surveyed 5,000 businesses in 2011, showing that 64% 
of them are equipping employees for mobile working (Newbusiness.co.uk, 2011). By 
2009 in the UK remote workers reached the 3.7 million while the global workforce is 
set to reach 1.3bn in 2015 (CPNI, 2012; Jones, 2013). It is apparent that the 
effectiveness of being able to be updated and respond to business on the go makes 
mobile business application and services a powerful tool and as IDC states it has 
become a top priority for businesses. (Microstrategy, 2012; Onestopclick, 2011). 
 
14 
 
Mobile Devices – Security & Risks 
 
Forrester research in 2010 showed that the 49% of small businesses own 
smartphones (Smallbusinessnewz , 2010). 
 With 3G technology, mobile networking met a proliferate growth on services which 
are becoming the ‘gold’ factor for mobile communications. Combining the increased 
bandwidth of 3G networks and the processing power and storage ability of the 
devices, the services and information are growing in volume and importance. Not 
only are network-based activities that were implemented so far through the Internet 
and web-based applications finding their equivalents in mobile, but also new services 
that correspond to the actual nature of mobility are coming up.  
One such service that has experienced significant demand is the use of the mobile 
device as a method for micro-payment. The nature of these payments is varied and 
has been seen as a significant revenue source whilst offering customer satisfaction 
(KPMG, 2013). Worldwide mobile payment transaction values are going to surpass 
$171.5 billion in 2012 and value to average 42% annual growth between 2011 and 
2016 ( Gartner , 2012). Furthermore services like mobile banking, share trading and 
a range of other sensitive services are going to becoming a common usage scenario 
for the mobile subscriber. According to Juniper Research, the worldwide number of 
users of mobile banking is expected to grow from 590 million users in 2012 to reach 
over a billion users in 2017 (Juniper Research, 2013). A survey by Federal Reserves 
(Fed) reports that consumers are using mobile banking up to 60 times per month 
with a median number of mobile banking transactions of 4-5 times on a typical month 
(Bankfutura, 2012).  
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Table 2.1 that follows provides an indication of services that 3G/4G networking made 
a reality.  
Services Examples of Implementation 
Text/Image Messaging SMS, MMS, Email, Instant messaging, Chat 
Networking 
Internet access Data Synchronization, File transfer, Intranet 
access 
Video services TV streaming, Video-on-Demand, Video conferencing 
Entertainment 
Mobile/Internet Gaming, Gambling, Mobile music, Adult 
entertainment , Social Media 
Infotainment Information/news alerts, Share-trade information 
Location-based services Navigation, location-based information/ commerce 
Financial services Banking, Share-trade, Electronic currency 
Mobile commerce Micro-payments, Ticketing, Advertising 
Business applications 
Supply chain management, Customer relationship 
management, Field-sales management 
 
Table 2.1: Examples of 3G/4G data-centric services  
 
Revenues gained by those kinds of services indicates again that subscribers are 
keen to adopt the possibilities that mobile networking has to offer, and do that 
through the ease and convenience of an item that they already use, their mobile 
phone. From network operators to software companies a large focus and investment 
is taking place to take advantage of the demands and the opportunities that come 
with 3G/4G (Visiongain, 2012), with 4G revenues expected to reach over $100bl by 
2014 as Juniper Research reports(Juniper Research, 2010). As high bandwidth 
networks such as 3G, WiMAX, and LTE are being deployed, they contribute to the 
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growth of mobile data services and revenue as the mobile broadband experience 
comes close to the home broadband experience (Openet Telecom, 2010).  
2.2 Security Issues and Considerations 
The features and capabilities currently enabled through 3G mobile devices link to a 
significant risk in relation to protection of information stored or accessed through 
them. The transition to the mobile environment poses a reconsideration of security 
provision and it is imperative that requirements need to be established for the 
protections of those devices. Given their portability, size and lack of physical barriers 
of protection or even electronic such as firewalls, they can easily become an easy 
target for misuse or attack, especially in business. This places a high security 
concern when these devices are used in the workplace, especially with an estimate 
of 1.3 billion people working on the move by 2015 (IBM, 2012; 
Scientificamerican.com, 2012). As such the protection of these devices is a more 
cumbersome issue for security whilst at the same moment their role in the accessing 
of business and private information is becoming more dominant. According to 
Canalys worldwide mobile security forecast there is an estimated average 
investment growth of 44.2% per year which would translate into a $3 billion market 
by 2015 (Canalys.com, 2011) Given all the updated use and access of a mobile 
device it is apparent that is imperative to protect them and their data access in a 
more efficient way. 
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2.2.1 Security Risk Posed by Mobile Devices 
The nature of 3G services implies the access and transmission of data which may be 
of far sensitive nature than before. For example enabling financial transactions, such 
as in the case of mobile banking, micro-payments or m-ticketing imposes the use of 
personal and financial information. Misuse of such services could be of a great 
financial loss to the owner of the mobile device.  If appropriate security is not 
provided, an impostor could so much use a mobile handset to download or purchase 
items, charging at the same time the subscriber’s account but furthermore 
endangers the subscriber in general as the use of personal information utilised to 
access these services could be used for several malicious purposes. 
An increasing amount of evidence is available to suggest that mobile devices are 
being used to store sensitive information, while at the same time being significantly 
susceptible to compromise. The concern of personal and private information stored 
in mobile devices is not to be overlooked. A Motorola survey reveals that 34% of 
users store sensitive data such as their bank account information or work email 
passwords on their phones, while a quarter of them would prefer to share a 
toothbrush than share their phone (Forbes, 2012). Jupiter networks’ survey reports 
that 76% of global respondents report they use mobile devices to access sensitive 
data, such as online banking or personal medical information whereas 89% use their 
personal device to access critical work information (Jupiter Networks, 2012). 
Furthermore, as the use of mobile devices in business increases so does corporate 
information leakage and financial loss (DarkReading.com, 2012). A Checkpoint 
survey across IT professionals shows that 47% report customer data is stored on 
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mobile devices and with 71% declaring that the introduction of mobile devices has 
increased security incidents (CheckPoint, 2012). Symantec reports that UK 
companies had the greatest increase in the cost of data breach if the incident 
involved a lost or stolen device (Symantec, 2013). Figure 2.4 shows an example of 
the type of information that is stored in mobile devices. Although companies are 
likely to update their policies after a loss of device incident (DarkReading.com, 2012) 
- even with enforcing stronger security policies within business that does not 
necessarily enforces the protection of information when the human factor comes in 
play. 55% of users admit to forwarding work email or documents to their personal 
email accounts on their phone (Forbes, 2012). With up to 80% of corporate IP stored 
in the email archive it can be foreseen that the danger of misuse significantly 
increases compared to access from PC inside a company’s network (Mimecast, 
2012). 
 
Figure 2.4: Corporate Information Stored on Mobile Devices (Adapted from Checkpoint, 2012) 
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At the same time incidents that involve mobile devices and the disclosure of personal 
and corporate information are frequently seen within the news (Clark, 2011; 
Raywood, 2010; BBC, 2009). A McAfee survey of 1,500 respondents across 14 
countries showed that 40% of the organizations say some of their mobile devices 
have been lost or stolen, half of which contained business-critical information 
(DarkReading.com, 2011). Data from Transport of London report that more than 
15000 mobile phones and 528 laptops were hand-it in as lost in 2013 (Worth, 2013). 
The issue of theft has been the driving factor behind the Government setting up a 
National Mobile Phone Crime Unit to specifically target the problem and calling for 
operators to provide more safeguards on the devices (NMPCU, 2012; Cellan-Jones, 
2010). The potential misuse of a device is not necessarily restricted to malicious 
indent but also to human curiosity. A Symantec- sponsored experiment that 
purposely abandoned 50 specially set-up smartphones in different public places 
showed that in 89% of the cases the finders tried to access what appeared to be 
personal data on the devices (Leyden, 2012). 
The concept of Bring your own device (BYOD), poses further risk to business and 
information. Gartner group predicts that by 2017 half of the companies would require 
employees to supply their own device for work purposes (Gartner, 2013). With 
access to corporate information and storage of them on a mobile device that a user 
may carry around all the time and treating them as their personal device rather than 
a business tool (which may have been of more restricted use), the risk significantly 
increases. A survey of 1075 UK employees by TNS Omnibus for Sophos shows that 
30% believe their companies lack appropriate security policies and 50% are 
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concerned that personal information would be at risk in the event of device loss 
(ComputerWeekly.com, 2011). 
Based on the extent of the information and services available on these devices the 
security threats have now growing on mobile platforms making mobile devices a top 
concern. It could be said that given the scale of penetration of mobile devices the 
target of misuse will be shifted to the mobile environment (Juniper Networks, 2013). 
Exploitation of a mobile device can now mean compromise of both business and 
personal data making them an attractive target for crime. Given that mobile platforms 
have not been designed in principle with comprehensive security it further makes it 
an ‘interesting’ target for attackers and malware with mobile exploits having 
significantly increased over the last few years (IBM, 2011). As stated in IBM report 
the most frequently seen mobile device security threats are (IBM, 2011): 
 Loss and theft 
 Malware 
 Spam 
 Phishing 
 Bluetooth and Wi-Fi  
Such evidence collectively demonstrates that devices are now being used to store 
sensitive information, and that large numbers of them are vulnerable to both 
accidental and deliberate threats.  With the ability to access and store a wide variety 
of more sensitive information (such as extensive contact lists, diaries, email, 
corporate information mobile banking and location based services), the need to 
ensure this information is not misused or abused is imperative. Whereas the theft or 
 
21 
 
Mobile Devices – Security & Risks 
 
loss of a device might previously have been the principal risk associated with mobile 
devices, unauthorised access to a device that utilises these information services will 
potentially result in the disclosure of a greater amount of personal information, 
endangering a wider variety of aspects in the user’s life (which could range from 
personal identity theft to serious corporate loss and increasingly liability). With this in 
mind, it is relevant to consider the degree to which related security measures are 
already provided and utilised. 
2.2.2 Security Safeguards on Mobile Devices 
A number of safeguards like encryption can be applied on a mobile device. However 
one of the important requirements in securing devices is sufficiently establishing user 
identity. Since encryption is intertwined with authentication, the mechanism would 
not be sufficient if the identity is not efficiently verified. IBM suggested a framework 
of issues that needs to be addressed regarding the security of a device in a business 
environment. One of the 5 areas is identity and access in which the need strong user 
authentication and possibly the use of two-factor authentication is underlined whilst 
also noting that in critical resources re-authentication may also be required, showing 
that there needs to be also a differentiation between critical and non-critical access 
(IBM, 2012) 
Even with the introduction of encryption such as in Apple iPhone, Fraunhofer 
Institute Secure Information Technology (Fraunhofer SIT) researchers revealed that 
it was a trivial task for an attacker using well-known exploits, scripts, and tools to 
jailbreak and decrypt passwords from the iPhone keychain, including passwords 
used for personal and corporate email, Wi-Fi, and VPN;  even if for devices that were 
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protected by a screen locking mechanisms or was password enabled (Jupiter 
Networks, 2012; Ricker, 2011). 
2.3 User Authentication - Biometrics 
 It is widely recognised that authentication can be achieved by utilising one or more 
of three fundamental approaches: something the user knows (password); something 
the user has (token) and something the user is (biometric) (Nanavati et al., 2002). 
The downside of the first approach has already been highlighted, with the use of 
PINs found to be somewhat lacking in practice. With one of the biggest concerns for 
example on mobile security to be phishing of passwords regardless the strength of 
the password/pincode, the risk still remains high (MobiThinking, n.d.; IBM, 2012). 
Even though PINs are the default mechanism 55% of consumers do not use a PIN to 
lock their phones (Siciliano, 2011). As Microtrend survey reports 61% of respondents 
that use a smartphone device even only for work do not use any password protection 
on their device (Microtrend, 2013) 
Similarly to secret knowledge techniques, token based approaches fundamentally 
rely upon the user to remember something to ensure security, with the token needing 
to be physically present in order to access the device.  However, it is considered that 
this does not lend itself particularly well to the mobile device context either. The most 
likely scenario is that users would simply leave the token within the mobile handset 
for convenience.  Indeed, this is the case with the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) 
in mobile handsets, which already exists as a token and could be physically removed 
from a phone when not in use. Users typically do not do this because it is 
inconvenient, and increases the risk of losing or damaging the SIM card. Nearly 60% 
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of respondents in a survey state that they would wish to have an easier form of 
authentication on their devices while 44% do not use the PIN because they find it too 
cumbersome (Confidenttechnologies, 2011). In contrast to the other methods, the 
third approach to authentication does not rely upon the user to remember anything – 
it just requires them to be themselves. Such techniques are collectively known as 
biometrics, and it is here that the most suitable alternatives for going beyond the PIN 
may be found. 
Biometrics have an advantage over the other two authentication techniques in that 
authentication is based on unique traits of a person and thus closely links the 
authentication credentials to the legitimate user, as these cannot be lost, forgotten or 
shared. As such, in contrast to passwords and tokens, the system does not 
authenticate the possession of specific knowledge or a token but the presence of the 
actual person, as it requires extracting their personal identifiers.   
The market for mobile phone biometric security products and services are seen to 
grow and are estimated to generate over $161 million revenue by 2015. A number of 
mobile devices such as laptops as well as smartphones are equipped with biometric 
solutions looking towards a more robust authentication solution. From traditional use 
of fingerprint sensors to more solutions that follow the current use of the device like 
Apple’s patent of swipe unlock with fingerprint recognition (Swider, 2012). Given that 
fingerprints sensors result in an extra cost on the device, it can be said that there is a 
move towards more cost effective solutions for deployment of biometric approaches. 
Other techniques like face recognition or gait recognition are being deployed looking 
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to utilise either the deployed hardware of the device or the mobile nature of it (Mazo, 
2012; Fraud for Thought, 2013; Mims, 2010). 
A number of biometrics have the potential to be applied in a mobile handset.  Some 
can leverage the hardware available by default, whereas others require more 
specific hardware in order to operate. Regardless of the implementation, many of 
these techniques carry the potential to enhance authentication in a mobile context 
and do so in a transparent fashion. These following sub-sections provide a 
fundamental understanding that under-pin biometric authentication, followed by a 
description of the biometrics that can be applied on a mobile handset.  
2.3.1 Characteristics of a Biometric System 
As defined by the ISO standard ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37, biometrics is the “Automated 
recognition of individuals based on their behavioural and biological characteristics” 
(ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 N 3068). Biometrics can be used in two distinct modes: 
identification to determine identity and verification to verify a claimed identity.  
• Identification: In this mode the biometric system reads a sample from the user 
and tries to find a match by looking at the entire database of registered users. 
A 1:N comparison is performed and thus is often more demanding in terms of 
distinctiveness of the biometric characteristics. Identification is commonly 
used when the goal is to identify criminals, where the subject must be traced 
from the system without necessarily providing an explicit sample (e.g. airport 
surveillance).  
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• Verification: In this mode the system tries to verify a claimed identity. The user 
provides a sample and an identity (e.g. a username). The system retrieves the 
template that it keeps relative to the claimed identity and checks whether the 
newly acquired sample matches that template. This is a 1:1 comparison and 
is in general a much easier procedure to implement as it can be less 
demanding in both processing and distinctiveness of the features (in order to 
achieve satisfactory results). Common applications of verification include 
logical access control. It is this mode of operation this research is primarily 
focused upon. 
2.3.2  A Typical Biometric System 
Regardless of the biometric technique or the comparison mode utilised, the way in 
which the biometric process takes place is identical. A generic example of a 
biometric system is illustrated in Figure 2.5, where the two key functions of the 
biometric authentication process are shown - enrolment and authentication.  
 
Figure 2.5: A Generic Biometric System 
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Enrolment represents the procedure where the user provides the biometric 
information to the system for it to store and generate a reference profile for 
subsequent authentication. The biometric sample is captured by an appropriate 
sensor and the reference template is generated through the extraction of features 
that the system requires to use for authentication (Woodward et al, 2003).  The 
reference template is then stored to the template database for it to be used as 
appropriate.  
Authentication represents the process that takes place when a user requests access 
to the system. At that time, an identification or verification of his identity must take 
place in order to be established as a legitimate user. A new sample is acquired from 
the sensor, which is subsequently compared to the reference template. The result of 
this comparison goes through the authentication policy of the system which 
determines whether the sample and template are matched closely enough to 
recognise the user as legitimate. The result of this comparison is unlikely to be a 
100% match, as it operates as a function of similarity. Due to the sensor and the 
user’s interaction with it, each time a new sample is acquired it is never exactly the 
same with any previous samples. Therefore the system relies upon the degree of 
similarity between two samples. This operational characteristic leads to a number of 
errors that determine the performance of a biometric system. 
2.3.3 Biometric Performance 
Biometrics do not operate like passwords, where the correct input of the secret 
knowledge can assure access to the system with a 100% accuracy. With biometrics 
a legitimate user might provide a sample, but several factors may still cause them to 
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be rejected by the system. These factors might be environmental (e.g. a bad 
acquisition from a fingerprint sensor due to a cut finger; inadequate lighting for face 
recognition; or too much background noise for voice verification) or related to the 
underlying uniqueness of the characteristics involved. This might not only lead to 
rejecting an authorised user but also in accepting an impostor. As the function is 
based upon the similarity of two samples, the techniques that are based on less 
distinctive features exhibit a higher probability of an impostor matching the features 
of a legitimate user and thereby being falsely accepted.  
Two basic error rates are commonly used in biometric authentication as performance 
metrics (Nanavati et al, 2002): 
• False Acceptance Rate (FAR), which represents the probability of an impostor 
getting accepted by the system (sometimes referred to as the Impostor Pass 
Rate);  
 
• False Rejection Rate (FRR), which represents the probability of falsely 
rejecting an authorised user (sometimes referred to as the False Alarm Rate). 
 
A threshold setting is attributed to the system, which defines the level of similarity 
that is acceptable. The threshold value is chosen in order to define what level of FAR 
and FRR are tolerable for the overall system. In general defining this threshold is a 
non-trivial task, as the setting will affect both the security and the usability of the 
system. For example, while a tight setting will result in a lower FAR (and therefore 
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improve security), it will also risk increasing the FRR, thus impeding usability. This 
relationship is illustrated in Figure 2.6.  
 
Convenience  Threshold  Security 
 
Figure 2.6: Biometric Performance Rates 
Ideally these two errors would have a very low value approaching zero at the 
threshold value. However, the two errors share a mutually exclusive relationship and 
as such are rarely both at zero (Cope, 1990). The point at which FAR and FRR 
converge is called the Equal Error Rate (EER), which offers a common reference 
between biometric systems in order to compare them (Ashbourn, 2000). Although 
FAR and FRR provide an idea of the accuracy of the system, when looking into the 
performance of different biometric systems, the EER provides a means of 
comparison as the FAR and FRR are influenced upon different factors that derive 
from setting the security of the system. As such EER is a more representative 
comparison metric for the average performance.  
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In addition, there are other error rates usually utilised within biometric systems for 
evaluation:  
• Failure to enrol rate (FTE), which refers to situation where the sample is not 
able to provide enough information to create a template. That can be due to 
noise from the capture or a lack of features from the user, for example burned 
fingers.  
 
• Failure to acquire rate (FTA), which refers to the situation where the system is 
unable to acquire a sample from the user 
 
Although FAR and FRR are the common error metrics, different vendors, evaluation 
tests and academic research use alternative means to represent performance. For 
example in some cases the two principal rates are referred to under the names of 
Failure Match Rate (FMR) and False Non-Match Rate (FNMR), which represent the 
errors that derive solely by the comparison between the reference template versus 
the newly acquired sample. In such cases, what FAR and FRR represent is a 
combination of the FMR and FNMR and failure to acquire rate (some might include 
the failure to enrol rate in the equation for the FRR rate) - showing the performance 
of the whole system for one attempt, as shown in functions 1 and 2 (Mansfield et al, 
2001; NSTC, 2006). 
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(1)  FAR(τ) = (1- FTA) FMR(τ) 
(2)  FRR(τ) = (1- FTA) FNMR(τ) + FTA 
, where τ is the threshold value 
Given the different interpretations that are possible, attention must be given to 
reported algorithms or vendor claims to ensure the correct comparison between 
performance rates is made.  Although independent parties, such as the International 
Biometrics Group, provide evaluation tests in an independent and standardised 
fashion (enabling the opportunity to directly compare different biometrics under the 
same experimental circumstances), these are not always the figures reported in 
marketing contexts.  It must also be recognised that performance claims are typically 
generated from controlled experiments, within confined environments and restricted 
conditions. Therefore a real-world application is very likely to see a drop in 
performance.  
2.3.4 Biometrics Techniques 
Generically biometrics are categorised in two types: physiological and behavioural 
(Nanavati et al, 2002). Physiological approaches perform authentication based on a 
physical attribute of a person, such as their fingerprint or their face. By contrast, 
behavioural biometrics utilise distinct features in the behaviour of the user to perform 
the relevant classification, such as their voice or their signature.  
Physiological biometrics tend to be more trustworthy approaches, as the physical 
features are likely to stay more constant over time and under different conditions, 
and tend to be more distinct within a large population (Woodward et al, 2003). For 
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this reason physiological approaches are often used in identification-based systems, 
whereas behavioural characteristics (which tend not to have such unique 
characteristics and vary more with time) are therefore mainly used for verification 
purposes.  
An overview of a number of biometric approaches, and an insight into their key 
functionality and features, is provided the in the following sections. 
2.3.4.1 Physiological Biometrics 
2.3.4.1.1 Fingerprints  
This technique bases its operation on the unique ridge configuration appearing on 
the finger, which remains unchangeable throughout the person’s life (unless injury 
occurs). Most of the fingerprint systems available base their operation in identifying 
discontinuities and irregularities - called minutiae - which characterise the ridges and 
valleys existing in fingerprints (Nanavati et al, 2002). Although there are different 
types of minutiae, the most commonly used is the point where the ridges end and 
where bifurcations exist (Nanavati et al, 2002; Yun, 2003). The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) suggests that there cannot be more than 8 common ‘minutiae’ 
between two people (Ruggles, 2002).  
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Figure 2.7: Fingerprint Image & Distinct Features (Yun, 2003) 
 
Further from minutiae, there also other techniques that have been adapted to match 
fingerprint samples. Maltoni et al (2003) classify the different techniques as follows:  
1. Correlation-based, where two digital fingerprint image samples are compared 
pixel to pixel given different alignments (i.e. rotation) in order to conclude to a 
result.    
2. Minutiae-based, which compares the common minutiae points between the 
two fingerprint samples 
3. Ridge feature-based, where features in the ridge pattern other than minutiae 
are utilised such as ridge shape, orientation and frequency etc. This technique 
is particularly useful in low-quality samples where the minutiae extraction is 
not sufficient.  
Fingerprint images can be categorised as offline and live-scan depending on the way 
that the sample is acquired. Offline scan is the technique usually performed in 
forensic applications, where the fingerprint must be collected from a foreign surface. 
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Live-scan is what is commonly used in automated systems today to perform 
verification or identification of a person, where the subject must present their 
fingerprint to a sensor and a live sample is collected. To perform live-scan a number 
of sensor technologies are utilised (optical, solid-state, ultrasound etc.), each of 
which varies in quality of acquisition as well as in cost. 
There are two ways for a person to present the fingerprint to the sensor. The 
commonly used approach is to simply apply the fingerprint on the sensing area. 
Nevertheless this not only creates dirt on the sensor (which gradually leads to badly 
acquired images), but also requires an extended sensing area to cover the whole 
fingerprint. As such another technique is for the user to swipe the finger on a smaller 
area and the image is subsequently recreated from the sliced instances of the 
fingerprint. This approach requires a far smaller sensor (thus reducing cost) and also 
keeps the sensor cleaner and raises the performance requirements. On the one 
hand the system must have had enough throughput in order to be able to capture 
subsequent images from the sensor, as the reconstruction of the image can be time 
and computationally demanding (Maltoni et al., 2003).  
Generally, the main problem with fingerprint systems is the acquisition of appropriate 
images to create templates. There a number of factors that play a role in acquiring a 
good clear sample, such as environmental conditions that might affect the surface of 
the fingertip (making the image of the fingerprint appearing to fade out). The 
positioning on the sensor and the finger, and the pressure applied might lead to a 
poor representation of the distinctive characteristics (Nanavati et al, 2003). To 
counteract this problem raw images are stored as templates (Maltoni et al, 2003).  
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 2.3.4.1.2 Facial Recognition 
The facial structure of a person provides enough information to recognise one 
individual from another. The most common approach captures the face and extracts 
its geometry, looking specifically for the distance between key features such as the 
points of the eyes, of the side of mouth and the nose (Ashbourne, 2002; Yun, 2003). 
This is one of the main face recognition techniques – called feature-based, which 
can be very tolerant in positioning variations. However the automatic tracking of the 
distinct points is not efficient enough to offer results of high accuracy (Yun, 2003). 
More recent techniques seek to analyse the face as a whole (Chellappa et al, 1994). 
Typical approaches of this are Eigenface images and elastic matching, examples of 
which are illustrated in Figure 2.8 (a) and (b) respectively.  Holistic approaches like 
these can offer higher performance, as they consider all available information rather 
than simply the distinct points (Yun, 2003). However, these techniques have poor 
tolerance to posing variations and require a more extensive amount of training data 
(Chepalla et al, 1994). 
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(a) Eigenface 
 
(b) Elastic Matching 
Figure 2.8: Face Recognition Techniques (Yun, 2003) 
Although face recognition has a good level of accuracy, each approach varies in 
performance relative to the others depending upon a range of factors such as 
lighting conditions or the angle of capture (Ashbourne, 2002; Zhang et al., 1997). 
This complicates its application in a mobile environment where varying conditions 
are likely to occur (e.g. the level of illumination is likely to change considerably 
throughout the day). Furthermore the potential of applying this technique in a 
transparent fashion introduces further complications, as it would be necessary to 
capture images of the user without them having explicit knowledge. That would result 
in images being captured in uncontrolled positions, with the user potentially looking 
in many different directions.  Research with promising results in the application of the 
fashion has been done by utilising different orientation samples to create the 
biometric profile so that better tolerance can be achieved (Clarke et al, 2008). With 
the current application of facial recognition for security purposes as e.g. in airports it 
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is envisaged that more noise tolerant algorithms would be developed that would in 
the future better support its deployment in other areas such as the proposed one. 
2.3.4.1.3 Iris Scanning 
The iris of each individual records a complex pattern in the coloured area of the lens 
which is unique and also remains stable throughout the life of the person (Daugman, 
2004). It has been identified that this pattern not only varies between two persons 
but is distinct for the left and right eye of the same individual, making the technique 
distinctive and highly reliable. As such it has been used for a number of applications, 
such as airport security, border control and hospital access. 
 
  (a) Iris Area                           (b) Iris pattern 
Figure 2.9: Example of an Iris (Yun, 2003) 
 
Despite the uniqueness of the features and the high tolerance, the accuracy of the 
technique relies on the ability to capture those features (Ashbourne, 2002). For that 
reason, technology plays an important role and specialised capturing sensors are 
required to capture the iris image. Due to sensitivities in the camera, stillness of the 
iris and distance from the capturing device are important factors to consider in the 
design of a system. For example, often a person must stand at least 10-12 inches 
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from the sensor in order to acquire a good sample, which makes the technique quite 
intrusive to the user (Ruggles, 2002). Within a mobile context, these requirements 
would make transparency difficult to achieve.  
2.3.4.1.4 Ear Geometry 
The human ear has been recently proposed as a basis for a biometric, with a 
number of research studies suggesting it has adequate distinctive characteristics in 
order to differentiate between people (Victor et al., 2002; Burge & Burger. 1998). 
However, the level of distinctiveness that the ear exhibits has yet to be fully 
established. The application of ear geometry to date has not yet been 
commercialised, but the distinctiveness of the ear has been utilised in a number of 
criminal cases (with earmarks are being used as evidence), suggesting the approach 
has promise (Lammi, 2004). 
 
There are three techniques used for ear identification: photo comparison of the ear, 
earmarks and thermograph photos.  Of these, earmarks are a technique used for 
crime investigations rather than for general biometric verification. Examples of the 
other two techniques are illustrated in Figure 2.10. Although the whole ear structure 
and shape is utilised, as it carries a range of complicated structure features, a 
special interest is focused on the outer ear and lobe. 
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(a) Ear features and distances utilised in photo 
comparison analysis 
(b) Thermograph photo  utilising 
colour and textures to identify 
distinct parts of the ear 
Figure 2.10: Examples of Ear Geometry Techniques (Lammi, 2004) 
 
Ear recognition is often compared to face recognition, as they both constitute 
appearance-based biometrics. As such some techniques used in face recognition 
such as Eigenfaces have been also utilised in ear recognition for image analysis. 
Even though face recognition is a well-established biometric there has been cases 
where ear recognition has matched its performance, under identical conditions and 
variations in lighting, posing, etc. (Chang et al, 2003). 
Ear recognition could be a future solution for application in a mobile device in a 
similar fashion to face recognition. Nevertheless, the application of the technique in a 
transparent fashion could be problematic as it requires the ability to acquire 
adequate full images of the ear (which would not be possible from the natural 
position when the handset is in use). 
2.3.4.1.5 Gait Recognition   
Gait recognition is a relatively new method for biometric authentication; looking to 
identify a person by the way they walk. Even though its biometric application is 
relatively new, the distinctive nature of a person’s gait has been proposed back in 
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the mid-1960s by psychologists (Murray, 1967). Its application is mainly based on 
analysing video sequences to identify distinct movements of the person’s main body 
parts (i.e. feet, hands, and angles between the body parts). Based on its operation it 
has a major advantage of being able to perform identification from a distance. 
However, in order to be utilised in a mobile handset as a standalone method the 
device would require a number of additional sensors, such as accelerometers. This 
kind of application has already taken place using a sensor device attached in a 
mobile phone which can identify walking characteristics to enable identity verification 
(Young, 2005). 
2.3.4.2 Behavioural Biometrics 
Behavioural biometrics have traditionally been less popular than their physiological 
counterparts as they have suffered from lower performance rates. This has started to 
change, and techniques such as voice verification are becoming increasingly popular 
to be used in commercial solutions making it also highly popular in consumer 
satisfaction (King, 2013). Given the underlying characteristics tend to change more 
frequently, careful consideration needs to be given to their design and 
implementation so that there is provision for profile template and retraining. 
2.3.4.2.1 Keystroke Analysis 
This technique discriminates between users based on their typing characteristics. In 
recognising users based on typing, two of the characteristics that have demonstrated 
to provide the most discriminative information are (Furnel et al, 2008): 
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• inter-key latency, which is the interval between two successive keystrokes (at 
press or at release), and  
• hold-time, which is the interval between the pressing and release of a single 
key  
 
Figure 2.11: Keystroke Analysis Characteristics 
Other characteristics have also been investigated, but have not proved to present 
significantly more discriminative information for the additional complexity they add to 
the system. To date, research has demonstrated a successful performance of the 
technique when applied to regular keyboards. The approach itself can be applied in 
two modes: static (text-dependent) or dynamic (text-independent). In the static 
approach, a user is verified against a known text string, allowing a profile to be built 
for the specific key presses (e.g. combining keystroke analysis with the input of 
usernames and passwords).  By contrast, the dynamic approach permits a user to 
enter “free-text” and therefore requires a more general profile of keystroke activity. 
The resulting characteristics are therefore likely to be more variable than their static 
counterparts. 
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In general, the technique does not share the distinctiveness of other approaches, 
resulting in higher error rates. Nevertheless, the fact that it can be applied in 
conjunction with normal user activity means that the dynamic mode could be a useful 
basis for transparent authentication. However, research to date has not reached the 
performance results of the static application of the technique (Leggett et al., 1991; 
Napier et al., 1995).  Nonetheless, studies conducted have concluded with promising 
results for the application of the technique in a mobile context (Clarke & Furnell, 
2006; Karatzouni & Clarke, 2007). 
2.3.4.2.2 Voice Verification  
This method tries to identify a person from the way they talk. It was one of the early 
biometric applications commercially available and in general is considered a good 
potential for many telephony based systems (Ashbourn, 2002). Voice scanning looks 
to extract discriminative information by examining the dynamics of an individual’s 
speech.  The technique does not rely only on the sound of a word or phrase that 
someone could closely replicate, but it takes under consideration the overall 
dynamics, which cannot be rendered by mimicking the voice of the legitimate user. 
There are three ways that voice verification can be performed: 
• Text–dependent : The user must repeat a specific pass-phrase.  
• Text–prompt : The user is given a new challenge phrase each time to repeat. 
• Text–independent : The user can be authenticated regardless of what they 
are saying. 
The first two approaches have been extensively researched and also applied in real 
world applications as a means of verification. Static verification techniques are much 
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easier to perform, as the distinct dynamics of the voice can be recorded during 
enrolment and the repeated pass-phrase is identical each time to the original 
enrolment. A text-independent approach would have to operate in a dynamic 
manner, to identify the voice characteristics without a static reference. This is a 
complicated task as it is difficult to identify the common discriminative features 
between two samples and puts a significant burden on both the feature extraction 
and classification algorithms. Although efforts have taken place towards this 
direction, the technique has still not yielded satisfactory results and lacks any 
commercial exploitation. 
A further downside of this approach is that the quality of sound required for the 
samples will be unlikely to have the same quality as the reference template which 
was acquired in a controlled environment (Nanavati et al., 2002). The noise that 
might be captured during the authentication process can significantly affect 
performance. Especially for remote applications where the voice signal might differ 
significantly due to outside noise. The application on a mobile environment would be 
even more problematic, where the practical conditions of use could impose much 
more interference. Nevertheless, voice verification is considered to be an approach 
that would be desirable for mobile devices. Moreover the evolution of the technique 
to operate in a text-independent fashion would enable transparent authentication 
(e.g. in telephony contexts). 
2.3.4.2.3 Signature Recognition 
Signature recognition in its non-automated form has been used for thousands of 
years as people have been signing their name in order to attach their identity to an 
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object or an action. The method tries to differentiate between users by examining the 
way in which they sign. The biometric can be realised in a static mode (by comparing 
the final appearance of the sample against the template), or in a dynamic manner 
(where the overall dynamics of the user’s handwriting, such as pressure, speed, 
direction and the number of strokes are analysed rather than just the final result) 
(Ashbourn, 2002; Gupta & McCabe, 1997). The latter approach provides a far 
stronger and more robust approach, as impostors cannot simply replicate a signature 
but must replicate the action of making it. As such, most current systems utilise the 
dynamic implementation of the technique.  
2.3.4.2.4 Service Utilization  
Service utilization has been a more recent suggestion as a biometric, looking to 
identify patterns of usage based on specific interactions with applications or services 
(Furnell et al., 2001). An example of such an approach in a PC environment would 
be the monitoring of the usage of applications with metrics such as frequency and 
duration of access. Unfortunately this would involve a large volume of data to 
process and classify, with the variance also quite high. Nevertheless, prior research 
has demonstrated sufficient discriminative information to utilise the technique to 
monitor interactions (Moreau and Vandewalle, 1997). Similar applications have also 
been used in domains such as fraud detection (Rawlings, 1997).  
2.3.5 Comparison of Biometrics 
It is often difficult to directly compare different biometric approaches.  However, as 
previously indicated, the EER is often used as a primary indicator. On this basis, 
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Table 2-1 illustrates the performance of the different approaches based on results 
from numerous research studies and independent sources.  
Biometric Approach Equal Error Rate (%) 
Facial Recognition  2.5, 7 (Mansfield et al, 2001) 
Voice Verification 3.5 (Mansfield et al, 2001) 
Fingerprint Recognition 4.5, 6, 9 (Mansfield et al, 2001) 
Signature Verification 1.19 (Mohankrishnan, 1999), 2.84 (Yeung et al, 2004) 
Iris Recognition  0.2 , 3.2 (IBG, 2005) 
Keystroke Analysis 1.3 (Obaidat & Sadoun, 1997), 8 (Clarke & Furnell, 2006), 12.2 (Karatzouni & Clarke, 2007)  
 
Table 2-1: Performance of Various Biometrics 
Apart from the accuracy or performance of a biometric there are other things to 
consider when deploying a biometric system.  For example, factors such as cost and 
user friendliness could impose major limitations on the system. The International 
Biometrics Group (IBG) has identified four factors to consider when choosing a 
biometric system: Intrusiveness, Distinctiveness, Cost and Effort (IBG, 2006). The 
evaluation of those factors in relation to the biometric approaches is illustrated in the 
Zephyr Analysis graph by IBG, as seen in Figure 2.12. 
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Figure 2.12: Zephyr Analysis of Biometrics 
 
• Intrusiveness refers to the involvement of the user in the authentication 
procedure, in terms of when and in what way they are required to authenticate 
themselves. For example, a biometric system that requires from the user to 
interrupt his activity, or demands the authentication procedure to be done 
under specific conditions, has a high level of intrusiveness. 
 
• Distinctiveness of a biometric is the ability of the technique to successfully 
discriminate between different users, which is in turn related to the 
uniqueness of the features that each biometric utilises.  
 
• Cost is the financial implications that the deployment of a biometric will incur.  
 
• Effort refers to the ease that the use of the biometric, including both the 
procedures of enrolment and verification. 
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2.3.6  Identifying Appropriate Biometrics 
As the prior discussion has identified, various biometric techniques could 
theoretically be applied to mobile handsets. However, from a practical perspective 
there are a number of issues to consider. As previously discussed there are issues 
of usability and cost associated with the selection of a biometric technique. For 
example, the application of iris scanning in a mobile environment is certainly more 
problematic if someone considers the sensitivity of the technique and the positional 
requirements that it imposes, rather than (for example) applying facial recognition as 
the detail required is far less extensive than the former. Furthermore iris imposes 
more extensive hardware requirements, as a far more sensitive camera sensor 
would be required.  Even though any biometric will be affected by the 
environmental/external conditions caused by the use of a mobile, certain techniques 
can be considered to be more tolerant.  
Table 2-2 illustrates a number of biometrics that have the potential to be utilised in a 
handset, as well as a number of parameters that are considered important for their 
application. The first factor is the hardware requirements and the potential cost 
implication of the technique. The additional integration of specialised biometric 
hardware would aggravate the already high cost of the mobile handset (e.g. 
AuthenTec a company that develops fingerprint sensors, needed to reduce prices 
from $3 to $1 to facilitate large-scale deployment (Blau, 2007)). The second factor - 
accuracy, representing the performance of each technique - has been attributed 
based on results announced by the International Biometric Group (IBG, 2005) and 
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National Physical Laboratory (Mansfield et al., 2001). The non-intrusiveness factor 
refers to the ability of a technique to acquire the necessary samples without requiring 
any explicit interaction from the user. This provides the capability of authenticating 
the user at various times, without adding inconvenience to their regular use of the 
device.  
Biometric 
technique 
Sample acquisition 
capability as standard? 
Accuracy Non-intrusive? 
Ear shape 
recognition  High  
Facial recognition  High  
Fingerprint 
recognition  Very high  
Handwriting 
recognition  Medium  
Iris scanning  Very high  
Keystroke 
analysis  Medium  
Service utilization  Low  
Voice verification  High  
Gait verification  Unknown  
 
Table 2-2: Potential biometric techniques for mobile devices 
From the table it can be seen that the techniques that share the highest accuracy are 
at the same time more intrusive to the user. As such there will always be a trade-off 
and a balance to be sought towards satisfying both sides. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of techniques that can operate transparently without further hardware 
requirements by utilising the standard built-in hardware and use the users’ normal 
activity. These are:    
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• Voice Verification: Capture voice samples during a voice call. 
• Face Recognition: Utilise the front camera of the handset during a video 
conference call or capture snapshots during other interactions when the user 
will be expected to be looking at the screen. 
• Signature (handwriting) Recognition: Capture samples while a user utilises an 
editor in order for example to keep notes. 
• Keystroke analysis: Capture samples while a user is typing text messages or 
writing a document.  
• Service Utilization: Monitor the interaction of the user with the device based 
on application use, frequency and timing of use, etc.  
Each of these techniques could be potentially used to acquire the authentication 
samples necessary, without disturbing the user and constitute a monitoring 
mechanism that can maintain trust in the user’s identity continuously throughout the 
usage of the device. 
2.3.6.1 Biometric Fusion 
Plenty of research to date has looked in the use of multiple biometric inputs in order 
to strengthen the decision making process. This approach is generally referred to as 
biometric fusion and it is believed to offer an improved performance in a biometric 
system that has the ability to incorporate a number of inputs (Ben-Yacoub et al, 
1999; Brunelli & Falavigna, 1995; Bigun et al, 1997; Hong & Jain, A.K; Jain et al, 
1999).  
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The concept of fusion techniques is the use of more than one input and the 
combination of those to create an output. The inputs could be representing the use 
of more than one sample from the same biometric – multi-instance/multi-sample 
fusion or the use of samples from different techniques – multi-modal fusion. Other 
approaches like multi-sensor- the use of different acquisition sensors, multi-algorithm 
– the use of different algorithms for feature extraction and/or matching, are also 
options (Ross, 2007).  Depending on the application and resources available, the 
use of fusion in an authentication system could provide a more informed decision 
related to user’s identity as it may utilise multiple samples of the same feature or 
utilise a combination of biometric traits for the system to reach its conclusion. By 
using multiple traits several challenges are addressed such as spoofing attempts are 
minimised since it would require the simultaneous forgery of more than one 
biometric, non-universality is addressed by covering a broader spectrum, noisy data 
that may characterise specific acquired samples and generally offers a more tolerant 
error approach (Ross, 2007).   
It can be foreseen that the performance of the system regarding both security and 
usability would so much depend upon the quality of the samples as well as the 
algorithm used in each biometric, but furthermore to the actual fusion decision 
algorithm to enable a balance between security and usability. When for example 
utilising fusion of different biometric techniques that ones have higher performance 
than others and giving to that techniques a considerable higher weight to the 
decision it may almost diminish any fusion in essence whilst overlooking the rest of 
the characteristics. If on the other hand the same weighting is applied across all 
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inputs that may be on the loss of either security or usability as it would not be taking 
into account the high FAR that may occur in one case or the good performance if 
there was more reliance on the better techniques on the other. Similarly when 
utilising samples of the same technique a similar consideration may exist relevant to 
using different algorithms of the same technique with different robustness or for 
example have a reliance on the quality of a sample so less quality samples do not 
get the same contribution to the decision.  
Further to its algorithmic consideration, biometric fusion also poses the consideration 
for technical compatibility. Its application in a deployable system presupposes the 
need for a common interface for the use and integration of different techniques. This 
issue is resolved by standardisation of biometric products and algorithms with 
standards like BioAPI being more widely used.  
Biometric fusion can be applied on several levels of the biometric process: at feature 
level, at matching level or at decision level (Ross, 2001). Figure 2.13 illustrates the 
operation of fusion depicting all 3 stages that it can occur. 
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Figure 2.13: Stages for biometric fusion (Adapted from Ross et al (2001) 
 
2.4 Summary  
Mobile devices have been identified as a significant risk given the current use and 
capabilities. Current security provision seems to lack the appropriate robustness to 
correspond to the respective security requirements. Biometrics have been suggested 
to be a more secure approach to authentication. In the context of this research 
seeking to enhance security in a continuous mode, biometric techniques could be 
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utilised as there are a number of them that lend themselves very well to this concept. 
The utilisation of these techniques requires a number of considerations in regards to 
user acceptance, storage of biometric information as well as issues of performance 
in their operation in a mobile device. The following chapter explores the various 
issues that derive in the application of such approach including presenting the user’s 
perspectives as well as discussing issues that play a significant role towards an 
authentication topology of such mechanism.   
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3 User Authentication on Mobile Devices– Requirements Analysis 
This chapter provides an overview of the different requirements that an 
authentication framework would need to address. Having identified the initial 
requirement of enhanced authentication and with the focus of this research upon 
evaluating the effectiveness of biometrics in order to apply transparent and 
continuous authentication, it was imperative to look at the elements and issues that 
this approach may introduce or need to be considered. This includes the user’s 
perspective as well as the technical issues that surround the realisation of a 
biometric based authentication mechanism. 
3.1 Establishing the Users’ Perspective 
In order to establish this research it was imperative to acquire the user’s perspective 
on the security requirements that they have for their mobile devices. That was done 
though a focus group and the following section presents the basic methodology 
followed as well as the key results. A detailed description and discussion for this part 
of this research was published in Karatzouni et al. (2007) (See Appendix B). 
Pertinent views of the focus group are also presented in Section 3.3 as appropriate 
in order to provide the views of the users in a discussion on authentication 
framework topologies.  
3.1.1 Focus Group Methodology 
To assess views and attitudes regarding the authentication requirements on mobile 
devices a focus group was conducted, in order to provide a forum for users to 
express and exchange their perspectives. Whilst an early survey by the research 
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group had undertaken a quantitative-based study to explore user perceptions (Clarke 
& Furnell, 2002), it was felt a follow up qualitative study was required to better 
understand the reasons behind some of the key results. 
The focus group aimed to include a mixture of end-users, representatives from the 
mobile industry, researchers in the area, and representatives from educational 
technology and university perspectives. It was important to have a multifaceted view 
on the subject and cover the perspectives of users that were likely to make different 
use of their device and as such they would have different requirements. Also 
important was to get the views from the providers’ perspective to establish whether 
they identify an issue on current authentication and how alternative solutions are 
perceived. A detailed listing of the participants’ composition can be found in Table 
3-1. 
Participant Background / Basis for inclusion 
1 Representative from a UK mobile network operator. 
2 Creator of a web resource that tracks mobile technologies and trends 
3 Project student, addressing public understanding of biometrics 
4 Project student, conducting user trials and evaluation of biometrics 
5 Academic, active in the mobile security domain 
6 Learning technologist, commencing research into educational uses of mobile 
devices 
7 Psychologist, with research interests in use of mobile technologies 
8 Representative from university ICT department, responsible for campus 
deployment of mobile devices. 
9 Academic with interest in human factors of technology. 
10 Male mobile phone user 
11 Female mobile phone user 
12 Female mobile phone user 
Table 3-1: Summary of focus group participants 
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All of the participants were regular end-users of mobile devices, and in many cases 
conversant with the features and facilities of smartphone devices.  As such, they 
were able to offer perspectives with first-hand knowledge of the more advanced 
features and facilities that are likely to become the baseline standard in a few years. 
It is understandable that the time at which the research took place (2007), people 
were not yet of full adoption of smartphones and their capabilities, at least to the 
extent that would be expected to be today given penetration of the mobile device.  
A number of research questions were created to form the framework of the 
discussion, addressing the main areas of interest around the objectives of this 
research on user authentication. A list of the question as well as a brief justification 
behind them follows. 
1. Do participants recognise a need for security on their current devices? 
This question aimed to investigate whether users consider their current usage of 
mobile devices to merit protection, with particular emphasis being given to 
whether or not user authentication is an important requirement.   
2. How do participants perceive the current authentication facilities, and do they use 
them? 
The intention here is to focus participants’ attention specifically towards the PIN-
based techniques that are dominant upon current devices, exploring opinions 
about the general nature of the method the extent to which they are used in 
practice.   
 
56 
 
User Authentication on Mobile Devices– Requirements Analysis 
 
3. Do participants envisage a need for greater security provision in the future? 
Anticipating that some participants would be unlikely to prioritise a need for 
authentication based upon their current usage of the device, this question aimed 
to make them consider the range of emerging and future applications of mobile 
devices that may involve far more sensitive data. Then they were asked to 
reassess their views on the requirement for authentication, based on this future 
scenario. 
4. How do participants perceive the potential alternative methods of authentication 
and the ways in which they could operate? 
Assuming that the preceding question would highlight a requirement for further 
protection, this question aims to elicit opinions about alternative mechanisms 
(such as token and biometric approaches), and methods of applying them. 
 
The participants were not led towards any particular viewpoints during the discussion 
of each question.  However a discussion guide was formed and followed during the 
session that would provide the background and the context for the research 
questions to be answered. The session lasted 100 minutes and was video recorded 
in order to capture any non-verbal information that could provide further input (i.e. 
reactions to a certain view) or help to quantitative appraisal of answers (i.e. show of 
hands as an answer).  Transcription of the recorded session followed and analysis of 
the derived document provided a series of results. Some key results were: 
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Current Usage & Authentication 
• The current usage of their mobile device for the majority of the users was 
restricted to basic telephony and text messaging although some of them 
suggested that this is likely to change in the future 
 
• Based on the above point most of the users felt not being at risk as their 
usage was still limited, and did not involve accessing sensitive information 
 
• Regarding current authentication achieved by the PIN, only 1/3 of them use it 
at switch on and only one participant used the PIN on standby mode. The 
rest of the group considered that their use of the phone did not require any 
protection based on their current usage. However the majority stated 
concerns for the actual effectiveness and usability of current authentication, 
noting traditional drawbacks of knowledge-based authentication.  
Future Usage & Protection 
• Most of the participants agreed that future applications and potential usage of 
their device would involve access of highly sensitive information and 
therefore they would see their security requirements altering to correspond to 
that change and look for enhanced security.  
 
• Another significant point identified by participants as part of this enhanced 
security is the fact that not all services carry the same risks - something that 
this report will address later in this chapter. So they would expect to have the 
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security applied respectively to the risk associated with a specific service or 
application. 
Alternative Authentication 
• Looking at the alternatives to knowledge-based authentication – tokens and 
biometrics, participants were not receptive to the former but highly positive to 
the adoption of the latter. As previous research had also in the past shown, 
users are starting to be more open to biometric techniques and consider their 
use in order to enhance security (Clarke et al. 2002). 
 
• In regards to specific biometric techniques, fingerprint was the most popular 
amongst all, however as one of the participants commented this preference is 
more likely to derive out of the fact that fingerprint is the most well-known one 
and therefore users are more familiar with the approach. Interestingly, some 
suggested the use of biometrics that can be applied based on the use of the 
device - something that can therefore mitigate any reliance on extra hardware 
and therefore extra cost of the device as well as extra interaction. 
 
• Another significant outcome based also on the above was also that no single 
technique can fit the needs of all users and therefore a more flexible approach 
would be more appropriate. 
 
• Although the matter of privacy of biometrics was commented upon, there was 
no real concern from the users’ perspective in regards to this matter, which 
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indicates the change in culture towards biometrics as people have been 
traditionally cautious relatively to this issue. Rather than privacy concern was 
raised towards the actual usability of the techniques and how well it would 
work in a mobile context and therefore where it will become a not easy to use 
security feature. 
Going beyond point-of-entry 
• The users were asked to provide their views on the application of continuous 
authentication during the use of the device if this was to be applied in a 
transparent fashion, in order to provide security at all times and mitigating the 
users’ interaction in comparison to explicit authentication. The views on the 
matter were mixed. However participants did not appear to be reluctant to the 
use of such approach, with the only concern focusing again on the usability of 
the approach.  
 
• A secondary issue was again the issue of privacy but mainly when the 
participants were asked to comment upon storage of biometric data and who 
they would perceive to be more appropriate to safeguard that data. Again 
views were mixed however the majority raised significant concern in regards 
to the issue of trust to others than themselves. A more detailed discussion 
specifically on this is provided in Section 3.3. 
As this focus group indicated future mobile usage will bring in the foreground the 
need for more enhanced and flexible authentication. Furthermore even though 
current usage does not command the need for extra security, current authentication 
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is perceived to hardly provide any protection in the first place. This focus group 
provided a significant part of the requirement analysis of this research as the user’s 
perspective is always an important factor when designing security mechanisms.  
3.2 Looking at Service Security Requirements 
Further from the level of security that can be provided by current authentication, the 
nature of its implementation also has the disadvantage of only providing 
authentication at point of entry. Although this could be effective in ensuring initial 
access to the device, it assumes that all services, applications and information 
accessible on the device are of equal value, and do not require any further access 
control restrictions. This was a concern that was also identified during the focus 
group by the participants. The analysis on the latter issue as well as an example on 
how security requirements could be attributed on different services is presented in 
the following sections. 
3.2.1 Service Usage & Security Provision 
With the increasing functionality of mobile devices the number of services, 
applications and information accessible to the user is significantly expanding. Basing 
authentication on point of entry without further control of legitimate access, and 
without any kind of sensitivity classification for services or data, could create a lack 
of appropriate protection for access to individual applications and services. For 
example, arguably the protection required to prevent access to a text message is 
substantially different to that required to prevent access to a bank account. Figure 
3.1 shows a representation of how current authentication schemes deal with 
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security, keeping a single level of security for all services. Figure 3.2 shows how the 
threat that derives from each service could add another dimension to the way that 
the security level is defined. Each service carries a certain risk of misuse and it is 
believed that this ought to be a factor in deciding the appropriate level of security.   
 
Figure 3.1: Current Security Assessment 
 
Figure 3.2: Proposed Security Assessment 
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As such the level of security could be more appropriately assigned to each individual 
service, so that each service or function can independently require a certain level of 
authentication and subsequently trust in the user in order for them to get access to 
the specific service.  In this way, more critical operations can be assigned a greater 
level of security and therefore greater protection, leaving potentially less risky 
operations to a lower level of trust. It is envisaged that this could provide a balance 
between the security of highly risk services and usability of less risky ones, without 
any of the two suffering due to a single security level or mechanism.   
Another issue to consider is that the level of security required within an individual 
service or application is likely to change during the process, as key stages may have 
a greater risk associated to them than others.  In order to carry out a specific task a 
number of discrete steps are involved, each of which may not carry the same level of 
sensitivity. Some processes are more critical where others are simply operational 
steps that assist in the completion of the desired task.  A simple example that 
illustrates this notion is the procedure of accessing what could be an email or an 
SMS inbox. The user access the inbox and at that instance there is not a real threat 
involved as the operation cannot lead to any misuse on its own (see Figure 3.3 (a)). 
Even if the next step is to create a new message and start typing the content, no 
additional risk exists. The security implications actually start when the user is 
pressing ‘Send’ as it is at that point that the misuse can occur if the user is not the 
legitimate one. All the previous steps do not involve any kind of threat as no negative 
effect has taken place in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability or even 
financial cost of the data. By contrast, in Figure 3.3 (b), the user again accesses the 
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inbox, but tries to access the saved messages instead. This time the requirement for 
greater protection occurs earlier in the process as accessing the saved messages 
could affect confidentiality by having an impostor reading them. Moreover, if the 
impostor was subsequently to delete them, the threat level and thus the required 
security would be even higher, as more factors become engaged, expanding to 
issues such as integrity and availability. A more complicated example of the above 
could be seen in mobile banking. Looking at the several steps that need to be taken 
in order for the service to be completed involves a range of different risks. For 
instance accessing the service provider in order to make a money transfer, 
intermediate situations during the process might involve navigating to specific bank 
pages or other recourses throughout providing personal information until reaching 
the final transfer.  
 
Figure 3.3: Variation of the Security Requirements during Utilisation of a Service 
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It can be foreseen that each operation has different sensitivities and as such each 
step of the process changes the threat and therefore the risk level. However, within 
the context of this thesis only the issue of inter-process security is addressed , 
looking to demonstrate the need for establishing appropriate levels of security for 
each service and application rather than the device as a whole.  Intra-process 
security and therefore establishing security though the duration of a specific service 
is also another issue to be considered but is not addressed in the context of this 
research . 
3.2.2 Identifying Usage Scenarios 
In order to apply individual security levels to applications and services there is a 
need for threat assessment to classify the security risks associated with them, from 
both organisational and individual perspectives. From such classification, a security 
level could be attributed to each type of service and subsequently to the level of trust 
required in the user.   
In order to demonstrate the above concept a number of usage scenarios were 
identified based upon current and potential future usage of mobile devices at 
present. Such scenarios can assist in the design of a threat assessment template, 
examining the security risk that each service encompasses and an associated 
severity level. In this example a criterion used to classify the different usage 
scenarios is the way that each service utilises network connectivity. As such the 
services and functions could be split into those requiring the network, those requiring 
traditional cellular based services, and those that operate locally on the device. This 
separation also assists in understanding what forms of authentication can be 
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subsequently applied; device-centric or network centric techniques. Table 3-2 
presents a listing of typical services and functions that can be accessed via a mobile 
device. 
 Cellular Non-Network  Network 
Voice Call Contacts E-mail 
SMS Calendar Instant Messaging 
MMS Tasks Data Synchronization 
Video Call  Document  Processing Browsing Information 
Voice Mail Camera use Downloading Web Content 
Fax Multimedia access Ticketing 
Push-to-Talk Data synchronization VoIP 
Conferencing Control of devices Location-based services (Pull) 
Value-added services Business Applications Video-on-Demand 
 Identification Documents TV streaming 
  M-payments 
  E-learning 
  E-health 
  Business Applications 
  Information Services (Pull) 
  Adult services 
  Gaming 
  Gambling 
  Electronic Currency 
  Voting 
Table 3-2: Examples of Usage Scenarios 
The classification of risk for each service and application could change to fit the 
requirements of each party, whether it is an organisation or an individual. However, it 
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is important for any such approach to be usable for all stakeholders – organisations 
of all sizes and individuals. The complexity of the risk assessment process therefore 
would need to change depending upon whether it is being completed by a 
professional within an organisation or a normal member of the public.  
3.2.3 An Risk Assessment Example for Mobile Devices 
The ability to assess the level of loss, whether it is financial, personal or perhaps 
business confidence, is imperative in establishing appropriate controls for the 
protection of assets. Risk analysis techniques have been developed and widely 
utilised by organisations to ensure they take account of the threats and 
vulnerabilities against their systems.  Without considering the full range of risks 
associated with mobile assets, an example method for establishing the level of trust 
required in the identity of the user wishing to access the application or service is 
presented here. It is recognised that mobile devices are often owned by individuals 
and used to store business data (or vice versa).  With this in mind, the required 
security could be defined by responsibility in one of three ways: 
1. Organisation is wholly responsible for the device and all applications, services 
and business processes that operate on it. 
2. Personal user is wholly responsible for the device and all applications and 
services that operate on it. 
3. Both organisation and end-user take partial responsibility for particular 
applications, services and business processes that operate on it. No specific 
apportioning of responsibility is assumed. 
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Similarly to risk assessment, it is the responsibility of the appropriate party (or 
parties) to define the trust level required for each application, service or business 
process. What actually needs to be assessed will largely depend on whether the 
device is being used for business or personal purposes. It is envisaged for instance, 
for personal purposes, the user is likely to utilise the applications and services that 
are available and provided on the device by the network operator. The range of 
applications and services will largely depend on the device and therefore be fairly 
static. For business purposes, the range of applications and services operating on 
the device is likely to include all of the default functionality (similarly to personal 
users), but also operate a wider range of third party and bespoke applications. It is 
therefore important to ensure an organisation has the ability to add applications and 
services.  
The level of trust can be established in several ways. By recognising the different 
requirements of a personal user versus an organisation, one could potentially use 
three main models:  
1. Personal Security Model (PSM) : A model to be undertaken by a personal 
user:  
Although risk assessment methodologies are traditional tools used by 
businesses to identify the level of risks, such an approach is not so viable for 
the end-user. It could place a significant burden upon novice users, as 
specialist knowledge and procedures are required. As such a simple means of 
assigning risk to a service or application could be a more appropriate solution, 
which could provide a simple way to the personal user to set a risk/security 
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level to each service or application, without any further analytical view of 
impact, based on his knowledge and use of the device.  
2. Simple Risk Assessment Model (SRAM): A model to be undertaken by either 
the personal user, the organisation, or a combination of both: 
This type of model could represent a more focused risk analysis tool than the 
one for the personal user, useful for more security aware mobile device users. 
As such it could include a risk analysis process that can incorporate a more 
complete solution and granularity required in the process but at the same time 
follow a simplified risk analysis process. Organisations not versed in risk 
analysis, or lacking related expertise, could also follow this model. In addition, 
taking into account that the responsibility of the device might reside with more 
than one party, such model could also permit the choice of which stakeholder 
has the responsibility of assigning risk to each service or application. 
In order to appoint the sensitivity levels, each service could be analysed in 
terms of the typical consequence that would potentially result from breaches 
of confidentiality, integrity and availability in each usage context.  The 
consequences considered have been adopted from a standard risk analysis 
methodology (CRAMM) (Barber and Davey,1992), and are classified as 
follows: 
• Disruption • Financial loss 
• Breach of personal privacy • Legal liability 
• Embarrassment • Threat to personal safety 
• Breach of commercial 
confidentiality 
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3. Organisational Risk Assessment Model (ORAM): A model to be undertaken 
by organisations incorporating the mobile device functionality into their 
current risk assessment methodology and tools: 
Many organisations already have formal risk assessment strategies in place, 
with relevant expertise. As such in this case the model would simply permit 
them to integrate mobile devices, and the applications and services accessed 
by them, into the existing risk analysis processes. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the 3 models, where it can be seen that as there is a move 
towards organisational use there is an increasing reliance upon formal and 
established risk assessment methodologies. 
 
Figure 3.4: Risk Assessment Models 
 
These three models are just an example used here to indicate a way to assist in 
providing the flexibility required when dealing with differing stakeholder 
responsibilities and for each party can use the process that best matches their 
Organization  
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requirements and ability. As such, even in the case of both the business and the 
user having responsibility on the contents of the device, each one will be able to 
attribute security levels to the services that refer to them. A more extensive 
description of the models can be found in (Clarke et al, 2011) in Appendix B. 
This section discussed the need for enhanced authentication as mobile devices 
evolve to offer functionality that enables the use and access of sensitive information. 
This need has been established from the views of stakeholders acquired through the 
focus group. What is also considered important is to address the issue of different 
security requirements across different services. Therefore a flexible and robust 
mechanism is required to meet these needs and provide an appropriate level of trust 
to the user’s identity. It is envisaged that the use of continuous authentication during 
the interaction that the user has with his device is one way that this can be achieved. 
In order for the latter to be tolerant from a usability perspective the authentication 
would require a level of transparency. As such the use of biometric techniques that 
lend themselves very well to transparency is considered in the context of this 
research. 
3.3  Analysis of Authentication Topologies 
This research seeks to establish how enhanced security might be achieved, through 
robust authentication mechanisms that are able to offer the user and network a wider 
variety of authentication options depending upon the individual, network operator 
and business security requirements. It is envisaged that an open approach utilising a 
wide variety of authentication techniques in both an intrusive and transparent fashion 
will assist in providing the flexibility required to meet the differing security and service 
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requirements of a large user community. The focus of this section is directed towards 
the technical and perceptual issues that are involved in the implementation of such 
authentication framework looking at the trade-offs between a network based versus 
a device-centric approach.  
The topology of an authentication mechanism is an important factor to consider at 
the outset of the design process, especially when looking to deploy biometric 
techniques. With numerous stakeholders, (such as network operators, corporate IT 
administrators and end-users), the ability to provide identity verification in a manner 
that maintains both security and privacy, and considers the operational impact upon 
the mobile device is imperative. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to maintain all 
these services for all stakeholders, and a trade-off exists between different security 
and privacy issues, depending upon what the system is trying to optimally achieve.  
In the context of networked mobile devices, two principal options exist for where to 
locate and operate the authentication mechanism: the device or the network. 
Although to date identity verification has been performed by the device itself this 
might not be the best approach to take when considering the particular objectives 
being sought in this research. The following sections will describe the two 
approaches and proceed to discuss the various issues involved with the topologies. 
During this discussion representative views from the aforementioned focus group will 
also be presented as it is important to consider the user’s perspective when deciding 
upon the topology. 
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3.3.1 A Network-Centric Approach 
A network-centric approach will direct all the key computational tasks and storage to 
the network. The physical placement of the authentication mechanism within the 
network could be with the network operator, corporate IT administrator, or third-party 
providing managed authentication services. As illustrated in Figure 3.5, the mobile 
device itself will act as the biometric sample capturing device and be able to respond 
to a decision sent from the server to permit or restrict access to a user. 
Depending upon the device, its processing capabilities and security requirements it 
could be possible to partially split the biometric process, where the data extraction 
phase is conducted on the device and classification on the network. This would 
assist in reducing the amount of traffic sent across the network. 
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Figure 3.5: A Network-Centric Approach 
3.3.2 A Device-Centric Approach 
In a device-centric approach the whole biometric process is completed on the 
device. All the information, algorithms and management controls required for the 
authentication process are stored upon the device. Furthermore, all the processing 
required to perform the verification also takes place on the device.  Figure 3.6 
illustrates an example of such an approach.  
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Figure 3.6: A Device-Centric Approach 
3.3.3 Trade-Off Considerations 
The two approaches have several advantages and disadvantages in their 
implementations from both social and technical perspectives. Key areas to establish 
the requirements and trade-offs that exist are: 
• User privacy 
• Storage and processing of biometric samples 
• Network bandwidth requirements 
• Network availability 
• Mobility and roaming 
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The following sections address and discuss these issues, examining in detail the 
trade-offs between the two potential topologies. 
3.3.3.1 User Privacy 
When considering which topology to deploy, resolving the issue of user privacy is 
essential for widespread adoption. This becomes even more important when the 
topology is looking to utilise biometric techniques as the underlying mechanism. 
Recent years have seen widespread media attention directed towards biometrics, 
due largely to their inclusion within passport and national identity card schemes 
(Gomm, 2005; Lettice, 2010). Unfortunately, and for some legitimate reasons, this 
attention has been somewhat negative towards the benefits of the technology, 
focussing instead upon privacy concerns (Porter, 2004; TimesOnLine, 2004; Lettice, 
2010; Rodriguez, 2012). It is therefore important to ensure the authentication 
mechanism is designed in a fashion that is sensitive to privacy issues. 
The principal concern focuses around the biometric template and sample. In 
whichever biometric technique that is used, these elements represent unique 
personal information. Unfortunately, unlike other forms of authentication (such as 
secret knowledge or tokens, which can be simply changed if lost or stolen), it is not 
possible to change or replace biometric characteristics - they are an inherent part of 
the person. Therefore, once lost or stolen, they remain compromised and can no 
longer be reliably used. As such, the creation and storage of a biometric template or 
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profile on either the device or the network leads to significant responsibility for the 
user or the network provider respectively.  
Public opinion regarding biometrics has been problematic, not least because of the 
proposed national ID scheme. This calls for a centralised repository of biometric 
information for UK nationals, but the ability to secure such databases from external 
attack and effectively manage authorisation to protect from internal misuse is no 
small undertaking. Despite the safeguards that one can apply, there will always be 
the potential for vulnerabilities due to both human factors and technical 
misconfigurations.  Such vulnerability, and moreover the lack of confidence that it 
engenders, was also raised in the focus group, with participants voicing the concern 
over security and trust:  
“…would you really want your biometric data then stored on the inside of a 
company that’s possibly got people dodgy, people breaking into it 
already…” 
 
“And even in the network don’t think it’s all that secure either, because 
there is always the rogue employee somewhere, who is in the pay of an 
attacker” 
 
These quotes demonstrate a major fear for the security of the information held 
remotely. Apart from the technicalities that might be overlooked, there are also 
examples of carelessness taking place that has led to severe incidents. An 
illustrative example occurred within an Orange call centre, where employees that 
had been granted access to full customer records (including information such as 
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bank details) were sharing their login credentials with other staff (Mobile Business, 
2006). This removed any ability to effectively monitor who and when they had access 
to information. The increased fear of identity theft and fraud makes people even 
more cautious about their personal information, and how and where they provide it.   
With the UK ID scheme, it was seen that people were not very comfortable with 
providing their biometric information to such a centralised system (Lettice, 2006). As 
such a device-centric implementation is arguably more favourable from the user's 
perspective. In such a case, the profile will be stored on their personal device giving 
no third-party access to the biometric template or samples. This approach is able to 
satisfy peoples’ desire for privacy preservation through giving them direct 
responsibility for its protection. Nevertheless such reliance does impose concerns 
about how reliable and also aware the end users will be in safeguarding their 
devices. As previously mentioned, several surveys have demonstrated that despite 
the storage of sensitive information in handsets, and despite the earlier cited 
evidence of loss and theft, users still disregard the use of even the available security 
measures. This is an important consideration to the choice in topology, as no further 
protection will be available once the device is stolen. On the other hand one might 
suggest that as the fear of misuse becomes greater the importance that each 
subscriber will attribute to each device will change respectively. Storing personal 
identifiers in the device might lead people to consider their device to be comparable 
to other forms of important information and ID, such as, passports, credit cards and 
car keys.  Such linkage could potentially change people’s perception and attitude 
toward the security and protection of their devices.  
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However, there was also a concern raised in the focus group expressing a fear of 
storage on the device and potential misuse. 
“…my concern is where would the fingerprint, let’s say like signature, 
where would be stored? Would that be stored on the phone, so if 
somebody stole my phone they have my signature which is signed on the 
back of your bank cards and my fingerprint obviously? What then can 
people do with the information…obviously if someone knows how to hack 
into a phone could they use the information?” 
 
It is certain that a biometric database will always constitute an attractive target, 
making it a more valuable target than a device involving only one person. It would be 
necessary in such cases to establish regulations and policies for the security of the 
database and biometric templates, and mandate continuing adherence to them. A 
central system, though, has an advantage that the system can monitor such activity 
and try to prevent it, thereby providing a more uniform and controlled protection 
space, than storage in the device.  
People have different views towards the storage of such information as concerns are 
raised over the security in each storage solution and how potentially easy a breach 
of confidentiality is. An earlier study conducted by the author’s research group 
attempted to assess public perceptions of biometrics, and performed a survey 
involving 209 respondents (Furnell and Evangelatos, 2007).  One question asked 
people about their concern about the theft of their biometric data and the potential of 
using them to cheat a system. The responses are illustrated in Figure 3.7.  
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Figure 3.7: Concern that Biometric Information could be Stolen 
As seen from the figure the majority of the respondents expressed some level of 
concern about the security of their data, with only 4% not having any fear of misuse. 
The same survey also asked where respondents would prefer their biometric data to 
be stored. 40% supported the network option having the template stored in a central 
database whereas only the 17% agreed on the device, as illustrated in Figure 3.8. 
Interestingly, 18% would prefer their biometric templates to be stored in a smartcard. 
This is analogous to a device-centric approach, as the smartcard must remain with 
the user, but represents a significant enhancement in physical and logical security of 
the information.  
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Figure 3.8: Subscriber Preferences on Storage of Biometric Profiles 
Privacy concerns that exist for the network implementation could be reduced by 
ensuring only the biometric templates are stored and not any form of raw data. 
Several studies have taken place to overcome that issue looking to protect the 
storage of biometrics using techniques such as distortion of the template. It is also 
notable that the creation of biometric templates is based upon vendors’ own 
proprietary formats. As such, one biometric template from one vendor will not 
operate with another vendor's product, as the format and characteristics used to 
authenticate people differ. This will reduce the potential harm caused by a stolen 
biometric sample to systems that only utilised that specific vendor's product. The 
one-way property of creating biometric templates also ensures they cannot be 
reverse engineered. 
3.3.3.2 Storage & Processing Requirements  
While the privacy issue represents a challenge of user trust and perception, there 
are also technical-level considerations in terms of the storage and processing of 
biometric data.  These will again differ according to the chosen topology. 
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Consideration needs to be given to the storage of the initial biometric template and 
also the samples that are subsequently used in the process of verification. For 
current PIN-based approaches this is not an issue, but the storage demands of 
biometrics are more significant.  Issues of storage might exist in both topologies, with 
individual devices potentially having limited on-board storage, while the network-
centric approach may need to cope with the storage of data for high volumes of 
users. 
Different biometric techniques require differing levels of storage memory.  
Techniques such as face recognition (where multiple images might be needed from 
different angles in order to achieve a high consistent outcome), or voice verification 
(where sound files need to be stored), usually require higher storage capacities. 
Furthermore, as the proposed authentication mechanism aims to take advantage of 
a number of different techniques, the device or network will need to store more than 
one template per user, which could potentially become very demanding. Figure 3.9 
illustrates typical template sizes from a number of more common biometric 
technologies. 
 
Figure 3.9: Typical Sizes of Biometric Templates (IBG, 2002) 
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Given the memory available on current mobile device, it can be seen that the storage 
requirements would not prevent a device-centric implementation. The most 
demanding approach is voice scanning which can reach the requirements of close to 
10KB.  Therefore in general terms, storage of biometric templates in a device-centric 
model does not present any difficulty. However, given the variability in devices and 
functionality, some care must be taken to ensure that this proposed authentication 
mechanism is able to operate with all hardware devices, including legacy devices 
which might have smaller storage footprints. 
In terms of processing capabilities, the network-centric approach has an advantage 
in the sense that devices themselves may have relatively limited capabilities. Indeed, 
this may actually represent a fundamental obstacle to establishing a device-centric 
solution. Whereas laptop-level devices may have the capabilities required to process 
biometric data, the processing power in handheld devices is still limited. Algorithms 
that are utilised in biometric verification tend to be intensive, as they are based upon 
complex data extraction and pattern classification techniques (and indeed the impact 
of this additional processing on the battery of the mobile device would also have to 
be carefully considered).  The process of enrolment and verification will place a 
serious demand upon resources on many mobile devices. In order to achieve 
transparent authentication, verification of the user needs to be completed without 
affecting the user's ability to use the device (e.g. no impairment to other running 
applications).  It would not be satisfactory for the device to pause or hang for a few 
seconds every time verification was being performed.  However, as with the storage 
footprint, different biometric techniques require varying levels of processing capacity. 
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It is therefore not necessarily infeasible to consider at least some biometrics 
operating in a device-centric model. Indeed, signature recognition, fingerprint 
recognition, keystroke analysis and facial recognition have all been developed for 
mobile devices early on (PDALok, 2006; NTT DoCoMo, 2003; Clarke & Furnell, 
2006; Omron, 2005; Karatzouni & Clarke, 2007). 
Over time, the processing constraints are likely to be overcome in the future as the 
capabilities of handhelds continue to advance.  However, from an implementation 
perspective, a network-centric model would still potentially be easier to deploy and 
offer a wider range of possible biometric techniques that could be used. Again, 
however, consideration needs to be given upon the scalability of such an approach - 
multiplying individual authentication requests by high volumes of users does place a 
significant demand upon processing. 
3.3.3.3 Bandwidth Requirements 
A particular consideration in the context of the network-centric approach is the 
network bandwidth that will be required for the transmission of user authentication 
data. A device-centric approach has no such implications, as at most it will only be 
required to perform its normal authentication of the device to the network. By 
contrast, the network-centric approach will require network bandwidth to send 
biometric samples to the network, and receive authentication decisions back. 
Communication across the network will also result in a latency occurring between the 
initial authentication request and the resulting decision. 
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Typical bandwidth rates in practical 3G network scenarios are 220-320 kbps for 
UMTS and 550-1100kbps with HSDPA, although the theoretical rates are a lot higher 
(3G, 2004). An average 3G portal page, for example, has a size of 40 Kbytes and 
should theoretically take less than a second to load. However, in reality the actual 
throughput results in an 8-20 second delay. A usability study in 2005 has shown that 
users are willing to wait for at least 3 seconds for a page to appear however this 
today has changed to a “blink of an eye” as Google engineers found, underlying how 
demanding users are when using their devices (Gissin, 2005, NYTimes, 2012). This 
willingness to wait is an important consideration and key factor in designing the 
authentication protocols and deployed mechanisms. Forcing users to wait too long 
before being given access would result in a negative perception, particularly when 
the approach is meant to be transparent. A good scoring mobile page e.g. in terms of 
responsiveness in 2008 would be of size 9.89K with a response time of near 1-1.5s 
for WiFi and GPRS and 4.40sec for GPRS. Whereas today the same page would be 
6.26K with maximum response time for GPRS 3.5sec, showing that bandwidth 
requirements are sufficient and improving to what was a requirement for standard 
web pages in the past and (Nubiq, 2008)  
As discussed in the previous section, biometric templates can range from as little as 
a few hundred bytes up to 10Kbytes. These templates contain the unique data that is 
derived after pre-processing (thereby extracting required features). The option of the 
device performing this procedure would be a way to decrease the bandwidth 
requirements as the data sent would be far smaller than the raw sample. However, 
the ability to perform pre-processing on the device will depend upon the individual 
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biometric technique and the processing capabilities of the device. If pre-processing 
can be implemented on the device it can be assumed that the size of data being 
communicated are similar to those presented in Figure 3.9. A simple computation will 
show that the largest template of 10Kbytes will require time of 0.36 sec for the lowest 
given throughput of UTMS (220 kbps). It must be considered though that this might 
well become larger depending upon the network condition at the time and also takes 
no consideration of the time taken for the network to actually perform the 
authentication. Beyond latency for individual users, the issue of scalability needs to 
be addressed. Large volumes of users sending biometric sample data across the 
network might have significant impacts upon network resources and increase the 
level of delay experienced. For example, in 2012 one of the largest operators in the 
UK accounted over 19 million UK subscribers (Mobile News, 2012). If just 10% of 
them used such a service, this translates to about 1.9 million users requesting 
authentication from the network. Of course the burden of the network will depend 
upon the authentication frequency and this will vary across users as the different use 
of their device will result in more or less authentication requests.  
At first glance one might suggest that current 3G and 4G networks (and certainly 
future networks) would be able to cope with the requirements.  Although this might 
not be wrong in principle, an investigation of the network consumption does reveal 
somewhat surprisingly high volumes. Based upon the figures of 1.5 million users 
Figure 3.10 illustrates the bandwidth required per day for three different types of 
biometric approach. 
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Figure 3.10: Average Biometric Data Transfer Requirements (Based upon 1.5 million Users) 
As illustrated in the chart, for voice scan, even a minimum request for authentication 
of five times results a required data capacity of 95Gbytes for the network provider, 
whereas with up to twenty requests per day this raises to 380Gbytes. In comparison 
however, taking a video stream application, (one of the standard 3G applications), 
for example streaming a high quality video in Youtube requires 3.0Mbit/s (Ad Terras 
per Aspera, 2010). In a population of 1.9 million subscribers that represents 712 
Gbytes to be transferred every second to which the comparison to the authentication 
requirements may seem affordable in terms of bandwidth. That said, there is a real 
cost associated with sending data across a network and there will be at least an 
indirect cost, given that the operator may otherwise be able to use the bandwidth to 
support revenue-generating services. 
3.3.3.4 Availability Requirements  
A factor that plays a significant role in a network-centric topology is the 
establishment of availability. In a fully device-centric approach all aspects required to 
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perform the authentication are self-contained locally within the device. However, 
having the authentication process relying upon the network makes a key assumption 
that the network is available at all times to facilitate the process.  
In practice, there are various reasons why network connectivity might not be 
available, such as loss of coverage, network overload, or server malfunction. The 
inability to perform an authentication request as and when required will have a 
significant impact upon the authentication mechanism and its perceived usability. 
Of course, if the authentication request is associated with a network-based 
application or service then one could reasonably argue that there is no 
inconvenience, as the service would not be available anyway. What would be less 
acceptable, however, would be reliance upon network availability in order to access 
applications or features that would otherwise be entirely local.  For example, opening 
a document, accessing contacts, or using Bluetooth to connect to another device, 
might all require authentication, and this would have a real and unacceptable impact 
if the process were to rely upon the (unavailable) network.  
Participants in the focus group were asked to consider this issue and overall there 
was a negative opinion on always requiring access from the network.  The following 
viewpoint was typical: 
“I find it difficult that it might be possible just even to interact with the 
network operator, because I’d like to use that information even when I 
don’t interact with the network operator." 
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It can be suggested that apart from the technical issues that can occur, it seems 
rather inconvenient to require authentication from the provider. The inconvenience 
does not only relate to the access of local functionality and applications, but also the 
general concept - that in order to access any service the user will be obliged to 
explicitly go through the network provider. This places a burden of inconvenience 
upon the user, network provider and the authentication mechanism. One of the focus 
group members specifically summed up the issues surrounding the availability of 
network resources: 
“There is quite a lot stored in the network. Potentially everything can be 
stored in the network. There is a trade-off between responsiveness and 
security….Especially if you are not in coverage all period of time and you 
want to look up someone’s name, address or whatever in your address 
book you haven’t got it. So that’s completely rejected by the operators. 
There’s got to be some balance between security that happens on the 
network and immediacy you have on the person... there isn’t a simple 
answer to this sort of question” 
3.3.3.5  Mobility & Roaming  
A network-centric topology would enable personal mobility (Thai et al, 2003) - the 
ability in principle to get authenticated on any mobile device and have all subsequent 
use of the device billed to their account. Having the verification coming from the 
network, the subscriber will be able to use the system from various devices, without 
any swapping of SIM cards. The device-centric approach lacks such convenience as 
the storage and authentication of the user is linked to the specific device.  
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Conversely, however, when considering the issue of roaming, the device-centric 
topology is more appropriate as authentication of the user can be performed on the 
device wherever they might be in the world. A network-centric topology would 
experience significant increases in latency and have to transverse a far larger open 
network. Unless the local network provider supported the authentication mechanism 
and had a local version of the biometric template (which would not be likely due to 
privacy) this increase in delay would again have an impact upon the authentication 
mechanism which would need to be considered. 
But what also happens when roaming is not available? In such a situation, the user 
will have no way to be authenticated as no access to the provider’s network will be 
available, restricting if not completely preventing any use of the device. There is also 
the consideration of cost. A home network operator implementing the authentication 
mechanism might be prepared to bear the cost of network consumption. However, 
this may not be the case for a roaming network, raising questions of who covers the 
cost. Currently the charges for roaming are very high rates, although this is starting 
to change with big operators reducing the occurring costs (Neil, 2013). A device-
centric approach would overcome this issue as no reliance upon external resources 
is required.  
3.3.4 Discussion  
The prior analysis has shown that comparing the device- and network-centric 
topologies introduces a varied and complex range of considerations, with each 
approach offering advantages and disadvantages in different contexts. Attempting to 
base a solution entirely around the device can introduce processing limitations, 
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whereas bandwidth and the requirement for connectivity may represent practical 
constraints for a network-based model.   In addition, both approaches may introduce 
their own privacy-related concerns.  Table 3-3 summarizes the key characteristics. 
 Architecture Approach 
Requirements Network-Centric Device-Centric 
Privacy  More focused and well monitored 
security 
 Biometric profiles kept by third party 
 Security of central storage with a 
great amount of personal information 
 Overcomes privacy issues 
 
 Security relies upon the individual 
Storage  Able to cope with storage 
requirements 
 
 Likely for new high-tech devices to be able to deal 
with. 
 Depends on the amount and type of biometrics 
used as to the captured samples.  
Processing  Able to cope with processing 
requirements 
 Likely for new high-tech devices to be able to deal 
with low demanding techniques 
 Depends on the type of the device 
 Depends on the processing requirements of the 
classification algorithms 
Bandwidth  Available networks can provide the 
required bandwidth 
 Scalability issues might exist 
depending on the type of data 
transmitted 
     
 
                     n/a 
Availability  Unable to ensure always-on access                      n/a 
Mobility &  
Roaming 
 Enables the use of the 
authentication mechanism to a number 
of devices 
 Restricts the mobility of the user 
over different networks and places 
 Enables user’s mobility without placing any 
restrictions 
 Binds the authentication to the device.  
Table 3-3: A Summary listing of the Advantages and Disadvantages of each Architecture 
Approach 
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Based on the issues arising from both potential architectures, it can be argued that 
no single approach can cover all aspects that are required for the practical 
implementation of the proposed authentication framework.  In order to try to 
overcome the troublesome aspects of each implementation, it is suggested that a 
hybrid approach would be more appropriate. Although complicating the underlying 
authentication system, it would provide a basis for overcoming the disadvantages of 
both topologies, while retaining their key advantages, so that the aims and objectives 
of the authentication mechanism can be met. 
In such approach both storage and processing would be potentially split over the 
device and the network, compromising between the issues of device processing 
capabilities, network availability, and privacy. The nature of the split in the 
authentication mechanism will depend upon the individual requirements of the user 
or organisation in relation to privacy and access, and the device in terms of which 
biometric techniques it can support locally. There will be therefore a number of 
hybrid approaches that could exist, each covering different issues on different 
scenarios for different users. For example, in order to deal with the issue of device 
processing and privacy, there could be the option to store all of the templates in the 
device, but place the processing functionality on the network, as illustrated in  
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Figure 3.11. This would satisfy privacy concerns but at the same time discharge the 
device of any excessive processing tasks. Cryptographic measures could be used to 
protect the data in transit and during processing. Depending upon the device 
capabilities, pre-processing can be performed locally when possible, so that the 
biometric samples that are being sent over the network are kept as small as 
possible, as illustrated in Figure 3.12. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Hybrid Approach - Storage of the Template on the Device & Processing on the 
Network 
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Figure 3.12: Hybrid Approach - Processing on the Network & Storage of the Template and Pre-
Processing of Biometrics Samples on the Device 
The specific nature of the hybrid system will closely depend upon a wide variety of 
factors that have been discussed in this chapter. Figure 3.11and Figure 3.12 form 
only two potential examples of such a system. In order to remove the concerns 
surrounding network availability it is suggested that at least one authentication 
technique will always remain on the local device. Although this technique might not 
provide the level of security strong network-based biometrics might, it will be able to 
provide an effective means of authenticating short term usage of local applications 
and functions. 
In devices with more possessing capacity, the hybrid approach would also be able to 
provide the ability to split the biometric templates, having the most intensive and 
demanding biometric techniques on the network and the others with fewer 
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requirements on the device. Another basis for determining this split could also be the 
uniqueness attributed to them for privacy issues.  
This hybrid authentication model must incorporate a level of intelligence so it is able 
to understand when and how the security requirements can be attributed, and how 
the framework needs to adapt between different authentication techniques to handle 
those requirements. For example, if a user sends a text message or makes a local 
voice call then the operation need not be considered that critical, whereas accessing 
a mCommerce service or making an international call could demand more 
protection. The authentication mechanism should recognise this and select 
techniques that are appropriate to the context. 
Having discussed in some detail the advantages and disadvantages of network- 
versus device-centric topologies, it is concluded that no single topology could 
achieve the desired aims. Therefore the principle of a hybrid version that is able to 
encompass the advantages of both systems and assist in mitigating the key 
disadvantages can be seen as more appropriate.  
3.4 Conclusion 
It can be foreseen that such authentication architecture will involve a number of 
consideration in terms of a topology. Most possibly the latter will need to be flexible 
to fit the differing requirements of individual users and individual techniques. In order 
have a practical view on the operation of such flexible framework that apart from the 
topology also encompasses further difficulties and evaluate the actual operation, a 
practical implementation of a pre-proposed framework has taken place and the 
 
95 
 
User Authentication on Mobile Devices– Requirements Analysis 
 
following chapter will provide the details and results of its implementation and 
consequent evaluation. 
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4 The NICA Framework – Implementation and Evaluation 
Based on the requirements analysis for security on mobile devices, the need for a 
flexible authentication framework that can intelligently handle the differing 
requirements of individual users and devices has been identified. Furthermore, it is 
envisaged that the enhancement of current point-of-entry authentication with a 
mechanism based on biometric techniques that can offer continuous and transparent 
authentication can offer a more robust way to establish user identity.  
In order to evaluate the feasibility of such approach a previous proposed framework 
designed to offer transparent authentication through the use of biometric techniques 
has been adopted. Based on this framework a prototype was developed and an 
evaluation using this prototype was undertaken. Section 4.1 briefly describes the 
aforementioned framework and its basic operation whereas Sections 4.2 and 4.3 
describes the developed prototype and the evaluation phase and results 
respectively.  
4.1 NICA Framework 
The framework selected for evaluation – called NICA (Non-Intrusive Continuous 
Authentication), is a framework that formed the core basis for a research project 
funded by Eduserv and is based upon prior work undertaken by the research group 
and was previously known as the IAMS architecture (Clarke & Furnell, 2007). It 
utilises biometric techniques to provide transparent and thus continuous 
authentication while the user interacts with the mobile device.  
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NICA operates by initially providing a baseline level of security, using secret 
knowledge approaches, which progressively increases as the user interacts with 
their device and biometric samples are captured transparently. Although user 
authentication will begin rather intrusively (e.g. when the device is switched on for 
the first time), with the user having to re-authenticate periodically, the system will 
however quickly adapt, and as it does so the reliance upon secret knowledge 
techniques is replaced by a reliance upon biometrics – where the user will be 
continuously and non-intrusively authenticated by the system. A number of services 
can also be defined as protected, where a specified level of security will be required 
to access them. The system will monitor the level of trust to the user and can allow 
or restrict access to those protected services. The purpose of the framework is to 
provide a highly modular authentication way that can utilise a wide-range of 
standardised biometrics, and which is able to take advantage of the different 
hardware configurations of mobile devices – where a combination of cameras, 
microphones, keypads etc. can be found. 
4.1.1 NICA Architecture 
NICA architecture supports two topologies: 
• A server based topology where the all the storage and processing is taking 
place on the server, and 
• A device based topology where either the functionality is split between the 
device and the server or the system operates solely on the device. 
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This allows for the architecture to work in cases where connection exists or not so 
that security is always in place for the user. Flexibility is also given to the storage of 
biometric information as it can be stored and configured as the user wishes and 
furthermore to the performance requirements as for example more intensive 
processing can be carried out on the server side and less intensive techniques can 
be used for the device. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the server topology. In this case there are 3 main engines: 
• The Authentication Engine which is responsible for dealing with the 
authentication samples and authentication decisions, 
• The Biometric Engine that deals with the biometric techniques and runs the 
authentication algorithms, 
• The Communications Engine which is responsible for the exchange of 
information between the device and the server. 
The system has also another main component which is the Authentication Manager. 
The Manager is the core component of the framework and is responsible for 
coordinating the functionality of the framework and in some cases of the different 
engines.  
The framework also encompasses 3 databases: 
• The Input Cache which stores all captured samples from the user’s interaction  
• The Biometric Profile database which holds the biometric templates of the 
individual user as well as approved biometric samples  
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• The Hardware Compatibility database which holds information about the 
device and compatible techniques. 
The Client database hold information about the individual clients and it includes the 
Authentication Assets which provides hardware dependent information 
authentication techniques available to each mobile device, in order for the 
Authentication Manager to select the most applicable input sample to authenticate 
the user 
 
Figure 4.1: NICA Server Architecture 
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The device based topology- illustrated in Figure 4.2, holds identical components to 
the server one. However in the case of the device based approach an extra engine – 
the Data Collection engine is also presented which is responsible for capturing the 
samples during user interaction. Also an extra component for the device approach is 
also the Intrusion interface and the security status which is the output of the system 
that is used to restrict access or display relevant information. These components 
also exist in the server topology to capture and control access respectively. 
The topology will slightly change depending on whether the system will operate on a 
standalone mode or a client-server mode. As such some of the engines might not be 
required – i.e. the Communication Engine in the standalone mode, or change from 
the device to the server for processing or storage issues- i.e. move the Biometric 
engine to the server that can more easily deal with the intensive biometric algorithms. 
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Figure 4.2: NICA Device Architecture 
As this is not meant to be a detailed description of the specification, an outline of 
how security is established will be described in more detail, specifically, the Integrity 
Level and the Alert Level that define the core operation of the framework and help to 
establish the security provided in the device as well as the usability of the system. A 
reference to the detailed specification of the framework can be found in NICA (2007). 
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The security in a NICA system is built based on a series of authentication techniques 
that are enabled on the user’s device. Each of the techniques - which could be either 
biometric or secret knowledge, is attributed with a confidence level. This level mainly 
corresponds to the error rates that each biometric technique can achieve so that they 
can be appropriately used to provide effective security. Table 4-1 illustrates 
confidence levels based on FAR rates. For secret knowledge techniques confidence 
levels P0 and P1 indicates their existence but are not comparatively related to the B* 
confidence levels. 
Biometric Secret Knowledge 
Confidence Level FAR Level Confidence Level Input Required 
B0 10-20% P0 PIN/Cognitive 
B1 5-10% P1 
PUK (Operator)/ 
Administrator Password 
B2 2-5%   
B3 0-2%   
Table 4-1: Confidence Levels 
Confidence levels are an indication of the security that a technique can achieve. The 
actual security of the system is defined by the Integrity Level. This level is a number 
that fluctuates between two values – 5 and -5, and its changes are a result of each 
authentication request. These fluctuations depend on each authentication technique 
that is utilised and the corresponding confident level. Table 4-2 illustrates an 
example of this notion. 
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Confidence Level Increment/Decrement Value Maximum System Integrity Level 
P1 None – System Integrity set to 0 NA 
P0 NA NA 
   
B3 2 5 
B2 1.5 4 
B1 1 3 
B0 0.5 2 
Table 4-2: System Integrity 
As can be seen each confidence level and therefore the related technique can cause 
a specific change on the System Integrity. This is achieved by subtracting or adding 
a value that represents the allowed change for each technique to the current Integrity 
Level. If the authentication is successful then the value is added otherwise is 
subtracted. However what can also be noted on the table is that each technique can 
be used to achieve a Maximum Integrity Level to ensure that high trust is not 
achieved based on techniques that do not have relatively high confidence. In order to 
establish that the Integrity Level does not remain the same while the device stays 
inactive and therefore there is risk of misuse, the Integrity level is also getting 
decreased periodically regardless of any authentication by a degradation function. 
The value attributed in each technique can be defined so much based on the 
performance of the technique but also based on the usability of each technique from 
a specific user (i.e. voice verification might not work that well for some user but 
another technique which is not considered that secure might do). As such there is 
the capacity here so that the respective value to the technique can be attributed 
individually to each user in order for him to have the more appropriate experience 
though the use of the system. Depending on the implementation of such framework, 
that may be configured by an administrator or be the preference setting of the actual 
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user. The Integrity Level at all times represents the trust of the system to the user 
and therefore the security level of the device.  
The second core process of the system is the Alert Level, which is implemented by 
the Authentication Manager. The latter as aforementioned is responsible to decide 
which authentication method to use. This is coordinated based on the most recent 
samples captured as well as the technique that is more appropriate at a given time. 
Essentially the most recent sample on a specified time frame that is a sample of a 
highest confidence technique will be selected to be used for authentication. The Alert 
Level is the process that implements this functionality as well as deciding the next 
step based on the authentication decision. Figure 4.3 outlines the Alert Level 
mechanism. 
The Alert Level is run by the Authentication manager that periodically initiates 
authentication requests based on which level the process stands. The Alert level is 
suggested in the original NICA specification to be triggered every 10-25 min 
depending on the type of user. As can be seen there are 6 steps on the process. The 
first 3 levels are transparent authentications that will be performed based on the 
most recent sample as aforementioned. At the beginning the first authentication will 
take place based on the most recent sample. If that fails the Alert Level will go to the 
next step taking again the most recent sample otherwise will return to the ‘safe 
mode’ which postpones the Alert Level. If all transparent requests fail then (reaching 
level 4) an intrusive request will be made while at the same time restricting access to 
the device as it is only up to a point that transparent authentication can be utilised for 
the sake of security. If authentication is successful then the Alert Level will drop 
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again to level 1 but only if a biometric is used. If only a secret knowledge technique 
is utilised then it is will only drop to level 3 waiting for a new transparent 
authentication with a biometric to mitigate any weaknesses of the secret based 
approach. If the authentication though request fails the Alert Level will be raised on 
level 4 where an intrusive authentication using the highest confidence technique 
available will be used and if it fails again it will go to level 5 where a two-factor 
authentication will be utilised – keystroke analysis based on a secret knowledge 
question. At that point if the authentication fails the device will be locked restricting 
all access to the user.  
The decision of each authentication request made by the Alert Level will cause the 
Integrity Level to change respectively based on the confidence level of the technique 
utilised. The Integrity Level is not used during the Alert Level to affect any decision. It 
will only be used effectively in the case that a user will try to access a service that 
the system has set to be protected. NICA provides the facility to safeguard particular 
services by attributing an integrity value as the minimum requirement to be reached 
in order for the user to access them. If the Integrity level is sufficient to access the 
service then access will be allowed otherwise the user will be prompted with an 
intrusive request. This last process is also achieved by the Alert Level by setting the 
latter to level 4 and therefore putting the system into alert mode like it would happen 
if all transparent requests would fail. As has been seen in the risk analysis sections 
each service carry a different risk but also the different steps within that service. 
Although NICA defines only the start of a service as a requirement the intra-service 
usage could also be an addition to the framework to establish more convenience.  
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Figure 4.3: Alert Level Process Algorithm 
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In order for the framework to compensate for keeping the integrity high whilst there is 
no use of the device, a degradation function has been defined. This function 
performs an Integrity drop of 0.5 every a certain amount of minutes so that the trust 
to the user reduces over time. As defined in the NICA (2007) specification the 
amount of min suggested was 30min for a frequent user and 50 min for infrequent 
use. 
4.2 The Prototype 
In order to evaluate the proposed idea an operational prototype was developed that 
will enable the functionality of the selected NICA authentication framework so that it 
could be practically evaluated. The approach taken in the prototype implementation 
is mainly a server centric model where all the intelligence resides in the server and 
the client acts as a mechanism for data collection and interface control. A standalone 
mode of prototype was also available however this was not tested during in the user 
evaluation phase as the processing requirements of the biometric algorithms made 
such an approach very time consuming and infeasible given the available devices at 
the time.  
As can be seen in Figure 4.4, one machine is acting as the server where the 
authentication manager controls and handles all operations, the biometric engine, 
the authentication engine and well as the databases. The server supports the 
concurrent connection of multiple clients that can communicate and exchange data 
with the server in order to perform the authentication through the relevant 
communication engines.  
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On the client side a thin-client was developed to support capturing face, voice and 
keystroke biometric samples, in addition to monitoring all service and application 
usage so based on user interactions and usage of the device the system would 
capture the relevant and appropriate sample. This information was sent back to the 
server in order for the system to make the appropriate decisions and run the relevant 
authentication requests. The thin-client also had an intrusive authentication interface 
mechanism that restricts access to the device depending on the response of the 
authentication requests or when the user tries to access a service for which they do 
not have permission – so representing level 4 onwards of the Alert Level process.  
Two devices were used as clients: a Sony VAIO UX1 running Windows Vista and an 
HP Mini- Note 2113 running Windows XP, both of which are illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
Although the initial desire for the prototype and the evaluation was to utilise 
smartphones, the restrictions posed by the OS and SDKs available at the time led to 
the selection of devices with a full OS. Similar restrictions were posed by the 
processing capabilities of the available at the time devices given the requirements of 
the biometric techniques. As such the Sony Vaio was selected as a close enough 
substitute to a small device with similar characteristics of a smartphone regarding the 
holding of the device and the hardware such as front facing camera, keyboard etc. 
The HP device was selected as a mobile device to represent a portable device with a 
different layout and holding as a normal laptop, notebook would be used. The Vaio 
was running Windows Vista whereas the HP notebook run Windows XP testing the 
prototype’s portability in different OS. 
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Figure 4.4: The overall configuration of the prototype 
The prototype implemented the majority of functions and database structures of 
NICA with only minor modifications to the architecture to support the implementation. 
These were simple internal updates e.g. although the databases were central to the 
server and common for all users there was a core authentication manager that 
handles multiple individual threads of user-tight managers to monitor processes and 
serve individual users. Similarly in practice the Communications Engine was present 
in the stand-alone mode although not present in the initial conceptual framework as 
there was a need for monitoring network connectivity. As aforementioned the 
prototype was able to operate in both a server-client mode as well as a standalone 
client mode as well as switching between the two approaches. In the event that the 
connectivity was lost with the server and could not establish a connection it was able 
to switch to a standalone mode and once connectivity was re-established it would 
switch back to network operation. 
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Matlab scripts for voice verification and face recognition were acquired and adapted 
to the requirements of the prototype for enrolment and verification. Keystroke 
analysis scripts were built-in house. The attempt to utilise also a commercially 
available SDK for signature recognition was made, however conflicts between the 
SDK and VB.NET did not allow for its final use on the prototype. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Example of the central monitor screen indicating Alert Level operation a) whilst 
going through L1 to L3 with available voice samples b) whilst accessing protected services 
leading to L4 and L5 
 
111 
 
The NICA Framework – Implementation and Evaluation 
 
 
 
   
                                      (a) (b) 
Figure 4.6: Example of intrusive interfaces of blocking access to any actions on device. a) 
Voice Recognition b) Cognitive Question with keystroke analysis 
 
4.3 User Trial  
In order to evaluate the effectiveness and perceived usability of the authentication 
framework in a hands-on context, the prototype was used as the basis for a series of 
trial activities.  This was imperative in order to establish the effectiveness of such 
approach and potential issues that derive from the practical application of the latter 
before further progress of this research and design of a new approach.  
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4.3.1 Methodology 
A methodology was developed so that important aspects of the framework could be 
assessed and evaluated in practice. Apart from monitoring the operation by 
collecting information from the system that would help the evaluation such as 
number of samples and authentication requests, a questionnaire was also available 
to assess the user experience and acquire any comments from the users. The 
questionnaire is available in Appendix C. The user trial was split to two phases: 
 
Enrolment Phase: The participants used the prototype to provide face, voice and 
keystroke biometric samples that would be subsequently used to create their 
biometric profiles. They were also asked to define two cognitive questions that could 
be used for secret knowledge questions in case the biometric authentication failed 
and they reached the last intrusive request as described in the previous section. A 
simple to use and intuitive interface was used to capture the samples. 8 samples for 
face and 9 for voice were captured. For the face samples they were asked to capture 
8 samples with slight variations on their position when facing the camera. For voice 
they were called to repeat the name of 3 applications that they were going to call 
subsequently as part of the scenario under the assumption that the system was 
using a voice recognition application. Also 15 keystroke samples were captured for 
each cognitive response they gave, in order to create the keystroke profiles for the 
two-factor authentication. The enrolment process took no more than 15 minutes per 
person and at the end the participants were asked to complete the first 
questionnaire. 
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Usability Phase: Each participant was asked to follow a series of steps that would 
force an interaction with the device while the authentication prototype was running 
on the background. This would enable for biometric samples to be captured 
transparently as well as force access to services set to be of high security in order to 
test the operation of the alert level algorithm and the authentication mechanism in 
general. The length of this phase varies as each user had a different interaction with 
the device and therefore took differing times to complete each task. The average 
time of this phase was 45 minutes. After completion of the scenario, the user was 
asked to fill in a questionnaire assessing their experience and the system. After that 
the users were asked to play the role of an impostor on the same device using the 
profile of another person and by using the same steps see how quickly the system 
will recognise that they were not the legitimate users. Again the users were asked to 
fill a questionnaire and assess their views again based on the new experience of the 
system, as now they had a further perspective from the security side rather than the 
usability of the system when they were acting as the legitimate users. 
   
The user trial involved 27 participants, with all of them having at least a basic 
knowledge of using a computer.  In order to ensure that the users would have 
something to do during the ‘usability’ phase of the trial and to ensure that contexts 
would occur in which different aspects of the prototype could be utilised, each user 
was asked to work through a given set of tasks (see Appendix C).  The rationale for 
each stage of user activity is shown in Table 4-3.   
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Activity Rationale 
Search for contact details of the other 
participant. 
Involves the use of a local application with 
mildly sensitive data. 
Establish an IM session and exchange 
initial greetings. 
Involves keyboard and/or voice 
interaction. 
Each user opens a web browser and 
searches for hotels in Las Vegas.  Each 
user should find 3 options. 
Involves the prolonged use of an 
unsecured web browsing session.   
Users discuss the options they discovered 
via IM and agree a choice. 
Returns the user to IM and provides a 
basis for a reasonably involved 
discussion. 
Users visit a secure ‘travel agent’ site, and 
provide the name of the agreed hotel plus 
other booking details. 
Involves the use of a secure browsing 
session (thus demanding stronger 
authentication assurance from NICA) and 
gives the users a basis for entering 
keyboard information. 
Each user opens a local ‘expenses’ file and 
record the estimated costs of the trip. 
Involves the use of a sensitive local file 
and requires keyboard entry. 
Each user creates a Word document that 
presents a biography statement, and types 
a standard disclaimer that permits the 
conference to post the details online. 
This ensures a prolonged period of typing 
activity in a less bursty context that IM.  
The aim of getting the users to type a 
biography is that it allows them to type 
free text on a topic that they should be 
able to say something about.  The aim of 
getting them to type a disclaimer 
statement is that it will represent known 
text in which we can ensure 
representation of profiled keywords. 
Email the document to the other user as an 
attachment for checking. 
Involves the use of a further application 
context (i.e. email). 
Each user checks and edits the other’s 
document as appropriate and sends it 
back. 
Continues the use of Word and email, and 
thereby prolongs the overall session to 
give Face and Keystroke metrics more 
opportunity for testing. 
Table 4-3: User trial activity and rationale 
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At the outset of each trial session the participants were briefed about the purpose of 
the experiment and what each phase would involve. Each user used the same 
device in both phases to mitigate any effect on the biometric samples from the 
device hardware.   
4.3.2  User Assessment of the Prototype 
The results from the evaluation overall demonstrated a positive opinion for the 
authentication system with 92% of the users considering the proposed system 
offered a more secure environment in comparison to traditional forms of 
authentication (Figure 4.7).  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Did NICA provide a more secure environment? 
The users were also asked to evaluate how convenient the system was in a scale of 
1 to 5, the results of which appear in Figure 4.8. Although the responses were mixed 
a slight skew towards the system being convenient exists on average. It is worth 
noting that through observation of the evaluation, participants’ opinions were affected 
by the delays that occurred on the system while trying to manage all the processing. 
These occurred in some cases where applications might have been initialising 
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concurrently giving extra overhead to the system with NICA running on the 
background. A real system would not have such significant delays. 
 
Figure 4.8: Perceived convenience of the NICA prototype 
Furthermore the above views were also affected by the transparency of the system 
which was not always ideal. The lack of robust algorithms caused a lot of transparent 
authentication requests to fail prompting some of the users with more intrusive 
requests that they would normally get. In order to mitigate that a manual trimming of 
the threshold was taking place during the experiment in order not to allow the lack of 
accuracy from the biometric algorithms to affect the performance of the actual 
system. Nevertheless what also happened in the experiment was that the scenario 
included access to a number of protected services in a small amount of time causing 
even more intrusive requests to occur but not necessarily having the chance to build 
the required confidence to user while authenticating them transparently. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to have the participant’s use the system for a 
prolonged period of days, so therefore the experimental study had to artificially 
include a number of steps to fully evaluate the prototype. It is likely this artificial 
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environment resulted in a more negative attitude towards the system than what 
would have occurred in practice. The responses of the participants with regards to 
the transparency of the system are illustrated in Figure 4.9. 
 
Figure 4.9: Perceived intrusiveness of the new authentication system 
With regard to the individual techniques that were utilised, a slight preference existed 
towards voice verification and keystroke analysis (Figure 4.10). From verbal 
feedback from participants there was a strong preference to techniques that did not 
require much user interaction or be very time consuming. As such, cognitive 
responses as an intrusive means of authentication were not very popular. The same 
occurred with face recognition as the algorithm utilised required more time than other 
techniques to perform the authentication and also they had to keep facing the 
camera until a sample was captured. At the same time voice verification (in its 
intrusive form) appeared to be more preferable as the user only had to repeat a 
small phrase and had a very quick response from the NICA server. Although many of 
the above were affected by the robustness of the algorithms utilised it still provides 
an insight that users prefer to have a higher level of security with the least overhead 
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in their interaction. Usability and convenience were stronger preferences than 
security.   
 
Figure 4.10: Participants preference towards the authentication techniques utilised 
Regardless the aforementioned problems regarding the convenience of the system, 
the majority of the users – 70%, registered a preference to the use of transparent 
and continuous authentication as a protection mechanism (Figure 4.11). Although 
many of the participants suggested that the requests were too many the idea of 
being constantly protected and specifically having extra security for highly sensitive 
information was very appealing to them. As such, 81% of the users said that they 
would use such system in practice as they would feel more protected than using 
traditional means of authentication. Although the remaining 19% stated they would 
not use it, their justification was that although they believed the system would offer 
higher security they do not perceive that their current use of their mobile device 
actually required a higher level of protection as they do not store or access personal 
information. This was actually an opinion that had arisen on a number of occasions 
during discussions with stakeholders. A body of users exist for which the mobile 
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device is only and will remain only a telephony-based device. They have no desire to 
use the device for any other purpose and as such do not perceive the need for 
additional security. 
 
Figure 4.11: Participants authentication preferences 
When the evaluation came to the participants acting as impostors it must be noted 
that although a number of users were not very positive when acting as the 
authorised user, when it became more positive was when they saw the performance 
of the system reacting to an impostor. When the users where asked where the 
system managed to recognise them and locked them out in a timely manner 81% 
said yes. When the users where asked on how secure the system was their answers 
were very positive with the majority leaning to being very secure (Figure 4.12). 
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Figure 4.12: The security of the system against impostors. 
In a question asking them to assess how much of the personal information they 
managed to access the majority of the participants indicated that they managed to 
access little or no information (as illustrated in Figure 4.13). It is also interesting to 
note the contradictory nature of participants. Although some users found that 
continuous authentication provided too much protection at the moment, another set 
of participants felt that NICA should have identified impostors when simply accessing 
applications such as Internet or Windows Explorer and no sensitive data. At the 
same time there was an obvious variation to what people perceive to be personal 
and how tolerant they are of the security methods.  Nonetheless, what was apparent 
from the experiment overall is that (perhaps unsurprisingly) people would like to have 
the highest level of protection with the minimal interference from the system and the 
higher convenience.  
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Figure 4.13: The level of information accessed before the system locks down 
4.4  Conclusion 
The evaluation of the discussed framework clearly demonstrates the strengths and 
weaknesses of such system. It is evident from the findings that such a transparent 
and continuous system has real merit and a large proportion of users feel it would 
provide the additional security they desire for their mobile devices. Unfortunately, 
with almost half of the world’s population having a mobile device, it is difficult to 
establish an approach that satisfies all users. Therefore the consideration of the 
latter and the development of such flexible approach that can utilise a variety of 
biometrics and other authentication techniques and through a series of operational 
settings can vary the level of security both transparent and intrusive is beneficial. 
Through this flexibility it is hoped the majority of users will be able to find a suitable 
mixture of settings and techniques they prefer and desire. 
Whilst the prototype and subsequent evaluation has illustrated a number of key 
findings, it is important to highlight that if the system was operating within 
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specification (i.e. the performance of the biometric techniques was good in the 
transparent operation and the operational performance of the server was managed 
rather than everything operating for a single server) the nature of the transparency 
would mean few users would ever realise or experience intrusive authentication.  
During the evaluation, however, the framework was configured to perform 
authentication on a more frequent basis than would normally be the case in order to 
ensure that sufficient judgements were made during the trial session.  This was done 
in order to ensure that participants would see the full extent of the system in 
operation, but the consequence was that participants encountered more intrusive 
authentication requests than would normally be expected. In some trial sessions, 
these requests were too frequent and time consuming, and participants therefore 
acquired a more negative impression of the prototype. 
The above issues were weaknesses so much of the implemented framework and the 
core process that it involves as well as of the biometric techniques. Concerning the 
former there were a number of issues identified during the evaluation trial which 
indicated that a more efficient approach is required in order for the Alert Level 
algorithm to operate more effectively. In many cases the way that the system worked 
would mitigate any good performance of the user due to the degradation function 
and the lack of timely dynamic decisions as these were not properly pre-analysed in 
the utilised framework to better fit particularly the time constrains of the evaluation. 
Furthermore the biometric techniques as they were techniques designed for explicit 
intrusive authentication lacked their actual performance when tried to apply them 
transparently or intrusively.  
 
123 
 
Modelling NICA 
 
5 Modelling NICA 
The implementation and user evaluation of NICA framework gave an insight as to 
the security effectiveness as well as usability under real usage scenarios for 
authorised and impostor users. Given the limitation that were introduced during the 
practical evaluation in regards to the restricted time that events required to take 
place and performance of biometric techniques it was considered imperative to 
perform a further investigation of the framework utilising simulations under different 
type of conditions in order to be able to test the performance of the approach further. 
A simulation environment would provide the opportunity of testing the framework 
under different conditions and removing the effect of the poor performance of 
biometric algorithms that are independent of the framework.  The following sections 
will describe the series of simulations that took place to evaluate the performance of 
the NICA framework and the data used.  
5.1 NICA Simulation - Methodology  
5.1.1 Data 
In order to be able to simulate NICA the production of appropriate data was required. 
In order to represent real-life data as close as possible, mobile activity data were 
sought in order to have a basis for the amount and type of usage. These type of data 
would be the basis regarding the number of events that could be generated within 
specific time periods that could subsequently be generating biometric samples and 
therefore feed the authentication algorithm.   
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For this purpose the MIT Reality Dataset (MIT Human Dynamics Lab, 2004) was 
utilised. This MIT database is a collection of data that has recorded the mobile phone 
usage of 106 users over a period of several months including timestamps of when 
interaction such as voice calls, SMS and launching of application occurred. Utilising 
this database it was possible to base the timed events to possible sample capturing. 
This would give a close representation to a real-world scenario in regards to the 
operation of an authentication framework such as NICA that relies on the capturing 
of samples as a result of the user’s interaction with the device. Each time an event 
occurs depending on the NICA configuration and the device capabilities this could 
link the capturing of at least one sample. Although the dataset was a strong basis for 
its use within the framework simulation it must be said that in a real situation if NICA 
was applied more samples had the potential to be captured. As MIT has only 
recorded the launch of a specific operation which in this simulation was linked only to 
one sample being generated, in reality after launching an application a user would 
continue in most cases having more interaction and therefore causing the generation 
of far more samples than what is available here. For example, MIT has recorded the 
event of launching a web browser which could lead to e.g. the capture of a face 
sample as the user is looking at the device. Given though that the user will possibly 
continue to navigate to sites or type search terms or write an email, all these 
interactions carry the possibility of more biometric samples to be captured. 
Furthermore the data set represents data captured in 2004 and therefore the device 
capabilities were more restricted than today as well as therefore the use of the 
device. This further poses an argument that capturing of samples would occur in 
more frequent basis than the current data set. As a Nokia study reports mobile users 
 
125 
 
Modelling NICA 
 
cannot leave their device alone for more than 6 minutes (Digital marketing university, 
n.d). The current dependence of business and communication upon mobile phones 
including even in things like social networking and gaming suggests the increased 
average capturing of samples given the phone interaction compared to the simpler 
use of the device that MIT has recorded. For the purposes of this simulation only the 
recorded events were used. Although artificial methods could be used to add extra 
events this was not applied at this point since the basis of using the data in the first 
place was to avoid artificial generation of mobile usage. This of course limits 
however the amount of samples that could be utilised per hour and therefore limits 
the operation of the framework causing possibly the more often leading to L3 that 
waits on next input by not finding samples available. 
5.1.2 Data Extraction & Production of Data sets 
In order to produce the data sets required for the simulation it was important to 
identify how the data can be used. As a first stage the data from 100 users were 
used – 6 had to be omitted for the solely purpose of missing some of the information 
required for the automatic extraction. Using Matlab as a processing environment a 
number of scripts were written in order to extract the events generated for each user 
as well as the timestamps of these events in a usable format (Appendix D).  
Given that each user will have a very subjective use of their device an initial analysis 
was made in order to identify whether the different users could be classified based 
on the extend that they were making use of the device. Since the operation of NICA 
framework relies on the presence of samples having a classification based on usage 
levels of the device and therefore the dynamic of having samples being generated 
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and the frequency of those, would be useful to better assess the performance of the 
framework under different scenarios.  For this purposes the activity of each user was 
split based on each hour and 2 metrics were calculated: 
o The average number of samples captured per hour 
o The intervals between 2 subsequent samples 
The first metric would help to classify users regarding the usage of the device 
whereas the second could be useful for the same purposes but could also be used 
as an insight as to how the framework could be getting affected by large spawns in 
sample capturing. It could inform the time window that the Alert Level process uses 
to be triggered or to seek for valid samples. Nevertheless as aforementioned there is 
always scope in real configuration of NICA to provide for more samples.  
A further basic analysis was undertaken to see whether specific time periods were 
characteristic of the user so that could be an aspect to consider in the NICA 
framework. As such the time and periods during the day were considered in order to 
identify average usage of the device (with simple means) but there was no 
characteristic output of such analysis. Given the subjectivity in the use of the device 
each user had variability of that usage in different hours with no indication as to 
usage periods that could be useful in the context of this research. 
An analysis of the above 2 aforementioned metrics was completed and averages 
across all hours for all users were produced. At this stage from these averages, the 
hours where activity would generate less than 6 samples - which would mean with 
the highest time span 1 sample every 10 minutes, were removed as it was 
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considered that it would not provide enough data for a characteristic use of such 
framework and it would affect the analysis at this stage as a lot of hours will even 
generate 0 events as the device is not always going to be in use. Is it quite apparent 
that NICA relied heavily upon samples being present for the mechanism to have any 
significant effect or be operating in a transparent mode. In very low usage it would 
operate closer to a time locking mechanism such as PIN protection provided in 
current devices and as such there was no scope in evaluating this here as the 
objectives were the evaluation of transparency. The averages of the metrics selected 
were produced across the users which however showed very similar results with no 
particular differentiation between users as to their activity during the hour or between 
accessing of different services and data. As such showing that there were no useful 
outcomes to be found solely based on the metrics extracted that could assist in 
determining the level of usage of particular users – e.g. a high usage user versus a 
low usage user. 
As an outcome of the above analyses it was considered that although the use of a 
specific biometric technique will be dependant somehow on the user and the device, 
the actual level of usage within a specific timeframe does not carry the same 
dependency. Furthermore for the purposes of this simulation the profile of a 
particular user is not important as a heavy user may have high activity for an hour 
and none for another and vice versa for an infrequent user. What is important is to 
be able to evaluate the operation of the framework under specific time periods based 
on the number of samples generated rather than particular users. The specific 
activity or user was deemed irrelevant. As such all data were collated with the 
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individual user aspect removed and the data were split again this time based on the 
levels of activity per hour. Three distinct data sets where created: 
• Low Usage : Set of hours with x number of events in the range of 6 < x < 20 
• Medium Usage : Set of hours with x number of events in the range of 20 < x 
< 40 
• High Usage : Set of hours with x number of events in the range of x> 40 
As expected the majority of the hours fell into the Low Usage category. As it was 
later realised during the simulation phase the amount of hours for medium use but 
furthermore for high usage were far too many given all the simulation permutations 
used resulting to too time consuming simulation with not much added value in 
relation to a smaller dataset. As such only 765 hours was used for all levels of usage 
to have a common basis. The number of hours represented in each category is listed 
in Table 5-1. 
 
 
 
 
These data sets form the basis for simulation representing the timed events at which 
a biometric sample can be generated. For each of these events the sample captured 
could represent a different biometric technique depending on the type of activity on 
the device and the configuration that the framework would have. Since this 
 Total Hours of Usage 
available 
Total Hours of Usage 
used 
Low Usage 30104 765 
Medium Usage 4436 765 
High Usage 765 765 
Table 5-1: Hours produced based on levels of activity 
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information was not available given the data at hand, an artificial generation of the 
type of sample that would be generated at each time event was introduced. However 
rather than specifying a specific technique that could have been used, what was 
generated is the confidence level linked to a specific technique. As the simulation is 
not concerned with specific biometric algorithms rather than looking at how the 
framework operates, the information required was confidence levels in order to be 
able to calculate Integrity update values and Alert level decisions. For each of these 
confidence levels a specific technique or biometric algorithm could be linked to each 
of them in a real life scenario depending on their performance. As such for each 
timed event a random selection between the four confidence levels (B0, B1, B2, B3) 
used in the framework was made. The use of artificial data at this point is not 
believed to affect or bias the operation of the framework as the confidence levels are 
randomly assigned with a fair distribution across them. Given also the large number 
of the hours there is an expected fairness in the spread of confidence levels. 
Although in a real life scenario this fairness is not a requirement and is not a 
necessarily expected result as it is largely dependent on the use of the device by a 
particular user as well as the configuration of the capturing mechanism, for the 
purposes of this simulation at least it ensures that there is no bias towards low 
confidence or high confidence techniques. 
Since no real samples were existent in order to be able to run biometric algorithms, 
the other requirement for the simulation was the ability to have an authentication 
decision for each event. Although not all events would be selected as part of the 
simulation as that would depend on whether their times would fit with the trigger of 
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the alert level algorithm, they all needed that decision in case they were selected for 
authentication. On this occasion applying an artificial generation of authentication 
decisions, values between 0-1 were randomly generated and linked to each time 
event. This decision would represent the outcome of a biometric algorithm in case 
the specific sample linked to this event was selected from the algorithm. This was 
not a type of information that such simulation could acquire otherwise.  
Two data sets were created with this technique: a set of data for the authorised user 
with random values above a threshold of 0.5 and a set of data for impostors with 
random values below the same threshold. These two data sets were created for 
each category of usage. In order to be representative of a biometric based 
authentication, a further processing of the data introduced also in the authorised and 
impostor data set the FRR and the FAR respectively for each confidence level.  As 
no specific technique was used in order to be able to utilise published error rates of 
the respective techniques, the error rates were introduced based on the error rates 
defined by NICA to represent each confidence level. Since NICA does not define a 
specific percentage but ranges of error rates of techniques that could be represented 
in each confidence category, 2 different data sets were produced. One to represent 
the best case scenario with the FAR and FRR in the minimum setting, and a worst 
case scenario with the FAR and FRR in the maximum limit of each confidence level. 
The limits of the error rate are depicted in Table 5-2. 
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 EERs 
 B3 B2 B1 B0 
Best Case EER 0% 2% 5% 10% 
Worst Case EER 2% 5% 10% 20% 
Table 5-2: EER introduced in data sets 
 
Similarly here the artificial generation of values does not create any positive bias on 
the simulation. Given that pass or fail values are created with incorporating 
representative EERs it closely represents a real scenario and NICA specification. 
Arguably in a real life scenario the actual values maybe higher for an authorised user 
and lower for the impostor. That would actually create a disadvantage for the 
simulation as the fusion techniques as part of their decision algorithm take into 
account this output value of each biometric algorithm in order to reach a positive or 
negative conclusion. However given that the samples in real life are captured 
transparently it is expected that some of the samples would not be as good as others 
due to e.g. the user not explicitly posing in front of the camera, environmental 
conditions introducing noise in voice samples due to the nature of a mobile device. 
That would mean that unless there is a quality check for the use of a specific sample, 
the output decision that defines a match of the sample to an identity might not have 
such a high value. Given all the above the random selection of values closely 
represents a fair representation of actual outputs to the extent that that is possible. 
As a result of the data production the datasets produced were a best and a worst 
case EER for each of the low, medium and high usage profile data so both cases 
can be tested under each usage frequency and denote and differentiation.  
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5.2 Simulation & Results 
The original NICA framework was written in VB.NET but for the purposes of these 
experiments the simulation code was developed in Matlab as a more efficient 
simulation environment. The simulation followed the same principles as would the 
framework in a real time scenario with the exception being that the operation was 
tested over the period of only an hour. As such each set of results represents how 
the integrity of the system would change over the course of an hour considering that 
at point 0 being the start of that hour the integrity of the system equals to 0. The 
simulation would start at time 0 considering that is the time the first sample would be 
available rather than the actual beginning of an hour as collected from the MIT 
database. The decision was made on the basis that this would mean that the device 
is at use.  
The operation of the NICA framework is based on the concept of transparency and 
as such the focus was on the transparent levels of operation.  Given that in the 
occasion of misuse from an impostor or bad conditions and error rates for the 
authorised user the framework is led to the intrusive stages where explicit 
authentication is taking place, the focus of this experiment did not consider any 
failure after that. Meaning that in the event that an authorised user reached the 
intrusive stage, the simulation would assume successful authentication and reset to 
Level 1 of the AL algorithm whereas for an impostor it would lead to lock of the 
device and consequently end the simulation for that hour. Given that at an intrusive 
stage a B3 technique would be used, that was accumulated in the operation and 
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thus the integrity would be raised for the authorised user or drop for an impostor 
accordingly.  
The main objective of the simulation was to record and evaluate how the integrity 
level and therefore confidence in the user would vary across each hour given 
different usage and biometric performances. Furthermore to assess how this would 
affect accessing of protected services.  
5.2.1 Determining Time Windows 
Further to the data sets created, a further aspect that needed to be considered was 
the time variables of the framework. These are the timing at which the Alert Level 
mechanism is triggered (AL time window) as well as the time period of the 
degradation function where there is an automatic drop of the Integrity Level of the 
system (IL time window). In the original NICA specification these are loosely 
determined as AL window being 10-25 min and IL being 30 min for high users and 
50 for infrequent users. These times appear good for usability but quite insufficient 
for security. This level of time settings could be more appropriate possibly during 
periods of inactivity or for users that do not use the device very often or for highly 
secure services. On such occasions the authentication requirements could be lower 
and therefore more often authentication would be possibly too much. Also for the 
purposes of this simulation, since time periods of 1 hour is being assessed, it would 
not be of much purpose to utilise these kinds of settings.  
Also building upon the experience of the practical evaluation, where a number of 
tasks required the accessing of secure services and sufficient activity, smaller times 
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were required in order to be able to build such confidence that accessing secure 
services would be done in a transparent fashion or to be able to detect the 
unauthorised use of the device. During the evaluation of NICA these indicative 
values could not be kept as the timing restrictions of the user evaluation required a 
far more timed compacted approach and thus far smaller time windows were used. 
Given that the users were having constant interaction with the device and therefore 
continuously generating samples it was possible to set lower time windows and 
check the operation of the framework.  This could be easily scaled given a longer 
period with less interaction as the operation would be similar and the only thing 
changing would be the time of events.  
An investigation was required to establish the effect of these timed events. The 
matter of the Alert Level being triggered too often for example could lead to 
exaggerating authentication. This may result to largely intrusive operation if the 
samples are not available as the framework would regularly reaching L3, which could 
become problematic in the occasion of occurring high FRR. Although the latter 
establishes the security of the framework it needs a balancing approach relevant to 
usability. The other time variable which is the periodic drop in the Integrity Level to 
mitigate against any misuse opportunities during periods of inactivity, low usage or 
lack of high confidence biometric samples, also requires consideration. A big time 
window could lead to maintaining high integrity without any activity taking place and 
therefore concerns of misuse where a small window could lead to intrusive requests 
for accessing protected services as the Integrity Level would not have the 
opportunity to being maintained for long after successful authentication.  
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Within the space of this simulation given that periods of one hour were being used 
there was the requirement to also use smaller time windows. Furthermore the use of 
30 or 50 min for the Integrity degradation seems to be a long time for it to have a 
significant effect on the security as the timing is too far apart given the specified drop 
of 0.5. Given the occasion for example that an authorised user may have reached a 
IL of 4 or 5 and the device fell into the hands of the impostor it could take more than 
50 or 100 minutes to restrict access to highly secure services.  As such a set of 
different values was created to test their effect on the framework but as the different 
combinations could be endless, only a subset was tested trying to keep a timing 
relative between the two variables was kept to represent the original specification of 
the framework. As such a scale was used based on the indicative values considering 
the AL at 20 min and the IL drop at 50 and then the rest between the 2 timings by 
halving the time windows by a factor of 2 each time. The time windows presented in 
Table 5-3 were used. 
Alert Level (AL) Time Windows Integrity Level (IL) Time Windows 
2 5 
5 12 
10 25 
20 50 
Table 5-3: AL and IL Time windows used in simulation 
 
Given the current use of devices these are times that could be justified as 
appropriate. As research reports, during downtime, 91% of employees check their 
email every 6-12 minutes (BasicITSolutions, 2013). Average number of times a user 
checks their phone is nine times an hour which could translate to 6-7 min per hour 
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and that this may increase to once every six seconds for ‘highest frequency users’ 
(Dailymail.co.uk, 2013). Although these numbers may not always translate to full use 
of the device they could be characteristic of device access and possible sample 
capture.  
5.2.2 Authorised User 
During the simulation for each hour of use a number of variables were recorded to 
accumulate the operation. The primary focus was how integrity would vary across 
each hour as it is the means to determine how secure as well as usable the 
framework is.  
The initial sets of simulation focused on the high usage profiles with best EERs as 
they were expected to show the framework operating at its optimum performance 
given the available data. The performance of NICA for an authorised user profile 
across all hours of high usage for each set of time windows can be seen in Figure 
5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: NICA performance on different time windows for an authorised user 
It can be seen from the graphs that the framework manages to maintain an average 
integrity above 0 with minor exceptions close to 0. For some hours the average 
integrity is quite high such as above 4, which means that the usability of the 
framework could be quite good in many cases. What can be noticed also is that the 
framework performs better with the smaller windows rather than larger one. This 
effect can be explained as in the former case authentication occurs far more often 
and even dropping the integrity often does not have a major effect on the integrity so 
that it cancels the successful alert level operation. With frequent authentication in 
place even if samples are not always available to the AL mechanism or the 
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techniques available may be of lower confidence, the framework still manages to 
maintain a fair level of trust. Although utilising small windows could result in samples 
not being available and thus having the effect to continue to dropping integrity due to 
the degradation function while the AL is e.g. waiting for a new sample to come in, it 
appears that this effect is counteracted. The same could occur or be further 
reinforced with high false rejection error rates that would make the AL mechanism to 
be moving to the next levels and reducing integrity. However since in this case the 
best error rates are used it is unlikely for this to be affecting the results. On the other 
hand when having bigger time windows (like AL-25 & IL-50) seems to be an effect of 
having only a few authentications occurring per hour and as such the integrity is 
unlikely to have the opportunity to be raised. The degradation function will only lower 
the integrity once so that is not quite affecting the average here. It can be seen that 
these 2 parameters play a significant role on how NICA will be able to operate 
regardless of the biometric techniques used and as well as the usage of the device.  
Given the variability across the hours it is not trivial to determine the best 
performance across the band for all windows. As such the overall performance 
across all hours in regards to the average integrity can be used. This can be seen in 
Table 5-4. 
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Table 5-4: NICA Average Integrity across all hours based on EERs 
 
It can be seen that the average values show that again the smaller the windows the 
better the framework performs by a noticeable amount (close to 1.3 degrees of 
confidence between the edge windows). Given the large number of hours and the 
integrity averages it appears that this performance is a representative result of the 
framework performance. Although there is variability regarding the amount of activity 
during each hour and the particular timings of that activity and therefore captured 
samples that are factors that performance would be dependent upon, as had been 
seen in Figure 5.1 there is a clear distinction where the framework operates better. 
What can also be seen from the table is that there is not a significant difference 
between the Best and Worst EER scenarios. Actually the worst EERs provide a 
slightly better average which is insignificant however it could be explained due to the 
fact that in case of a failure the AL mechanism would likely at some point reach an 
AL 2 min
IL 5 min
AL 5 min
IL 12 min
AL 10 min
IL 25 min
AL 20 min
IL 50 min
NICA Best EERs 3.237 3.0007 2.5353 1.941
NICA Worst EERs 3.2266 3.0356 2.5422 1.9475
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intrusive stage and therefore there would be a force of a more confident technique 
and subsequently a higher increase on the integrity.  
To get a closer look an analysis was undertaken to explore how the average integrity 
changes based on the number of samples used and therefore the amount that 
authentication is taking place each hour.  Figure 5.2 demonstrates the integrity in 
relevance to the number of samples used per hour. The top graph in each subfigure 
shows the average integrity across each hour of use. The mid graph represents the 
amount of samples used during that hour during transparent operation whereas the 
lower graph shows the number of intrusive requests that have occurred on the hour. 
The hours are sorted based on the number of used samples. As the hours are 
independent of each other in this simulation this does affect the representation of the 
results. 
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Figure 5.2: NICA Performance for Best EERs 
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As can be seen from the graphs the number of authentication requests on average 
has a positive effect on the integrity of the system with a noticeable upwards graph 
particular for the small windows. It can be noticed that for smaller time windows the 
number of samples likely to be utilised is more variable from the larger time windows 
which may reach the use of up to 8-9 samples and therefore a far more subtle 
change can be seen in integrity. What is also worth underlying is that in the smallest 
time windows it appears that the effect of frequent authentication seems to cause a 
more stable average integrity compared to the use of less samples. Although it is 
uncertain as to why this is occurring it is likely that in the event that samples are 
always available to be used there is a constant maintenance of the integrity whereas 
if samples are not available the AL will be likely waiting for a long time at L3 for the 
next sample whilst at the same time IL is dropping or be prone to a FRR which would 
lower the integrity of the system. At the same time, larger windows allow for less 
authentication requests during the hour and therefore the finding samples in good 
timing are therefore very few.  
Regarding the transparency of the system as can be seen on the lower graph the 
amount of intrusive authentication requests that occur during the hour are minimal 
varying between 0-1 with the majority being at 0 and with only two occasions of 
hours with 2 intrusive requests. It is also apparent that the more samples being used 
-which in this occasion is a matter of timing of events and availability, the likelihood 
of an intrusive request increases. This is logical as the possibility of a false rejection 
event occurring is higher.  As transparency has a dependency upon the performance 
of biometric techniques it is likely that a real system will be more prone to worst 
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performance, nevertheless given the representative EERs used, it appears that the 
framework has the ability of dealing with this failure quite well maintaining a fair level 
of transparency. As aforementioned the average performance of NICA shows that 
even with worst case EERs the framework still performs at the same level. To 
examine this further Figure 5.3 represents the intrusive requests for Best and Worst 
EERs as means of comparison where it can be seen that Worst case EERs increase 
the occurrences of intrusive requests but still minimally reach the maximum of 2 
requests per hour showing that the framework deals with these failures. This further 
confirms the fact that the user evaluation was largely affected by the high EERs 
occurring due to poor biometric algorithms rather than the framework itself. 
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Figure 5.3: Intrusive requests in Best and Worst EERs for High Usage 
 
A different representation of the results is given in Figure 5.4. These graphs 
represent the average integrity achieved in regions of samples used. So for example 
what is the average integrity across hours that max of 10 samples was utilised, or 
max of 20 samples etc. Given that integrity is lowered or increased based on one 
sample per time on this occasion the number of samples represent how many times 
the user will be authenticated per hour. This includes the failed authentication 
request which will lead to decrease of the integrity. Here is clearer – at least for the 
small windows, that frequent authentication leads to higher trust for the given dataset 
with a much greater number of samples. The latter also shows that although the 
dataset at hand does not explore the full possibilities of the samples that could be 
available in real life usage, even these levels of usage/activity are generally sufficient 
for the mechanism to work. 
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Figure 5.4: Average number of samples used per category 
 
To see how lower usage would affect these results the simulation of the hours with 
medium and low usage where put to the same test. Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 
represent the results of NICA operation under the different windows for medium 
usage and low usage respectively. It can be seen that the dynamics of framework 
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are less in lower levels of usage as the amount of samples do not allow for 
heightening the integrity, experiencing close to one degree less integrity per level of 
usage. In medium usage the smaller windows (AL=2, AL=5) appear to perform well 
but with minimal differences whereas in low usage this occurs for the middle 
windows (AL=5, AL=10). This performance can be explained as, as expected the 
less the activity the less possible for a sample is to be available. At the same time it 
can be again seen that the large windows (AL=20) never perform well in achieving a 
good level of trust. It is quite apparent the significance that the timed windows plays 
in the operation of the framework given the levels of usage/activity of the device. It 
can be seen that the framework still manages to at least maintain a positive integrity 
however quite a lot lower for the low usage. This would mean that at least for the 
hours with very few samples the framework could be quite intrusive at least for 
protected services depending on the timing of events.  
 
Figure 5.5: Average Integrity on Medium Usage 
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Figure 5.6: Average Integrity on Low Usage 
Figure 5.7 show the average number of intrusive requests generated as a default 
operation of the AL mechanism and it can be seen that the number remains again 
below 1 request per hour.  
 
Figure 5.7: Average Number of Intrusive Requests based on Usage and EERs 
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High Usage on Best EERs 0.0458 0.0314 0.0183 0.0144
High Usage on Worst EERs 0.2013 0.132 0.0784 0.0418
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Medium Usage on Worst EERs 0.1176 0.0797 0.0523 0.0353
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5.2.3 NICA Impostor 
The above section investigated the authorised user and the operation of the 
framework in regards to transparency and its ability to maintain a representative trust 
to the user. The security aspect of the framework needs to be assessed as to the 
ability of an impostor to utilise the system. The same series of data were used and 
the respective EERs where introduced to represent the FAR of the different 
techniques. The average integrity of the system for an impostor under high usage 
can be seen in Figure 5.8. It can be seen that the framework reaches a very low 
integrity which represents a good security for the system. The below -4 values show 
that the user not only will not be able to access secure services even before but also 
that the accessing of the open services of the system would be restricted and the 
impostor would be essentially locked out. Similar results are achieved for low and 
medium usage, which can be seen in Table 5-5. 
Although the integrity of the system on average is quite low a more representative 
metric for the security of the system would be to see how fast the impostor would be 
locked out and to what extent the accessing of secure services is restricted and 
provides a better insight in to the role of the time windows on the system in regards 
to security. This will be examined in Section 5.2.4 that looks at the protected 
services.   
 
151 
 
Modelling NICA 
 
 
Figure 5.8: NICA average Integrity for Impostor on High Usage 
 
 AL 2 min IL 5 min 
AL 5 min 
IL 12 min 
AL 10 min 
IL 25 min 
AL 20 min 
IL 50 min 
Low Usage     
 -4.8432 -4.8055 -4.7763 -4.7446 
 -4.8406 -4.7956 -4.7622 -4.7222 
Medium Usage     
 -4.8739 -4.8489 -4.8297 -4.7738 
 -4.8477 -4.7804 -4.6952 -4.5853 
High Usage     
 -4.9088 -4.8792 -4.8511 -4.7743 
 -4.8872 -4.8184 -4.7229 -4.5418 
 
Table 5-5: Average Integrity for Impostor in based on usage and time windows 
 
AL 2 min
IL 5 min
AL 5 min
IL 12 min
AL 10 min
IL 25 min
AL 20 min
IL 50 min
NICA Best EERs -4.9088 -4.8792 -4.8511 -4.7743
NICA Worst EERs -4.8872 -4.8184 -4.7229 -4.5418
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5.2.4 Protected Services and Security 
The two-pronged approach of NICA allows for monitoring during access of secure 
services. After the simulation of the standard NICA operation in monitoring of the 
confidence level to the user, the performance of NICA regarding protection of secure 
services was assessed. This series of tests provided insight as to how often an 
authorised user or an impostor would be requested to get authenticated whilst using 
of the device to access a protected service, thereby assessing usability and security 
respectively.  
The same dataset was used to provide the basis for testing. In the previous sets of 
testing all events were considered the same as far as the framework was concerned. 
In this case some of the events would need to be events generating access to a 
protected service. Given the limited number of events it was considered rather than 
removing some of the events from the generation of the confidence level and assign 
them to be events of accessing a protected service, a different approach was 
considered. Each timestamp of each event present in each hour was considered to 
generate an event for accessing a protected service with a skew of 5 seconds later. 
This decision would have a 2-fold effect. First of all it would generate a sufficient 
amount of protected accesses relative to the normal access of the device. Although 
this could potentially bring a negative effect to the performance by testing a lot of 
protected access events relatively to the user activity it was considered appropriate 
for this simulation as it is relative to the rest of the operation rather than generated 
random events during e.g. no usage of the device. It also gives a better 
representation of the network for a user that requests more often access to a secure 
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service during its normal use of the device as well as a stress test to the system. The 
second effect is the request of a protected service being close to a previous 
authentication request which could bring though a positive or negative effect the 
latter due to error rates. Given that it could be either it was not considered to provide 
artificial benefit to the simulation of any of the approaches, merely a more 
representative model. Furthermore this would only be the case on certain occasions 
as even though the protected service event happens every 5 seconds after each 
sample/event on the device that doesn’t mean that the specific event/sample would 
have been used for authentication at the specific timing and therefore minimising the 
effect that this would have. As the operation of the device is just a subjective matter 
of user and hour of use the only solid basis can be the times of the data set used. All 
other activity would need to be somehow linked to the latter in an artificial way based 
on some logical suggestions.  
To have a basis of comparison Table 5-6 shows the average number of protected 
services access events that occur per hour on the different types of usage. As can 
be seen the number of protected services particularly for high usage is quite high 
which would provide an exaggerated scenario however envisaged to provide a good 
test for the transparency of the system. 
Type of Usage Average Number of Protected 
Services Access 
High Usage 57.2 
Medium Usage 25.9 
Low Usage 9.9 
Table 5-6: Average number of protected services access events 
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As defined in NICA each protected service has a respective security level which 
shows the amount of integrity that the user needs to have in order to access it. As 
such, each of the protected services got attributed a randomly required level of 
integrity for accessing it. The values varied from 0-5 to represent from no or low 
protection up to high security services and a fair split was done across these values. 
This would give a variation of security services to be able to assess the system 
under different types of access requirements.  
In the event that a user tries to access a protected service and does not have the 
required integrity level they will be faced with an intrusive request. Although at 
normal operation in any authentication request NICA specifies the decrease/increase 
of the integrity given a fail/pass, the framework does not specify the increase of the 
integrity at the intrusive request if that is a result of trying to access a secure service 
with insufficient integrity. Given that the lack of the appropriate IL to access a secure 
service results in the intrusive stage 4 of the Alert algorithm it could be a matter of 
increasing or decreasing the IL similar to the normal operation. However it could be 
argued that the user would only be granted temporary access to the service looking 
to increase usability whilst having at the same time the opportunity to reach an 
appropriate IL in the next transparent authentication. In the latter occasion the IL 
operates solely as the alarm and monitoring mechanism to establish user identity 
rather than establishing the requested IL. It could be argued that not applying an 
increase on the IL provides more security with the risk of affecting usability in the 
event of that stage being reached again soon. At the same time increasing the IL 
provides the user with a better chance of continuing to maintain a higher security 
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level during the continuous use of the secure service and reducing the chance of an 
intrusive request. Both would depend on the individual situation of device usage and 
the trade-off will exists.  To evaluate that effect, both approaches during accessing 
secure services were simulated.  
Two series of tests took place. The first test would put NICA framework under the 
test of accessing all the created protected service as a series of events during each 
hour with no integrity updates occurring if the required integrity has not been 
reached. During the first test another aspect of the framework is accessed. To see 
the performance of NICA in the occasion that the protected services are accessed as 
independent events during normal operation on NICA irrespective of any previous 
protected service access. So it demonstrates as well how well the device operates 
transparently and manages to reach appropriate levels of integrity for accessing 
secure services seamlessly in the case of an authorised user and how well it 
establishes security in the event that an impostor tries to access a protected service 
after an authorised user has been accessing it. The second test would be introducing 
the integrity update after an intrusive request and access how this can affect the 
operation of NICA and possibly add to the performance. At this test the services are 
seen as series of events.  
5.2.4.1 Authorised User 
Table 5-7 refers to the first test and presents the results of the simulation for the 
different levels of usage for Best and Worst EERs as per the original specification of 
the framework, which allows for no change in integrity after successfully accessing a 
protected service and as well as aforementioned see the service access as 
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independent events.  As can be seen the framework manages to maintain a certain 
level of transparency with avoiding explicit authentication with a ratio of close to 1:4, 
1:3 and 1:2 in the cases of high, medium and low usage respectively. The specific 
scenario presented here is quite extreme as for example for high usage an average 
of 57 events represents a protected service being access almost every minute if we 
see this as series of events. It does however provide a good stress test for the 
framework. For that occasion the 28.3% for high usage translates to 16 intrusive 
requests on average per hour which demonstrates a fair level of transparency - with 
the 13 out of the 16 requests represent services of Level 4 and Level 5,  not though 
ideal. However it is envisaged that this will not occur very often, when considering 
this as series of events, given a continuous use of the device. Given the particular 
dataset as well that provides fewer samples than could in practice shows that 
potentially a more transparent operation could be achieved. It can be foreseen that 
the highest the usage the less intrusive the approach is which was envisaged to be 
the case given the higher integrity that was seen to be achieved in the previous test. 
For low usage the mechanism is expected to operate more intrusively as there is not 
an opportunity to acquire possibly enough samples to raise integrity to required 
levels.  Given this approach the big time windows affect the transparency of the 
system with the requests more than doubling from the smallest to the largest 
windows. This demonstrates an insufficiency of the mechanism to provide the 
required integrity transparently at the rate that the protected services are accessed. 
Given that this is an extreme scenario with a high rate of services produced at the 
earlier stages of the hour it could be largely affecting the performance of the 
framework. The results also show that the bigger time window would have a stronger 
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negative effect on the framework in the case of increased number of services being 
used. This application of not increasing integrity in the framework as a result of a 
protected service also translates to a highly intrusive nature of such system in the 
event that activity is performed that requires continuous access to such services 
whether this is assessed as a series of events or independent events. 
 AL 2 min IL 5 min 
AL 5 min 
IL 12 min 
AL 10 min 
IL 25 min 
AL 20 min 
IL 50 min 
High Usage (57 services per hour) Number of Intrusive Requests 
Using Best EER approaches 
16.1906 
(28.3%) 
22.0901 
(38.6%) 
27.0078 
(47.2%) 
32.3016 
(56.4%) 
Using Worst EER approaches 
16.3525 
(28.6%) 
21.8629 
(38.2%) 
26.9399 
(47.1%) 
32.1345 
(56.1%) 
Medium Usage(26 services per hour)         
Using Best EER approaches 
9.2376 
(35.6%) 
11.2402 
(43.3%) 
12.9295 
(49.9%) 
14.6658 
(56.5%) 
Using Worst EER approaches 
9.3251 
(36.0%) 
11.3133 
(43.6%) 
12.9517 
(49.9%) 
14.7507 
(56.9%) 
Low Usage (10 services per hour)         
Using Best EER approaches 
4.9256 
(49.3%) 
5.2533 
(52.6%) 
5.6149 
(56.2%) 
5.9974 
(60.0%) 
Using Worst EER approaches 
4.8995 
(49.0%) 
5.1619 
(51.7%) 
5.5222 
(55.3%) 
5.889 
(58.9%) 
Table 5-7: Intrusive Requests as absolute numbers and percentages as a result of accessing a 
protected service as series of events without integrity updates or as independent access 
events 
 
Looking to establish the difference that an update in integrity each time a successful 
access of a protected service occurs would add to the framework, a second series of 
tests calculated the latter case. The results- as presented in Table 5-7, show that 
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such addition to the original framework largely improves the performance as it would 
automatically add a significant increase to the trust of the user. Although it is not 
guaranteed that e.g. a B3 technique would be used each time for accessing a 
protected service, it is more likely that protected services would be protected with the 
more confident techniques and therefore the integrity update due to a successful 
authentication would significantly add to the integrity and therefore the transparency 
of the system as seen from the results. This is specifically apparent for extreme 
scenario of high usage which shows an 8.3% possibility of intrusiveness which 
translates to 4.7 intrusive requests per hour compared to the 57 generated events 
showing a high level of transparency. The aforementioned effect of accessing a 
protected service very early on the start of device activity is counteracted here with 
the cost of an intrusive request which however establishes a far more transparent 
system for the reminder of the activity. 
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AL 2 
min 
IL 5 min 
AL 5 min 
IL 12 min 
AL 10 min 
IL 25 min 
AL 20 min 
IL 50 min 
High Usage (57 per hour) Number of Intrusive Requests 
Using Best EER approaches 
4.7454 
(8.3%) 
3.6645 
(6.4%) 
2.9204 
(5.1%) 
2.3982 
(4.2%) 
Using Worst EER approaches 
4.7324 
(8.3%) 
3.6488 
(6.4%) 
2.9491 
(5.2%) 
2.4334 
(4.3%) 
Medium Usage(26 per hour)         
Using Best EER approaches 
3.3825 
(13.0%) 
2.8198 
(10.9%) 
2.4922 
(9.6%) 
2.248 
(8.7%) 
Using Worst EER approaches 
3.4465 
(13.3%) 
2.8355 
(10.9%) 
2.5026 
(9.6%) 
2.2493 
(8.7%) 
Low Usage(10 per hour)         
Using Best EER approaches 
2.3081 
(23.1%) 
2.0822 
(20.8%) 
2.0157 
(20.2%) 
1.9843 
(19.9%) 
Using Worst EER approaches 
2.2337 
(22.4%) 
2.0457 
(20.5%) 
1.9687 
(19.7%) 
1.9439 
(19.5%) 
Table 5-8: Intrusive Requests in absolute number and percentages as a result of accessing a 
protected service with integrity updates and access as series of events 
 
A further point to be noticed in these results that although the medium to bigger 
windows maintain a better level of integrity on average, the number of intrusive 
requests slightly drops as the window increases. This effect shows how the 
degradation function possibly affects the framework. Although here the difference 
translates to 1-2 requests which can be considered minimal compared to the large 
amount of requests per hour, since this is an average across many hours of use 
shows a notable effect. This result underlines the importance of balancing these 2 
timing events for the better operation of the system. As the integrity increase would 
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be dependent on the biometric samples, having activity for example that only allows 
the capturing of low confidence samples while the degradation function is running 
could cause the framework to be far more intrusive than other occasions. Given the 
drop in integrity together with the restriction of being able to raise the integrity above 
certain levels and a quite big gap between authentication requests, it is expected to 
have a more intrusive system.  
A further analysis was done to see which type of protected services get affected 
mostly by generating intrusive requests. Whether this occurs largely for highly 
protected services or occurs also for minimum risk services which would minimize 
transparency. Table 5-9 shows the average number of protected service access that 
occur within each hour split on required level of trust (always looking at high usage 
hours) together with the number of intrusive requests that the user will receive when 
trying to access the services. The table shows both approaches with or with no 
update in the integrity each time a protected service is accessed. As can be seen 
with no update the majority of the highly protected services would generate intrusive 
authentication while at the same time with having the integrity updated the system 
becomes far more transparent. The highly protected services with trust level 5 would 
still generate some intrusive events far less however whilst the services will trust 
required < 5 will reach in average close to full transparency. This demonstrates that 
the system has the ability to reach a high level of trust during a fair usage of the 
device and be secure whilst maintaining a high transparency to the user. Full 
transparency could exist depending on the timing of events in each scenario but 
nevertheless is not expected anyway at all times as the whole purpose of the trust 
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monitoring and the integrity level is exactly to monitor occasions where the level of 
trust is not sufficient to guarantee access in these services and therefore a certain 
intrusive due to higher risk is expected and accepted.  
Integrity 
Required 
Average 
Number of 
Generated 
Protected 
Services 
AL 2      
IL 5  
AL 5   
IL 12  
AL 10  
IL 25  
AL 20  
IL 50  
AL 2    
IL 5  
AL 5   
IL 12  
AL 10  
IL 25  
AL 20    
IL 50  
  No Update in Integrity With Update in Integrity 
0 9.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 9.7 0.4 0.6 1 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
2 9.7 1.2 2.2 3.3 4.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
3 9.8 2.5 4.2 6 7.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
4 9.4 4.5 6.6 7.9 8.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 
5 9.2 7.7 8.4 8.9 9.2 3.5 2.5 1.8 1.3 
Table 5-9: Number of intrusive requests generated on average per hour due to protected 
service access of each trust level (based on high usage and best EERs) 
In consideration of any bias that the above data may have formed in regards to the 
quantity of the protected services per hour or the timing after each sample a series of 
test data was created that would represent a random set of protected services that 
occurred during the recorded activity of each hour. This means that the service 
accesses occur between the interval of the first and the last sample recorded each 
hour. Seven datasets represented the following – one represented 20 random 
selected services across all trust levels from 0-5 and 6 datasets representing 20 
services in which each set all required the same level of integrity e.g. one dataset 
only with services needing a trust level of 5 to assess the operation of the system on 
each required security level. All datasets correspond to the same timed event with 
however different need of service access. 
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Integrity required in each 
dataset 
AL 2 AL 5 AL 10 AL 20 
IL 5 IL 12 IL 25 IL 50 
Random fair split 
(20 services per hour) 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3 
0 (20 services per hour) 0.1 0 0 0 
1 (20 services per hour) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
2 (20 services per hour) 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 
3 (20 services per hour) 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 
4 (20 services per hour) 3.2 2.3 2 1.9 
5 (20 services per hour) 9.3 5.6 4.1 3.2 
Table 5-10: Number of intrusive requests based on randomly timed protected service access 
events for an authorised user 
It can be seen that a good level of transparency is achieved for the lower security 
services. For the high trust ones the smaller the window the more intrusive the 
framework becomes with a fair transparency for middle windows. Although the 
bigger the window the framework appears more as aforementioned this is largely an 
effect of the degradation function with possibly an intrusive request happening early 
in the hour. It can be said that given the random spread of the events, in a real world 
scenario where the service access would be linked to normal activity of the device 
the framework would be expected to be even more transparent. In the event that a 
highly protected service occurs in periods of inactivity or not sufficient authentication 
then the framework of course would lead to intrusive authentication (as this is its 
purpose to gain a strong level of trust).  
5.2.4.2 Impostor 
To evaluate the performance of the system under impostor the number of access to 
any protected services was investigated, representing the FAR in this case. This 
would give an indication as to whether given the present impostor data the user 
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would have any opportunities to access a protected service without being authorised 
to do so. The results as presented in Table 5-11 showed virtually no access to 
protected services demonstrating high security of the system given the present 
datasets. The non-rounded zero’s in the results of high usage show that in some 
occasions an impostor has gain access to a service. Analysis showed that this 
occurs in the event that in the beginning of activity during the hour were integrity is 0 
if an FAR occurs as first access the impostor would gain access if accessing a 
service immediately after that authentication succeeds. However the services that 
they would be gaining access were only the services represented by 0 integrity 
meaning low or no security and in the case of the worst EERs for high usage there 
were also the occasions of accessing a service with required trust of 1 which also 
represent very low security requirements.   
 AL 2 IL 5 
AL 5 
IL 12 
AL 10 
IL 25 
AL 20 
IL 50 
High Usage (57 services per hour) Number of protected services accessed 
Using Best EER approaches 
0.0039 
(0.0068%) 
0.0039 
(0.0068%) 
0.0039 
(0.0068%) 
0.0039 
(0.0068%) 
Using Worst EER approaches 
0.0261 
(0.0456%) 
0.0287 
(0.0501%) 
0.0287 
(0.0501%) 
0.0287 
(0.0501%) 
Medium Usage (26 services per hour)         
Using Best EER approaches 
0 
(0.0000%) 
0 
(0.0000%) 
0 
(0.0000%) 
0 
(0.0000%) 
Using Worst EER approaches 
0.0104 
(0.0401%) 
0.0104 
(0.0401%) 
0.0104 
(0.0401%) 
0.0104 
(0.0401%) 
Low Usage (10 services per hour)         
Using Best EER approaches 
0 
(0.0000%) 
0 
(0.0000%) 
0 
(0.0000%) 
0 
(0.0000%) 
Using Worst EER approaches 
0 
(0.0000%) 
0 
(0.0000%) 
0 
(0.0000%) 
0 
(0.0000%) 
Table 5-11: Protected service access by an impostor in absolute numbers and possibility of 
access with integrity updates  
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5.3 Discussion 
Given the NICA results it can be suggested that the security as well as the 
transparency the system is notably increased based on the number of samples used. 
Furthermore, the time windows appear to notably affect the operation of the 
framework with more frequent authentication offering a more balanced approach 
between security and usability. The introduction of integrity updates due to an 
intrusive request also improves upon performance taking advantage of a high 
confidence technique. The original degradation function triggering at 20-50min is 
somewhat unrealistic as it will have a minimal effect upon the security of the system. 
Degrading Integrity by 0.5 every 30 mins or 50 mins would take, if the integrity was 5 
to reduce to 0, 4.5 hours and 7.5 hours respectively, offering little to the protection of 
the device.  As such, further investigation could seek to determine how these time 
windows could be alternatively balanced to improve upon security and usability as 
well as reconsider the degradation function and its effect on the framework. 
Compared to the user evaluation the framework gave fair performance – as there 
was a beneficial situation where the biometric algorithms have no effect in 
performance. The data attempts to represent a system close to a real scenario 
showing that integrity increases as long as samples are available. Managing to 
maintain a good integrity whilst keeping security. 
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6 Modelling of enhanced fusion models 
Following the practical evaluation and simulation of NICA and the results obtained an 
objective was set to explore the improvement of certain operations. Further to the 
increase of the integrity upon accessing a protected service which showed a notable 
improvement to the transparency of the framework one of the core operations of 
NICA was revisited – how biometric samples are used. 
Given the fact that NICA operates only on one sample it overlooks the fact that the 
device could be capturing more than one sample within certain periods. That could 
be a waste of authentication opportunities that can provide a greater level of 
confidence for the user’s identity. Given that fusion approaches utilise more than one 
sample have shown to provide a better operation it was envisaged that an 
investigation into the use of fusion techniques would enable the production of a more 
robust approach and the improvement of the NICA framework.  
As the capturing mechanism constantly is capturing samples of different biometrics 
both of the following approaches could be implemented: 
• Multi-Instance approach - Use of multiple inputs of the same biometric: A 
number of biometric samples of a single biometric captured over a specific 
timeframe could be utilised. This will enable the biometric algorithm to make a 
more informed decision by having multiple traits to base its decision. At the 
same time the existence of bad samples could be mitigated or at least 
decrease the possibility of FAR and FRR due to that cause. 
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• Multi-modal approach: Use of a single input of multiple biometrics: In this case 
samples of different biometric techniques are utilised. This could enable a 
more fine balance and tuning tied to the individual user and its preference and 
furthermore balancing the performance of the individual biometric techniques. 
Given that certain techniques may not operate well due to the user or mobile 
conditions this provides a fused mechanism with the capacity to mitigate 
some of the downsides of those occasions. This approach could furthermore 
provide another variance to the security of an individual service, creating a 
more multifaceted way to attribute security levels.  
 
It is envisaged that any of the above approaches would provide a more dynamic 
system in comparison to the current one. The original approach although it offered 
the flexibility of the use of a number of biometric approaches its final decision was 
very much static based on a single outcome. As became apparent in the evaluation 
this was far from ideal for certain users and the way that they utilised the mobile 
device, which on top of the bad performance of the biometric algorithms would 
sometimes make the authentication decision questionable. For example during the 
user trial, the use of the Vaio device for some users would produce very bad image 
samples as the way that the users were holding the device while typing would not 
capture the entire face resulting to failure of the biometric algorithms. In this case the 
use of more than one sample or the use of more than one technique during that 
authentication process could produce a more valid result. That however needs to be 
balanced so the decision is largely based on the stronger or more appropriate 
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biometric. Therefore consideration needs to be also given to the way that the 
technique and the weight on the decision will be attributed. 
 
At the same time the system could tune the biometric inputs to fit the individual 
requirements of the user in case for example certain techniques and features are not 
very characteristic for a specific user. In such a case the reliance could shift placing 
more weight to techniques that work better for the specific user. The aforementioned 
approaches (multi-modal & multi-instance) are by default available for direct 
application from the NICA framework as depending on the samples available a multi-
modal or a multi-instance approach has the dynamic of being applied. As the 
framework looks to acquire the most recent samples with the higher confidence 
samples of the same biometric or samples from multiple biometrics could be 
selected. 
A reconsideration of the framework and adaptation of the original NICA framework 
process and authentication mechanisms that would enable fusion of biometric 
decisions has taken place as well as an evaluation against the performance of the 
original NICA. The following sections describe these adapted models and the nature 
of the simulations and results.  
6.1 Enhanced Simulation Models 
Two enhanced approaches were developed for enhancing the NICA operation with 
fusion. These two models were consequently put to the same tests as the NICA 
framework (highlighted in Chapter 5) in order to compare the enhanced fusion 
models to NICA performance.  These approaches looked to see how the use of more  
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than one sample at the time depending on availability, could provide a more 
confident result and a better usability of the framework. The fusing of the results of 
more than one authentication decision would mean that the authentication decision 
should be stronger.  The way that the weight of the decision and as well as the 
decision itself would affect the authentication algorithm is presented in the following 
sections. No differentiation was used in regards to multi-instance or multi-modal as 
both of them could occur depending on the availability of particular samples. 
6.1.1 Fusion Approach 1 – NICA with 2 samples fusion: 
In this approach the first investigation was undertaken to examine the effect of using 
more than one sample would have on NICA performance. Furthermore, how this 
approach could be incorporated into the NICA framework and update how the Alert 
Level mechanism would work. In this approach the authentication algorithm seeks to 
use 2 samples instead of one if that is available. Depending on the presence of the 
samples the Alert level algorithm would respond respectively in order to take into 
account on how many samples were used and the confidence of these samples. The 
fusion occurs at decision level by utilising the individual decisions based on each 
sample. 
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For this enhanced framework the authentication manager looks each time to utilise 
at maximum 2 samples. Triggered every x number of minutes, the algorithm seeks to 
recover 2 samples from the input cache. Amongst the present samples in the input 
cache the selected 2 samples must: 
• Have been captured within a set time window of y minutes that defines 
how recent the samples must be. If only one sample satisfies this condition 
then the framework defaults back to NICA operation. 
• Be samples of biometric techniques with the highest confidence level 
possible.  In the event that e.g. one of the 2 samples does not represent 
the highest confidence level the next available best confidence level 
technique will be selected.  
The above ensures that the samples are timely ensuring a greater validity as well as 
utilising the best samples for a more confident decision. Even though in certain 
occasions even if 2 samples exist they do not represent a high confidence technique, 
they still provide a more confident decision since the authentication decision rather 
than using only one of the 2. The latter may not be as beneficial when using 
biometric algorithms with high error rates compared when using more confident 
techniques; however, it provides a more informed decision. An alternative approach 
in the criterion of selecting the samples could be a configurable setting of the 
framework that defines the best performing techniques for the specific use and/or 
device. 
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6.1.1.1 Alert Level Modifications 
The Alert Level algorithm was modified to incorporate the new aspect. In NICA the 
AL would reset to L1 at any point that the authentication decision was positive with 
the only difference in this rule being during intrusive authentication if the technique 
used was not a biometric, in which case the AL would only go the L3 waiting for the 
next sample. This process provides usability but it is a possible shortfall depending 
on FARs. As such resetting the AL to L1 with the only basis of one sample and 
therefore more prone to a security risk due to possible FAR. In this version there was 
an effort to mitigate this by moving to different levels depending on how many 
samples are being used.  
In the approach with 2 sample fusion, in the event of the authentication decision 
being the outcome of 2 samples the AL would reset from the current level to L1. 
However if the authentication decision is the outcome of only 1 sample then the AL 
will only reset to the previous level. That was envisaged as a more confident 
approach to the security aspect of the framework so that the AL resets only due to 
the strongest possible operation of the framework as it currently stands with 2 
samples, whereas the less stronger approach still maintains usability but attributed 
less weight on the security aspect. Given this mechanism a one sample 
authentication decision can reset the authentication framework to L1 but not if the AL 
level has already reached L3 which would mean that at least 2 continuous 
authentication requests have failed already. The only occurrence that a one sample 
technique would reset to L1 is that a 1 sample approach has failed giving some 
leverage to the algorithm.   
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The same reverse operation happens in the event that a 2 sample based 
authentication fails. Respectively in this case the AL will jump directly to L3. With this 
decision the transparency of the framework is being kept and gives one more chance 
to the user with waiting for the next input as well as maintaining a better security by 
removing the possibility of yet again another transparent level. With this step also the 
chance of consequently having a reset of the AL due to a one sample based 
authentication is mitigated as by jumping to AL 3 if the next authentication happens 
on one sample and is successful then the AL will go back to AL 2 rather than AL 1 as 
would happen in NICA. In order for finally the AL to reach 1 only on one sample that 
will mean at least 2 successful one sample based authentications.  
In order for the above solution to operate accordingly to the AL algorithm a further 
modification had to be introduced. When the AL algorithm reaches 3 in NICA that 
would mean that the algorithm would wait for a newly captured sample to come in. In 
this modified version that would mean that the framework on AL 3 would always only 
authenticate on 1 sample at that point as only the next captured sample would be 
taken into account.  Since this is a fusion approach the framework in the updated 
form would still wait for a new sample to come in so there is a current sample being 
taken into account in the authentication decision process as well at the same time 
looking to utilising any other sample that fits the pre-defined time window for valid 
timely samples. The latter would enable the possibility for fused authentication at L3 
and enabling the opportunity for also resetting the AL directly back to one if the 
outcome was positive. Given a high use of the device is very likely that more than 
one sample are going to be captured depending on the configuration of the capturing 
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mechanism and therefore more than one newly captured samples could be actually 
used at this point.  
The logic of the Alert level algorithm is depicted in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Operation of the transparent levels of AL with 2 sample fusion 
 
For purposes of usability and transparency it was decided that a failed authentication 
on 2 samples would still provide the opportunity to the user for another transparent 
authentication. As such the AL failing at any of the 2 transparent levels will only go to 
L3 rather to an intrusive stage providing for a trade-off between security and usability 
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at this event. Given that the techniques used would not necessarily at all times be of 
high confidence it was considered that such opportunity was a valid approach.  A 
more enhanced decision making could take this factor into account in order to make 
the decision making of the AL rely on the confidence levels rather than the number of 
samples used but this is not something that was evaluated in this research. The 
number of factors that could be taken into account are numerous and the 
combinations too many for all aspects to be evaluated to this extent. 
6.1.1.2 Decision Level Fusion 
In the NICA framework the way that the Alert Level process will proceed is 
dependent upon the positive or negative result of the authentication based on one 
sample. Depending on whether the authentication decision is above or below the 
specified threshold for determining successful authentication the AL will reset to AL 1 
or jump to the next level respectively. When utilising one sample the output of the 
authentication decision is a number between 0 and 1 as being outputted by the 
biometric algorithm and therefore a straight forward decision can be made relatively 
to the threshold. In this fusion approach as 2 samples are being used and therefore 
there are 2 different outputs from the same or different algorithms, fusion of these 
two outputs is required in order to decide whether the overall authentication 
response lies above or below the threshold.  
There are several ways that the outputs of different algorithms could be used. 
Depending on the samples utilised the algorithms may be of the same or a different 
confidence and of the same or different biometric technique. Given the definition and 
operation on NICA and its reliance on confidence levels attributed on different 
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techniques and algorithms, that was an aspect that needed to be incorporated in the 
fusion.  A simple for example mean of the biometric decisions used would not be 
appropriate at this point as different techniques have different performance and 
therefore confidence that can be relied upon. As such in order to calculate the fused 
output a weighted average was used that would take into account the confidence 
level of the technique and the output of the algorithm. The weighted decision 
calculation is depicted in the following formula: 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
= �𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒1 ∗  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒1 +  𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒2 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒2�
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒1 +  𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒2  
 
The weight of each biometric technique is based on the confidence level as defined 
in Table 6-1. The weighting could be configurable as stands for other values of the 
framework. In this case it was considered appropriate that this type of weighting 
would provide an adequate differentiation between the different confidence levels 
without proving however an extreme benefit to any of them if e.g. the second 
algorithm gave the opposite result. As such balancing the fusion of the response to 
not have a significant skew towards only one of the technique as in that case the 
benefit of having more than one samples would be significantly mitigated.  
Confidence Level Weight based on Confidence Level 
B3 3 
B2 2 
B1 1 
B0 0.5 
Table 6-1: Decision Level weights according to confidence levels 
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In the event that only one sample is present and used then the decision will only be 
based on the single output of the authentication decision as any weighting is 
cancelled out. 
 
The above process helps in determining the decision of the authentication request 
and how the AL will proceed, however there is one more aspect to consider and that 
is how the Integrity level would be modified. On the NICA framework each time an 
authentication request is taking place as part of the Alert level process an update on 
the Integrity level of the system was made to reflect how the trust to the user was 
affected by authentication request. A decrease or increase change would be 
occurring to the IL in case of a failed or a successful authentication respectively. The 
amount that this increase or decrease would be dependent on the confidence of the 
biometric technique used (This can be seen in Table 4-2 - The more confident the 
technique the highest the change on the IL).  
As in this case more than one sample are used as happened with the weighted 
decision in the authentication request a similar principle needed to be applied here 
so that the use of composite authentication can be also reflected in the integrity of 
the system. Given that a more confident approach is being used that should be able 
to provide more confidence to the user identity or remove that confidence if the 
authentication is unsuccessful. In this occasion the decision was made to update the 
IL based on the sum of the increment/decrement value corresponding to the two 
techniques being used. Although a weighted average was considered initially in this 
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occasion it did not appear appropriate as when techniques with different weighting 
are being used the resulting value has less effect compared to if one sample being 
used opposing to the core idea of this approach. A similar effect occurs even if 
techniques have the same confidence as the weighted average will again result 
being the same as if one sample was used. So the IL updates is reflected in the 
following formula. 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒2  
6.1.2 Fusion Approach 2 – NICA with 3 samples fusion: 
A similar approach was used for this version of NICA. In this occasion the use of 
maximum 3 samples was applied. This staged approach was utilised so that it was 
possible to see whether by increasing the number of samples the effect on the 
authentication was becoming negative rather than improving performance. Although 
use of any sample available could be another approach this simulation gave an 
insight as will be seen in the simulation results section on how the increase of 
samples affects the performance.  
As in the first approach the Authentication Engine will seek to identify from the input 
cache the number of most recent samples available based on a specific time 
window. If more than 3 samples are present then the ones representing the highest 
confidence techniques will be utilised. If 3 recent samples are not present then will 
look to retrieve 2 following the same principle and if that is not possible then will seek 
for 1 sample etc.  
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6.1.2.1 Alert Level Modifications 
The Alert Level was again modified to reflect the use of 3 samples. A similar updated 
decision making in regards to which level should the transition of the AL process be 
needed to take place. This is reflected in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Operation of the transparent levels of AL with 3 sample fusion 
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In this occasion it was decided that if 3 samples are being used and the 
authentication fails at any stage it is more confident to say that the authentication 
decision based on the fusion of 3 samples can give a trust-reliant result not to 
provide another opportunity for transparent authentication and directly introduce a 
intrusive interface for explicit authentication. As aforementioned in the previous 
sections this principle was not applied in the first version to mitigate the event of 
having a low performance technique driving the AL directly to an intrusive stage. 
However given 3 samples this decision can be made more confidently.  If 3 samples 
are not present then the operation defaults back to the first approach as can be seen 
in the flow chart. 
6.1.2.2 Decision Level Fusion 
The same principle was followed as in the first approach with now though the 
weighted average of the fusion to represent all 3 techniques if 3 samples are used. 
Similarly the update on the IL to reflect the sum of all integrity change value of the 3 
techniques. 
6.2 Fusion models simulation 
The simulation seeks to follow what would be considered as normal operation of the 
framework.  The only exception to the rule is that in the enhanced versions of NICA 
which could be utilising 1, 2 or 3 samples each time and reset to -1 level for the 
former 2 or -2 levels for the latter. During transparent operation when utilising one 
sample then the alert level mechanism drops only -1 level in the event of successful 
authentication. However in the simulation during the intrusive stage it will reset to 
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level 1 without taking the number of samples into account considering a successful 
pass. In a real case scenario it would only request one explicit sample but that could 
depend on the setting of the framework – as it could extend to also to composite 
authentication with fusion. However since these samples would be provided explicitly 
it is envisaged to be clearer, better sample(s) that would be characteristic enough for 
the biometric algorithms to have a good performance, something that as 
aforementioned is not always going to be the case for the transparent stages and 
therefore the intrusive stage would be expected to be less prone to FAR.  This 
decision on the intrusive stage is based on using the strongest available technique 
and therefore confidence level on the device and for the purposes of this experiment 
a B3 level was used. As such also the integrity level was modified respectively in 
each occasion.  
6.2.1 Alert Level & Integrity Change Time Windows 
Given the experience of the NICA original prototype development, evaluation and the 
simulation results further to the performance of the biometric algorithms it was 
apparent that 2 important elements that play a significant role in the performance of 
the framework – the AL Window and IL Window. These 2 factors have been seen to 
significantly impact the performance of the framework and as such further different 
approaches were considered in this simulation. The time windows in which the Alert 
level is triggered plays a significant role to determining how often authentication 
would take place, which is in turn dependent on the availability of samples. 
Particularly in the simulation of the fusion versions as more than one samples would 
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be sought the timing of authentication request could be also of more significance to 
the performance of the approaches.  
Given that there is the requirement for transparency but also monitoring the security 
level of the device at the same time these two aspects and consequently the time 
variables are proportionally inverse with each other - as always happens when 
seeking to balance security and usability. As seen in the previous simulation the 
more often the Alert level mechanism gets triggered the more security can be 
achieved and the less often the integrity drops the more convenience can be 
established by minimising the security aspect and vice versa.  The problem exists at 
finding a balance between the two variables so that the one does not diminish the 
effect that the other has on the operation of the framework. Given the previous 
simulation results it was considered that there is scope to further investigate the 
relativeness of these two values and how effective they may be.  
Based on the above a number of different time window settings were decided to be 
tested during the simulation. This was envisaged to provide a further insight of how 
these variables affect operation. The time settings are depicted in Table 6-2 
    
Alert Level (IL) Time 
Windows Integrity Level (AL) Time Windows 
2 1 2 6 
5 3 5 12 
10 7 10 25 
20 15 20 50 
Table 6-2: Time windows  
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The values selected represent 3 different settings for the IL time window – to be less, 
equal or more than the AL timing. That would give an idea on how the framework will 
be affected from having the IL drop in different frequencies. For each of the AL 
windows each of the corresponding IL window was tested. The above windows were 
tested so much for the fusion approaches as well as the original framework.  
6.2.2 Summative Comparison Results 
The following section presents the results of the fusion models in comparison to the 
original NICA as well as the evaluation of the different time windows. The results 
discussed here will be focusing on best EERs as the worst EERs produced a similar 
result as happened in the first tests and therefore the results will not be discussed 
here but can be found in Appendix D.  
6.2.2.1 Fusion Models vs NICA 
Using the same datasets as in Chapter 5, simulation code was written for the 
adapted fusion models. The results of the simulation for the previously used time 
windows are depicted in Figure 6.3 and the original NICA results are included for the 
purposes of comparison. As can be seen the fusion models manage to achieve and 
maintain a higher trust than NICA whilst utilising one sample. This is the case for all 
time windows achieving a 3.8-4.0 for the 2 smaller windows. Although the integrity of 
close to 3 is also achieved for the large time windows as aforementioned although it 
provided good usability the security of the system is not considered appropriate 
given the large time span. It can be seen how also this large gap in authentication 
also drops average integrity by a great amount as no much opportunity to 
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authenticate exists. Nevertheless it is apparent that the use of fusion raises the trust 
for an authorised user to a quite higher level which it is expected to be interpreted in 
high levels of transparency for protected service access whilst maintain good 
security with short authentication time spans.  
A further notable result is that the improvement coming from exploring 3 sample 
fusion model is minimal. This could be the effect of non-existent samples for such 
authentication or that simply the chosen fusion or framework operation does not 
benefit from such approach/algorithm. Given that these results represent high usage 
profiles the latter is more likely to be the major reason in this case as samples are 
likely to be available. However this is arguable given the consideration that the 
particular dataset as aforementioned represent only initiation e.g. of an application 
rather than the samples that can be selected during its usage. The other 
consideration could be that the samples available may not at all cases represent 
high confidence samples. However given the fair randomness of the confidence 
levels that have been generated this is unlikely to have a significant effect here. 
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Figure 6.3: NICA vs Fusion Models for Authorised User on High Usage 
 
Although there was a consideration that the use of fusion could cause a negative 
effect on the framework due to FRRs but as can be seen from the results this is not 
the case. The performance does not seem to be negatively affected from larger 
updates in integrity as a result of the weighting functions showing that a fair 
distribution of weightings has been achieved. Also given that the AL does not reset 
after the use of one sample rather it sets at -1/-2 level of the AL it allows for more 
enhanced monitoring of the device and seem to assist in maintaining the integrity on 
high levels and therefore managing to reach a better level of trust. Although these 
two parameters have not been assessed individually here the combination of them 
works towards the increased integrity. It would have been good to see these two 
factors working in practice together so much to be able to also assess how this 
increased authentication may affect issues like processing or be prone to negative 
effect due to FRR but this is not possible due to time restrictions.  
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Figure 6.4 shows a characteristic example of how average integrity changes 
according to samples to give a visual representation across the 3 approaches on the 
one of the best performing time windows. As can be seen the larger improvement 
occurs as the number of samples used increases. The hours are not arranged 
necessarily the same on all graphs rather than being represented on increased order 
based on the number of samples that have been used in each approach to detect 
whether the increased number of samples used in each authentication actually 
affected the good operation of the framework. What can be noticed is that fusion has 
a more consistent performance regardless of the number of samples that are being 
used providing that would potentially benefit the approach in differing sample 
availability. The representation of the results for comparison across the same hour 
for all models can be seen in Figure 6.5 where again the improved performance is 
apparent where also it can be noticed as seen previously that fusion models are too 
close in performance and there is not much improvement in using further fusion. 
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Figure 6.4: NICA vs Fusion Models across all hours based on best performing window. 
 
Figure 6.5: NICA vs Fusion Models across all unordered hours based on best performing 
window 
The individual performance across a specific hour varied from case to case. 
Although there are quite clear limits of where mainly integrity lies in each approach, 
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there were of course particular hours that the framework would not perform well 
under specific approaches. This is mainly an effect of the number of samples and 
timing of them as well the biometric technique coming each time at specific steps of 
the AL mechanism. So for example if in the enhanced version of NICA utilising 2 
samples, if low confident techniques are being used at the upper levels of the 
mechanism that mean that the AL would be constantly reducing the level but not 
resetting the AL mechanism.  In cases as for example where the AL will be waiting 
for the next sample to come in and there is no activity on the device, a two-fold effect 
occurs. The integrity would keep dropping periodically as it is an independent 
function whereas the AL mechanism would be tilted and on hold not having the 
chance to raise the integrity of the system causing the latter to be reduced 
significantly.   
Similar improved results for fusion were achieved for medium and low usage profiles. 
The results are depicted in Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7. Fusion models manage to 
achieve a much higher integrity regardless the lower usage of the device showing 
fusion outperforming the original NICA and offering a better operation of the system. 
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Figure 6.6: NICA vs Fusion Models for Authorised User on Medium Usage 
 
Figure 6.7: NICA vs Fusion Models for Authorised User on Low Usage 
 
The results for an impostor are presented in Figure 6.8 which show that fusion 
models follow a good level of security for impostor as NICA did with no particular 
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differentiation. Although this can provide an indication of how the integrity drops, the 
real test for the security aspect is better evaluated though protected service access. 
 
Figure 6.8: NICA vs Fusion models for Impostor User 
 
The simulation results for the authorised user gave the results depicted in Figure 6.9. 
The graphs show the average integrity achieved by the system across all hours 
when using the 3 different variations of the framework. As can be seen from the 
graphs the original NICA framework has the worst performance across the band. 
Both the enhanced versions achieve a better integrity to be maintained.  
As it can be seen on the graphs the time windows and their relativeness notably 
affect the framework performance. It can be noticed how the integrity for the larger 
windows appear less effective. Given these series of tests what is to be noticed is 
that on average when integrity is dropping more regularly than the AL is triggered 
this notably decreases the integrity of the system. This is solely the effect of IL 
dropping too regularly since the AL mechanism stays constant and counteracting 
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any positive effect that the AL mechanism has. However these changes are more 
notable in the smaller time windows and far more subtle to the larger windows as 
anyway the relative events are going to occur less frequently. 
It can be seen that for windows like AL=10 & AL=20 the average integrity is 
maintained close to 3 or even above for the enhanced frameworks and close to 1-2 
degrees lower for NICA. Although this means that the user will be likely to be 
experiencing high usability depending on the application use, it also again places a 
concern regarding system security as given to this level of integrity as authentication 
is low with this type of large windows. We can see also that the average integrity 
does not change significantly for the AL time windows 5 and 10 for the enhanced 
versions where the IL window are the same of greater than the AL window, 
experiencing a variation less than 0.5. That is potentially the effect of the degradation 
function having little to add to the integrity of the system as in comparison with the 
role of the authentication requests.  
Based on these results it can be suggested that the relativeness of time windows are 
originally defined in NICA with the AL window being smaller than the IL window 
offers a better performance however they need to be a few degrees smaller than 
originally defined. More frequent authentication can lead to a higher integrity being 
maintained and particularly with the fusion models this reaches quite high and 
satisfactory levels- something that will be further investigated with protected access. 
What becomes apparent from the results is that the single dimensionality of NICA 
causes the integrity to rise only as much as the corresponding biometric technique 
used each time allows which in turn is affected by the IL drop every so often.  The 
 
190 
 
Modelling of enhanced fusion models 
 
values between the increase due to a successful authentication request and the IL 
drop are quite close that unless the timings are very far apart and big in duration the 
IL drop overpowers as it is most likely to occur more often. Whereas with the 
enhanced models given the integrity could be raised more confidently and thus 
higher provides a bigger opportunity to the framework to be usable. Both of the 2 
approaches have an effect on security and a potential risk. In the former NICA 
approach the fact that bigger time windows would mean more intrusive system 
whereas as to the latter approach the framework could potentially raise the integrity 
high and if the IL window does not have a quick effect on it would be also leaving a 
window of opportunity for misuse.  The way that the framework operates this is not 
an aspect that can be mitigated but requires a more individual configuration of these 
settings which again are not going to fit all scenarios.   
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Figure 6.9: NICA vs Fusion Models for the Authorised User based on time windows variations 
 
The aforementioned effect of the relativity between the IL time window and AL 
window is apparent in Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11. It can be noticed in more detail 
here (Figure 6.10) how the different combinations affect the original NICA framework 
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with seeing that the original defined relativeness of the time windows disbenefit the 
operation whereas the reverse balance between the windows improves as the time 
windows become larger. Although the former case still provides better security and 
transparency it makes more apparent that the setting of such framework cannot 
follow a fit-all-users approach as it very much depends on various factors such as 
use, timing, user profile and biometric techniques that are likely to affect the efficient 
performance of the system.  
As has been aforementioned and can be seen in Figure 6.11 for the fusion 
approaches these changes are far more subtle and integrity manages to be 
maintained in high levels with again the small time windows being a better approach. 
 
Figure 6.10: NICA performance with time window variation 
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Figure 6.11: NICA with 2 sample fusion with time window variation 
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in conjunction with smaller windows take better advantage of cases when the usage 
of device is restricted in time as such potentially is at a better position in offering a 
good level of transparency to the user. Use the following 2 samples to show that 
integrity does not have the chance to increase as the samples are crowded to only a 
specific interval. 
Figure 6.12: Variation of integrity when NICA is applied 
 
Figure 6.13: Variation of integrity when NICA fusion is applied 
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6.2.2.2 NICA vs Fusion models - Protected Services Results for Authorised User 
To assess the performance of fusion in the protection of protected services and 
transparency of the approach, a similar simulation to Chapter 5 was implemented. 
The simulations run for all approaches and all time windows. Table 6-3 presents the 
results of the simulation for NICA and the 2 new versions relatively to the time 
windows displaying the average number of intrusive requests occurring per hour in 
the high usage scenario. These results represent the case the IL was not updated as 
originally defined by NICA framework.  
As can be seen there is a significant reduction of intrusive requests due to the fusion 
models on all time windows, further underlying that offers a far more transparent 
approach for the user. These results provide a more representative view of the 
general average as to how much less intrusive the framework becomes with being 
able to establish a higher IL even with the use of a further sample. Although it was 
seen in the previous section that certain changes were more subtle than others that 
still this translates to a fair amount of intrusive requests which could play a fair role in 
the transparency of the framework.  
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Time Window & Integrity drop 
IL same as AL AL 2 - IL 2 AL 5 - IL 5 AL 10 - IL 10 AL 20 - IL 20 
NICA 25.74 28.12 31.21 34.59 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 9.99 12.79 17.66 24.81 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 9.48 12.25 17.01 24.23 
IL less than AL AL 2- IL 1 AL 5- IL 3 AL 10- IL 7 AL 20- IL 15 
NICA 44.06 37.39 34.94 36.17 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 16.08 15.89 19.58 26.08 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 15.2 15.28 19.02 25.55 
IL more than AL AL 2- IL 5 AL 5- IL 12 AL 10- IL 25 AL 20- IL 50 
NICA 16.19 22.09 27.01 32.3 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 7.33 11.27 16.31 23.83 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 7.05 10.91 15.92 23.45 
Table 6-3: NICA vs Fusion – Number of intrusive requests as a result of accessing protected 
services during high usage with no integrity update as series of events or as independent 
events during the hour ( 57 services per hour) 
 
It can be seen here more clearly than the previous section is that smaller windows 
seem to perform better here as well in most cases for the different versions of AL 
and IL timings. Given the analysis of the overall results, the degradation function 
does not seem to be the key player in the transparency of the framework here as in 
occasions that it is triggered more often that still maintains a fair level of access. The 
downside here seems to be the missed opportunities for authentication that could 
affect integrity and the luck of integrity increase during an active usage period.  
As has been aforementioned the translation of the results is 2 fold. The results in 
Table 6-3 show not only intrusiveness of NICA with no updates in case of the 
scenario of all protected services occurring as a series of events but also any of 
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them occurring proving further the outperforming of fusion with a significant 
improvement in transparency. 
When introducing the update on integrity as a result of the intrusive request on 
protected service, the result with fusion further improves (Table 6-4). With the results 
presented on high usage profiles it can be seen that such approach makes the 
framework far more transparent for the user whilst managing to establish a good 
level of trust.  
 
Time Window & Integrity drop 
IL same as AL AL 2 - IL 2 AL 5 - IL 5 AL 10 - IL 10 AL 20 - IL 20 
NICA 7.16 5.06 3.92 3.07 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 4.84 3.71 3.1 2.61 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 4.82 3.7 3.1 2.61 
IL less than AL AL 2- IL 1 AL 5- IL 3 AL 10- IL 7 AL 20- IL 15 
NICA 10.82 6.55 4.73 3.64 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 7.75 5.23 4.05 3.34 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 7.74 5.23 4.05 3.34 
IL more than AL AL 2- IL 5 AL 5- IL 12 AL 10- IL 25 AL 20- IL 50 
NICA 4.75 3.66 2.92 2.4 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 3.38 2.97 2.59 2.33 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 3.37 2.97 2.59 2.33 
Table 6-4: NICA vs Fusion – Number of intrusive requests as a result of accessing a protected 
service during high usage as a series of events with integrity update (57 services per hour) 
 
Here it can be seen that the smaller the window the intrusive requests increase by 
close to 1 and fusion performs for that amount better. Here the effect of the 
degradation function within the larger windows has little to no effect considering it 
takes place once or twice during the hour. In contrast with the original NICA the 
degradation function differences are more apparent here although appears to again 
play a small role given the little difference in the results. The amount of improvement 
in fusion is less in comparison to the original NICA with no integrity updates during 
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protected service access however still shows that it can be a better solution given 
sample availability as it can reach higher integrity in a shorter amount of time. 
6.2.2.3 NICA vs Fusion models  - Protected Services Results for Impostor 
To assess the performance of each approach for an impostor a series of two tests 
took place. One was looking at the system starting from IL=0 and the other starting 
from IL=5 at the beginning of each hour. That would give the opportunity to see the 
response of the system so much after a period of inactivity as well as the occasion of 
an impostor accessing the device directly after an authorised user has established 
the highest levels of integrity and assess the opportunities of misuse. The results 
presented in Table 6-5 and Table 6-6 represent the occasion of an impostor 
accessing any of the protected services at their given time as independent events 
though the hour examining how many services would an impostor be able to access 
in an effort to access the device at any of these times.  
 
Time Window & Integrity drop 
IL same as AL AL 2 - IL 2 AL 5 - IL 5 AL 10 - IL 10 AL 20 - IL 20 
NICA 0.0313 0.0587 0.0914 0.1567 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 0.0248 0.0431 0.0718 0.1162 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 0.0248 0.0431 0.0718 0.1162 
IL less than AL AL 2- IL 1 AL 5- IL 3 AL 10- IL 7 AL 20- IL 15 
NICA 0.03 0.0522 0.0888 0.1514 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 0.0248 0.0431 0.0718 0.1162 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 0.0248 0.0431 0.0718 0.1162 
IL more than AL AL 2- IL 5 AL 5- IL 12 AL 10- IL 25 AL 20- IL 50 
NICA 0.0339 0.0601 0.0914 0.1567 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 0.0248 0.0431 0.0718 0.1162 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 0.0248 0.0431 0.0718 0.1162 
Table 6-5: Number of protected services accessed by an impostor during high usage as 
independent events starting at IL=0 (57 services per hour) 
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As seen in Table 6-5 there is a small opportunity of misuse due primarily to false 
positives which translates to accessing the lowest security services defined at 0 
which basically means basic use of the device by the same amount presented in the 
table. Of course this may increase depending on the false positives that may occur. 
When running the same experiment under the scenario of accessing the protected 
services as a series of events and therefore the intrusive interface would be invoked 
at the first occasion of accessing a protected service without the required security 
(where the simulation in the hour would end as well unless there was a false 
positive), the results showed a 0.0068% possibility of accessing any services almost 
diminishing any misuse. Fusion with 2 or 3 samples show no differentiation as the 
integrity that can be achieved did not change much between the two approaches. 
The more representative and stress test is when starting at IL=5 the results of which 
are presented in Table 6-6. As can be seen for all windows there is close to at least 
an opportunity of accessing a protected service which translates of accessing close 
to 1 protected service per hour with that possibility increasing as the windows get 
larger (as would be expected). This time this does not only translate to access of 
only low security services but also to highly protected services however with a small 
amount of 0.035% for level 5 and 0.14% for level 4 leading down to 0.65% for basic 
usage for the best performing windows of AL-2 & IL-5. Full breakdown of the results 
can be found in Appendix D. 
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Time Window & Integrity drop 
IL same as AL AL 2 - IL 2 AL 5 - IL 5 AL 10 - IL 10 AL 20 - IL 20 
NICA 1.0718 1.4791 2.0783 3.0339 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 1 1.312 1.7742 2.3016 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 1 1.312 1.7742 2.3016 
IL less than AL AL 2- IL 1 AL 5- IL 3 AL 10- IL 7 AL 20- IL 15 
NICA 1.0209 1.3903 1.9883 2.9138 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 0.9634 1.2337 1.6958 2.2298 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 0.9634 1.2337 1.6958 2.2298 
IL more than AL AL 2- IL 5 AL 5- IL 12 AL 10- IL 25 AL 20- IL 50 
NICA 1.141 1.5653 2.2689 3.3238 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 1.0718 1.3956 1.9426 2.564 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 1.0718 1.3956 1.9426 2.564 
Table 6-6: Number of protected services being accessed by an impostor during high usage as 
independent events starting at IL=5 (57 services per hour) 
 
Table 6-7 shows the results when an impostor is trying to access the protected 
services as a series of events. Here there is again an improvement although more 
subtle which is however expected given the small window that there is any chance to 
misuse the device. Nevertheless it appears that fusion has a better chance to close 
down access in comparison with NICA whilst the window is small enough as there is 
going to be a bigger drop in integrity. The latter counteracts the possibility of false 
positives and impacts on the integrity far greater than the degradation function.  
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Time Window & Integrity drop 
IL same as AL AL 2 - IL 2 AL 5 - IL 5 AL 10 - IL 10 AL 20 - IL 20 
NICA 0.8185 0.9478 1.124 1.3916 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 0.7781 0.8864 1.0574 1.3094 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 0.7781 0.8864 1.0574 1.3094 
IL less than AL AL 2- IL 1 AL 5- IL 3 AL 10- IL 7 AL 20- IL 15 
NICA 0.7924 0.906 1.0614 1.3198 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 0.7585 0.8446 0.9948 1.2389 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 0.7585 0.8446 0.9948 1.2389 
IL more than AL AL 2- IL 5 AL 5- IL 12 AL 10- IL 25 AL 20- IL 50 
NICA 0.8251 0.9491 1.124 1.3916 
NICA with 2 sample fusion 0.782 0.8877 1.0574 1.3094 
NICA with 3 sample fusion 0.782 0.8877 1.0574 1.3094 
Table 6-7: Number of protected services being accessed by an impostor as series of events 
during high usage at IL=5 (57 services per hour) 
 
The same series of tests were performed for the random sets of 20 protected 
services starting at IL=5 as a better stress test. Table 6-8 shows the results for all 
versions proving only here the best performing windows in general. For a set of 
results please refer to Appendix D. Here all versions seem to perform well compared 
to each other with little change; leaving misuse opportunities with the majority being 
at lower risk services with a 1.65% and 1.5% possibility of falsely access by an 
impostor for fusion as independent events and a series respectively till the 
framework manages restrict access.  
 AL 2 IL 5 
AL 5 
IL 12 
AL 10 
IL 25 
AL 20 
IL 50 
AL 2 
IL 5 
AL 5 
IL 12 
AL 10 
IL 25 
AL 20 
IL 50 
 As independent events As a series of events 
NICA 0.4634 0.6449 0.8668 1.1971 0.3172 0.376 0.4648 0.5326 
NICA with 2 samples 0.4504 0.6057 0.782 1.0261 0.3094 0.3616 0.4386 0.5065 
NICA with 3 samples 0.4504 0.6057 0.782 1.0261 0.3094 0.3616 0.4386 0.5065 
Table 6-8: Possibility of a protected service being accessed by an impostor during high usage 
for random timed protected services (20 services per hour) 
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6.3 Discussion & Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the application of fusion within the NICA framework seeking to 
see the effect on its performance. After introducing modifications to the NICA 
mechanisms to incorporate fusion, a series of experiments showed that the fusion 
approaches give an improvement compared to the original framework over various 
timing windows. Fusion seems to be able to maintain a better trust on the authorised 
user based on the given usage scenarios whilst utilising the available biometric 
samples. Given availability of samples, fusion offers a more confident result and 
therefore being able to raise integrity at higher levels and providing better 
transparency. Even though the improvements in terms of the integrity maintained are 
subtle in some cases it stills offers a more trustworthy approach, as decisions when 
applicable are based on more than one sample. That is a two-fold benefit not only in 
the ability of raising the integrity but also possibly lowering the possibility of misuse 
straight after the use by an authorised user since the presence of authorised 
samples would not be able on their own to permit access. In NICA, the most recent 
sample with higher confidence could be that of an authorised user given particular 
timings. With fusion that effect can be possibly counteracted.   
The improvement was found to be subtle for the best combinations of time windows 
however by fusion performing better compared to the one-sample approach in 
different time window combinations shows that it offers a more flexible and dynamic 
approach in comparison to the latter more linear approach. Given that the series of 
these experiments was testing the data only taking into account the biometric EERs 
without taking into account the environmental conditions it is believed that the 
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performance of fusion and one-sample approach is closer that it would be in real 
conditions. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter fusion is expected to be 
more tolerant to FRR due to bad and/or mobile conditions given that the decision is 
based on more than one sample and/or technique.  
The operation of fusion and the change in the decision process so that the AL does 
not reset to L1 after a successful one sample authentication gave the opportunity to 
the framework raise better levels of integrity whilst at the same time providing better 
protection to the device a FAR due to a bad sample or failing of a biometric algorithm 
would not provide access to an impostor for the duration of the AL hibernation.  
Fusion seems to also operate better across all levels of usage activity. Although the 
difference is not substantially large compared to one-sample authentication it is 
considered a more confident decision based system and in far less intrusive. This 
can be seen particularly in the protected service results based and on how NICA was 
originally defined. In the event of a protected service access NICA would utilise the 
IL simply as a monitoring mechanism in such event causing no change in IL. That 
produced a largely intrusive mechanism as even though the user would gain access 
to a protected service their current IL status at that particular moment would not be 
raised and the AL would also hibernate. Given cases where protected service 
access continues the user would keep getting intrusive interfaces going through the 
same process with no chance for the IL to be raised in a state that allows for 
transparent use of the device. At these occasions the application of fusion brought 
better results as it gave the framework the opportunity during usage of the device to 
maintain a heightened level of integrity and thus making the framework far less 
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intrusive. The introduction on the IL change at any case of intrusive authentication 
further counteracted the intrusiveness of original NICA with the results showed that 
introduces a significant improvement in all NICA versions. Given the large number of 
protected services tested here it is expected that scaling this down to normal 
operation the percentage of intrusive requests could be minimal however that would 
depend on the timing of access relevantly to the at time use of the device. Given a 
period of inactivity the user would need most likely to authenticate for a high security 
usage as though is the purpose of the framework and thus protect the device from 
unauthorised access.  
As seen in the results and the different variations that are possible there is need to 
configure the framework to match the usage of the device. Given that for low, 
medium and high usage there is a difference in performance as well as the 
complication that the time variables bring to the framework’s operation is unsure as 
to how it would best suit a particular user. As seen in the initial analysis of the 
datasets as well the usage of the device is not subjective to particular periods and as 
such it would not be easy to establish a fit all configuration regarding time windows 
that would provide the optimal configuration for both transparency and security at all 
times.  
  
 
205 
 
CASper – a New Framework Approach 
 
7 CASper – a New Framework Approach 
The simulation of NICA and the enhanced approaches gave an insight to the large 
variability of the factors affecting authentication. The amount of settings that are 
required and the different options that exist create a problem from a practical 
perspective. For example, what are the most appropriate time windows for each type 
of usage and user.  The objectivity that is required in the definition of those variables 
poses a problem to the way that the framework currently operates. This trade-off 
between offering flexibility and a user-specific configuration of the authentication 
mechanism becomes very apparent when setting those variables and realising the 
impact they have upon authentication.  
7.1 CASper Enhancement Model 
To try to counteract the above issues a different approach was sought that would 
provide a solution to the security and usability trade-off without the challenges of 
defining the variables. The approach moves somewhat away from the multi-level 
approach whilst keeping the multi-sample fusion authentication that appears to help 
the authentication decision. The simulation of the protected services component 
showed that monitoring based upon the confidence level was operating well in both 
approaches and thus this was an aspect of the framework that was kept within this 
new concept.  
Identifying the problems of the AL and IL time windows and their interconnectivity 
and dependencies it was considered that tying those 2 aspects together would 
provide an easier and a more realistically configurable framework. Given that these 
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may be aspects that a user needs to set there needs to be a way of providing a more 
usable approach and one that a user can easily become familiarized with and 
understand the consequences of the settings - to the extent that user awareness 
allows. Given that the possible stakeholders selecting to utilise such mechanism 
would have a certain level of privacy concerns and possibly business requirements a 
certain level of awareness would be expected. But also for a simple home user it is 
an easier to understand approach – by implementing a ‘trust on-trust off’ mechanism, 
something that is closer what an average user can comprehend in regards to 
security. 
The approach to merge the AL and IL together was achieved with rather than 
providing 2 timed events with possible opposite effect on the system – of one 
seeking to maintain/raise and the other lower integrity, one timed event would take 
place. That event would seek for appropriate authentication samples and modify the 
integrity of the system based on the authentication decision in a weighted manner 
depending on the number of samples pursuing 2 sample fusion that showed 
confident performance. The 3 sample fusion approach was not pursued for testing 
this approach as showed minimal differentiation in these set of tests, however given 
the setting of the approach any type of multilevel fusion can be incorporated. In the 
event of a successful result the integrity would be raised accordingly whilst 
maintaining access to the device and the AL mechanism would be reset and 
retriggered in x minutes. Otherwise the authentication would be triggered again 
seeking for the next available and timely samples. If authentication requests are 
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failing, the system would keep dropping the integrity level till it reaches its minimum 
value of -5 where the system would be locked leading to the respective AL level 6.  
The degradation function as originally defined has been removed. Since the user has 
gained the integrity at a specific time and by defining a small enough time window of 
retriggering the AL mechanism there is little scope to decrease integrity as it is 
assumed that the user continues to use the device. In this way the authorised user is 
not negatively affected by a periodic drop of the integrity that eliminates the effect the 
authentication has achieved so far –something that was also a restrictive outcome of 
the evaluation. At the event the AL mechanism retriggers and that no samples are 
present, then integrity of the system is reset at 0 and keep waiting for the next 
available sample. This would be representing a case of inactivity and therefore the 
trust to the user resets to minimum. In this way no window of misuse is left open 
which essentially also means no access of protected services. In the case that an 
impostor will pick up the device then CASper due to the continuous monitoring would 
continue to decrease the integrity (unless FARs occur constantly) and thus restricting 
access to any services till lock down of the device. This counteracts the presence of 
the degradation function by targeting to establish a balance between security and 
transparency of operation. Even if the impostor have picked up the device straight 
after an authorised user which would mean that authorised samples are going to 
exist in Cache, using the fusion approach it increases the possibilities of rejecting the 
impostor. Although CASper provides more flexibility to the impostor as well as it may 
take more authentications to reach the device lock that it may in NICA, the use of the 
integrity for accessing any services would provide protection and restriction to that 
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anyway and therefore not risking the accessing of sensitive data or services. At the 
same time resetting integrity to 0 rather than locking access does not lock access to 
any basic use of the device. The CASper algorithm operation is depicted in Figure 
7.1. As can be seen CASper does not quite have levels as NICA. There is primarily a 
cyclical operation of looking for samples kind of representing a loop between the L1 
and L3 (–if reached) of NICA. All access is controlled via the IL. In the particular 
implementation as no intrusive stages are concerned device lock occurs when IL 
reaches -5. In a more generic specification of such approach a series of intrusive 
stages could be introduced at -5 or even at any level under IL of 0 and therefore 
provide a staged shut down of the device at any failed request after that. That could 
be a user or an administrator preference to be set up during device configuration. 
However, given the way the algorithm works, it is considered that defining an 
intrusive authentication at every level under 0 could trigger frequent intrusive 
requests in cases of inactivity. Essentially this is a surpass of levels which are now 
controlled by the IL in regards to how many opportunities the user gets. In that way 
restricted access is achieved however without a set number of efforts that the user 
gets.  
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Figure 7.1: CASper Alert Level Mechanism 
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the security as given the previous approach the window of misuse becomes bigger.  
At any time if a request comes for a protected service the operation follows the same 
approach as to assessing whether the current integrity matches the security criteria. 
If not then explicit authentication would be requested as normal again updating the 
integrity level accordingly. In the event of an unsuccessful authentication whilst 
accessing a protected service the framework will continue the same operation while 
zeroing integrity. Given that high confidence techniques would be used like B3 which 
would be modifying the integrity by 2 this would mean that till the lock down of -5, 3 
intrusive requests would be reached at maximum before lock down and therefore 
giving at worst case scenario 1 more intrusive stage to the user compared to NICA. 
However given that the integrity of the system is lowered at the same time access to 
any services is protected at any case and therefore the security of the system is not 
compromised.   
At the same time this approach although it does not necessarily offer an intrusive 
opportunity by default after 3 transparent fails as NICA, it does still allow the use of 
the device by an authorised user in the event of bad conditions that would restrict fair 
acquisition of some techniques for authenticating the user providing some 
opportunity of getting good samples. Although access to protected services may be 
restricted the user can still have any pre-defined basic use of the device and when 
they wish to access a protected service then of course they would need to provide 
explicit authentication as would happen in NICA as well. If they reach the predefined 
level that would provide them with an intrusive authentication opportunity this would 
raise the integrity level and more opportunities exists of regaining the trust to the 
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authorised user by looking for samples whilst not locking the device and not burden 
the integrity further by a periodic drop at the same time. Something that in the event 
of the impostor would act negatively as the trust would be continuously dropping 
under constant authentication whilst restricting access to services. In both NICA and 
CASper, these opportunities are given to counteract also poor environmental 
conditions however it does not necessarily mean that it would allow for the biometric 
techniques to work even intrusively as for example a noisy or a dark environment 
would not allow for good samples regardless of the way of acquisition. As such in 
both systems the intrusiveness may exists more than envisaged as the performance 
relies on samples and algorithm performance. 
With these modifications several aspects are simulated and substituted with one 
function and simplifying the operation as well as the setting of the framework. The 
requirement of different variables setting is minimised and the only requirement 
remains the definition of the one timed event – that being the triggering of the AL 
mechanism. At the same time transparency is maintained at all times apart of lock 
down or access of protected services. 
7.2 CASper Simulation Results 
The simulation for CASper followed a similar approach to NICA and fusion models 
with the same datasets. In regards to the simulation in this case only one timing 
variable needed to be set and that is the triggering of the authentication mechanism 
– the CAS window. The windows used to be tested here were 2, 5, and 10 minutes. 
Taken the lessons learned and the aforementioned discussion of triggering of the 
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authentication mechanism every 20 minutes being insufficiently long it was not used 
in this simulation. 
In these series of tests looking at the average integrity across the hour CASper did 
not appear at first to manage to maintain high levels of average integrity compared to 
similar time windows with NICA versions. As can be seen in Figure 7.2 CASper 
maintains low average integrity across the hour however appear to be consistent 
regardless the time window in comparison with NICA which varied in cases close to 
1 degree depending on the time window. This may translate to a more consistent 
solution regardless configuration but that is to be examined from the further results. 
The low percentages of average integrity in comparison to NICA were not an 
unexpected result. Given that CASper operates on a binary state of some or no 
Integrity whilst no samples are present or a fail authentication occurs does not keep 
the integrity raised as NICA does. NICA maintains the integrity between 
authentication windows as the degradation function only modifies it by a small 
amount. That provides of course a better average with leverage on transparency and 
a trade-off to security. Given the difference in operation makes here average integrity 
not great means of comparison as was for NICA versions. The later results of 
demonstrating transparency and security during protected service access provides a 
better insight where the basis for protection of the framework lies. 
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Figure 7.2: CASper average Integrity for the authorised user during high usage hours 
 
 
Figure 7.3 demonstrates the average integrity of CASper across the different hours 
of high usage showing an increase of average integrity towards the right side of the 
graph that represents hours with higher sample availability. Given the possibility of 
more samples CASper may have the ability to maintain higher levels of integrity for 
the particular active periods as in each authentication the integrity can be increased 
or at least maintained due to authentication being able to take place. However is not 
expected to ever be higher from NICA as aforementioned due to its binary ‘on-off’ 
mechanism. 
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Figure 7.3: CASper average integrity in all high usage hours by increasing number of samples 
 
Simply for demonstration reasons the impostor percentages are also presented here 
where CASper shows the similar averages as NICA does. However the security 
against an impostor needs to be assessed with the protected service access tests. 
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Figure 7.4: CASper average integrity for an impostor during high usage hours. 
 
 
To provide a representation of the difference between the two algorithms Figure 7.5 
shows how integrity changes during a random hour for NICA and CASper. 
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(a) NICA 
 
(b) CASper 
Figure 7.5: NICA(a) & CASper(b) integrity changes during an hour 
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As can be seen from the figures NICA manages to maintain its average integrity high 
due to the degradation function whereas CASper operates binary and although it 
allows for the integrity to be raised in high levels by the close of windows or failed 
authentication it zeros integrity closing any window for misuse. That leads to the 
need to rebuild the integrity from 0 each time samples are not present or fail. NICA 
on the other side maintains any gained integrity for longer offering good 
transparency but lower security. As can be seen from the particular example in 
Figure 7.5(a) although the last sample used and present was at close to minute 40 
for 20 minutes after the integrity is maintained down to 2.5 of course at no use of the 
device. If during that period there was some use of the device there is the possibility 
for unauthorised access which however depending on the timing of the access in 
relation to the alert level triggering could be counteracted by running 2-3 
authentication requests. CASper on the other side drops that possibility by directly 
closing the window after 2 min (in this example of window). But furthermore in the 
event of an impostor accessing a device only one unauthorised sample (with the 
exception of a false positive) would deny service access directly. 
7.2.1 Protected services Results 
7.2.1.1 Authorised User 
The same series of datasets used in NICA were used to test the tolerance of CASper 
mechanism. As discussed earlier no intrusive levels where defined here apart from 
device lock and therefore the simulation of each hour stops at IL=-5 by continuously 
dropping integrity as normal. The results (Table 7-1) appears to be a bit more 
intrusive than NICA for the best performing windows as again expected given the 
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automatic integrity drop. In the initial tests the integrity updates would occur in 
transparent authentication were also applied here including a zeroing of integrity in 
case of fail. The subtle improvement that occurs with larger time windows makes the 
system a bit more transparent but it is to be accessed in relation to an impostor 
accessing the system as well.    
 Authentication Window 
Level of Usage 2 5 10 
High (57 services per hour) 6.5875 
(11.5%) 
5.7141 
(10.0%) 
4.5966 
(8.0%) 
    
Medium (26 services per hour) 5.7376 
(22.1%) 
5.2363 
(20.2%) 
4.3512 
(16.8%) 
    
Low (10 services per hour) 3.4399 
(34.4%) 
3.2885 
(32.9%) 
2.9204 
(29.2%) 
Table 7-1: Number of Intrusive Requests as a result of accessing a protected service during 
high usage with integrity updates as series of events 
  
However, looking to improve the approach given the binary operation of CASper 
consideration was given to the way that integrity updates work. In NICA they were 
introduced to take advantage of an authentication requests that in the original 
specification the user was not getting benefit from. Whilst accessing a protected 
service and getting authenticated the trust of the system could still be quite lower. So 
e.g. after inactivity the user may have trust of 1 getting authenticated for a service of 
level 5 and remain at integrity 1 whilst accessing a highly secure service. Even with 
the integrity updates that oxymoron still stands as even if the integrity still gets 
heightened at 3 with B3 level technique the user still accesses services which does 
not appear to have the integrity for. As such it was considered that CASper 
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particularly given its binary operation would benefit in transparency whilst an 
intrusive request as a result of protected service access occurs the integrity of the 
system to match the required integrity of the protected service that they are 
accessing. As such although CASper would always be a bit more intrusive it gives a 
user the opportunity during protected service access whilst the device in use to 
maintain the privileges gained by any intrusive requests and better represent the 
level of trust. Table 7-2 shows the results when the absolute match to the protected 
accessed each time is presented providing a small improvement to the system 
however what is believed a more representative trust to the user. The particular 
improvement comes from level 4 and 5 services in occasions where the user would 
not have the chance to always reach the integrity required with transparent 
authentication. Regarding the levels of usage CASper matches NICA performance in 
all types by a varying degree of 0.5-1.5 more intrusive requests per hour in all cases 
showing a standard comparative performance regardless the usage.  
 Authentication Window 
Level of Usage 2 5 10 
High (57 services per hour) 5.6227 
(9.8%) 
4.765 
(8.3%) 
3.7794 
(6.6%) 
    
Medium (26 services per hour) 4.9491 
(19.1%) 
4.4373 
(17.1%) 
3.624 
(14.0%) 
    
Low (10 services per hour) 3.0914 
(30.9%) 
2.8969 
(29.0%) 
2.5209 
(25.2%) 
Table 7-2: Number of Intrusive Requests as a result of accessing a protected service during 
high usage with integrity updates as series of events to match the level of service integrity 
requirements 
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Compared to fusion the difference for high usage translates to 0.5-2.2 more intrusive 
requests for CASper which out of the 57 protected services that are being accessed 
does not seem to cause a significant downside to transparency. The break down 
compared to NICA fusion is presented in Table 7-3. It can be seen that CASper 
closely matches the scores of fusion and although there is a very small improvement 
coming at higher protected services it does not seem to be of statistical significance.  
 
Integrity Required 2 5 10 
AL 2 
IL 5 
AL 5 
IL 12 
AL 10 
IL 25 
AL 20 
IL 50 
 Casper with Update in 
Integrity 
NICA fusion with 2 samples with 
Update in Integrity 
0 (9.4 services per hour) 0.01 
(0.1%) 
0.01 
(0.1%) 
0.01 
(0.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0% 
0 
(0.1%) 
1 (9.7 services per hour) 0.21 
(2.2%) 
0.17 
(1.8%) 
0.13 
(1.3%) 
0.06 
(0.6%) 
0.06 
(0.6%) 
0.06 
(0.6%) 
0.06 
(2.2%) 
2 (9.7 services per hour) 0.73 
(7.5%) 
0.57 
(5.9%) 
0.41 
(4.2%) 
0.16 
(1.6%) 
0.17 
(1.8%) 
0.17 
(1.8%) 
0.17 
(7.5%) 
3 (9.8 services per hour) 1.13 
(11.5%) 
0.89 
(9.1%) 
0.68 
(6.9%) 
0.31 
(3.2%) 
0.32 
(3.3%) 
0.33 
(3.4%) 
0.33 
(11.5%) 
4 (9.4 services per hour) 1.44 
(15.3%) 
1.2 
(12.8%) 
0.93 
(9.9%) 
0.52 
(5.5%) 
0.53 
(5.6%) 
0.55 
(5.9%) 
0.57 
(15.3%) 
5 (9.2 services per hour) 2.11 
(22.9%) 
1.93 
(21.0%) 
1.61 
(17.5%) 
2.33 
(25.3%) 
1.88 
(20.4%) 
1.48 
(16.1%) 
1.19 
(22.9%) 
Table 7-3: Number of intrusive requests generated on average per hour due to protected 
service access of each trust level (based on high usage and best EERs) 
 
 
221 
 
CASper – a New Framework Approach 
 
The results for random protected services following the absolute integrity match are 
presented in Table 7-4. As it can be seen CASper does not achieve the transparency 
of NICA fusion with generating close to 1.8 intrusive requests more than NICA, 
matching a near 20% of intrusiveness compared to than  11% of NICA fusion in 20 
protected services. What can be noticed is that CASper gradually increases 
intrusiveness whereas NICA fusion is highly transparent for lower security services 
while becoming a bit more intrusive for services of level 5 - making NICA fusion a 
more appropriate choice here. 
Integrity Required 2 5 10 
AL 2 
IL 5 
AL 5 
IL 12 
AL 10 
IL 25 
AL 20 
IL 50 
 Casper with Update in 
Integrity 
NICA fusion with 2 samples 
with Update in Integrity 
ALL(0-5) 
(20 services per hour) 4.094 4.004 3.401 2.285 2.257 2.201 2.14 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0.41 0.36 0.24 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 
2 0.59 0.52 0.42 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.07 
3 0.85 0.81 0.64 0.17 0.27 0.33 0.17 
4 0.95 0.95 0.82 0.34 0.4 0.52 0.34 
5 1.29 1.36 1.28 1.66 1.42 1.15 1.66 
Table 7-4: Number of intrusive requests generated on average per hour due to 20 random 
timed protected service access of each trust level (based on high usage and best EERs) 
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7.2.1.2 Impostor 
As seen in the previous section CASper matches or is a bit more intrusive than NICA 
and NICA fusion when it comes to protected service access. Comparison for the 
security of CASper is provided here regarding the ability of CASper to lock down 
access to protected services. The results of the latter for false positive access when 
protected services are access as a series of events throughout the hour with IL 
starting at 0 and 5 are depicted in Table 7-5. Results for NICA fusion are also 
presented for comparison. In regards to security CASper matches NICA 
performance in locking access for IL=5 but performs better than NICA fusion 
particularly evidently in the stress test of starting at IL=5. CASper manages in all 3 
types of usage to restrict access and with low percentages. For IL=0 there isn’t much 
differentiation as the periodic zeroing out of CASper and the intrusive interface of 
NICA do not give much opportunity for access anyway.  
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Integrity Required 2 5 10 
AL 2 
IL 5 
AL 5 
IL 12 
AL 10 
IL 25 
AL 20 
IL 50 
 Casper  NICA fusion with 2 samples  
 IL=0 IL=0 
High (57 services per 
hour) 
0.0039 
(0.01%) 
0.0039 
(0.01%) 
0.0039 
(0.01%) 
0.0039 
(0.01%) 
0.0039 
(0.01%) 
0.0039 
(0.01%) 
0.0039 
(0.01%) 
Medium(26 services per 
hour) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
Low (10 services per 
hour) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
 IL=5 IL=5 
High (57 services per 
hour) 
0.2755 
(0.48%) 
0.3812 
(0.67%) 
0.547 
(0.96%) 
0.7820 
(1.37%) 
0.8877 
(1.55%) 
1.0574 
(1.85%) 
1.3094 
(0.48%) 
Medium (26 services per 
hour) 
0.1710 
(0.66%) 
0.1828 
(0.70%) 
0.1932 
(0.74%) 
0.6436 
(2.48%) 
0.6645 
(2.56%) 
0.6775 
(2.61%) 
0.6906 
(0.66%) 
Low (10 services per 
hour) 
0.1671 
(1.67%) 
0.1671 
(1.67%) 
0.1671 
(1.67%) 
1.1501 
(11.51%) 
1.1671 
(11.68%) 
1.1749 
(11.76%) 
1.1815 
(1.67%) 
Table 7-5: Number of Protected services accessed by an impostor per hour on average during 
all types of usage as series 
 
When the protected service happens as independent events in the hour so testing 
access from an impostor at any given time CASper again shows better performance 
when noticing the stress test of IL=5 as can be noticed in the results presented in 
Table 7-6. For IL=5 shows how the gradual decrease in NICA during periods of 
inactivity may increase the chances of misuse whereas with CASper most likely the 
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zeroing out in IL largely minimizes the same opportunities. Particularly evident in 
lower levels of usage when with high inactivity the integrity would still remain high for 
large periods of time with no evidence of the user’s identity. Here as with the 
authorised user whereas with NICA one can notice large variations depending on the 
time window, CASper shows a more consistent approach with closely matching 
performance in all cases. 
Integrity Required 2 5 10 
AL 2 
IL 5 
AL 5 
IL 12 
AL 10 
IL 25 
AL 20 
IL 50 
 Casper  NICA fusion with 2 samples  
 IL=0 IL=0 
High (57 services per 
hour) 
0.0339 
(0.06%) 
0.0561 
(0.10%) 
0.0901 
(0.16%) 
0.0248 
(0.04%) 
0.0431 
(0.08%) 
0.0718 
(0.13%) 
0.1162 
(0.20%) 
Medium (26 services per 
hour) 
0.0039 
(0.02%) 
0.0078 
(0.03%) 
0.0183 
(0.07%) 
0.0026 
(0.01%) 
0.0026 
(0.01%) 
0.0065 
(0.03%) 
0.0091 
(0.04%) 
Low (10 services per hour) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
 IL=5 IL=5 
High (57 services per 
hour) 
0.3355 
(0.59%) 
0.4765 
(0.83%) 
0.6762 
(1.18%) 
1.0718 
(1.87%) 
1.3956 
(2.44%) 
1.9426 
(3.39%) 
2.5640 
(4.48%) 
Medium (26 services per 
hour) 
0.2037 
(0.79%) 
0.2272 
(0.88%) 
0.2454 
(0.95%) 
0.7624 
(2.94%) 
0.9164 
(3.53%) 
1.0274 
(3.96%) 
1.2428 
(4.79%) 
Low (10 services per hour) 
0.1906 
(1.91%) 
0.1906 
(1.91%) 
0.1906 
(1.91%) 
1.8094 
(18.11%) 
1.8943 
(18.96%) 
1.9922 
(19.94%) 
2.0261 
(20.28%) 
Table 7-6: Number of Protected services accessed by an impostor per hour on average during 
all types of usage as independent events 
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Table 7-7 presents the breakdown of the above 2 scenarios in regards to the security 
level of the protected services that are being accessed for the IL=5 case. It can be 
seen that for the protected services at level 5 there is not much opportunity for 
misuse utilising either approaches. For lower level services CASper outperforms in 
all cases. 
 
Integrity 
Required 2 5 10 
AL 2 
IL 5 
AL 5 
IL 12 
AL 10 
IL 25 
AL 20 
IL 50 
 Casper Independent 
Protected Access 
NICA fusion with 2 samples 
Independent Protected Access 
ALL 0.3355 0.4765 0.4765 1.0718 1.3956 1.9426 2.5640 
0 0.2350 0.2846 0.3446 0.3564 0.4909 0.7363 1.0144 
1 0.0209 0.0418 0.0757 0.2454 0.3029 0.3864 0.4791 
2 0.0235 0.0379 0.0653 0.2010 0.2467 0.3277 0.4138 
3 0.0183 0.0339 0.0640 0.1762 0.2154 0.3003 0.3956 
4 0.0209 0.0366 0.0692 0.0770 0.0992 0.1384 0.1841 
5 0.0209 0.0457 0.0614 0.0209 0.0470 0.0627 0.0888 
 Casper Serial Protected 
Access 
NICA fusion with 2 samples 
Serial Protected Access 
ALL 0.2755 0.3812 0.5470 0.7820 0.8877 1.0574 1.3094 
0 0.1828 0.2010 0.2311 0.1919 0.2102 0.2389 0.2820 
1 0.0144 0.0313 0.0614 0.1971 0.2141 0.2454 0.2872 
2 0.0222 0.0366 0.0640 0.1540 0.1684 0.1971 0.2467 
3 0.0183 0.0339 0.0640 0.1462 0.1619 0.1945 0.2454 
4 0.0209 0.0366 0.0692 0.0757 0.0914 0.1240 0.1645 
5 0.0209 0.0457 0.0614 0.0196 0.0444 0.0601 0.0862 
Table 7-7: Number of Protected services accessed by an impostor per hour on average during 
all types of usage as independent and series at IL =5 split down to protected service level 
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The same test took place for the 20 random timed services where again the results 
are better for the security provision of CASper with the latter giving a 0.55% 
opportunity of misuse in the smaller window where NICA gives a 2.25%. 
 
Integrity 
Required 2 5 10 
AL 2 
IL 5 
AL 5 
IL 12 
AL 10 
IL 25 
AL 20 
IL 50 
 Casper Independent 
Random Protected 
Access 
NICA fusion with 2 samples 
Independent Random Protected 
Access 
ALL 0.1188 0.1475 0.2102 0.4504 0.6057 0.782 1.0261 
0 0.1031 0.1162 0.1371 0.121 0.18 0.268 0.346 
1 0.0065 0.0104 0.0222 0.108 0.137 0.155 0.218 
2 0.0026 0.0065 0.0183 0.099 0.127 0.162 0.21 
3 0.0052 0.0117 0.0196 0.09 0.116 0.136 0.17 
4 0 0.0026 0.0078 0.03 0.044 0.054 0.063 
5 0.0039 0.0039 0.0104 0.004 0.007 0.014 0.027 
 Casper Serial Random 
Protected Access 
NICA fusion with 2 samples 
Serial Random Protected Access 
ALL 0.0587 0.0783 0.1266 0.3094 0.3616 0.4386 0.5065 
0 0.0444 0.0496 0.0614 0.0809 0.094 0.1123 0.1266 
1 0.0052 0.0078 0.017 0.0666 0.0796 0.0914 0.1044 
2 0.0013 0.0052 0.0144 0.064 0.0705 0.0953 0.1057 
3 0.0052 0.0117 0.0196 0.0705 0.0809 0.0927 0.1031 
4 0 0.0026 0.0078 0.0261 0.0352 0.0379 0.0457 
5 0.0039 0.0039 0.0104 0.0039 0.0065 0.0144 0.0274 
Table 7-8: Number of Random Protected services accessed by an impostor per hour on 
average during all types of usage as independent and series at IL =5 split down to protected 
service level 
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7.3 Discussion 
The modifications of CASper that aimed so much at simplifying the authentication 
process in terms of parameter settings as well as removing/minimising the effect that 
the degradation function has on the trust to the user during inactivity or tolerance in 
false positives, showed to provide a better response in security whilst maintaining 
transparency at a tolerable level.  
Although on average the integrity that CASper maintains through the hour is not 
comparable in performance with NICA and NICA fusion, is not as aforementioned 
the directed means of comparison as the 2 approaches use a different core 
operation. The particular tests of protected services are the real test in this occasion 
as they are the ones that better define so much the security as well as transparency 
of the system. In those CASper showed to closely match the transparency of NICA. 
However the effect of automatically zeroing out the integrity makes CASper a bit 
more intrusive as expected with 1-2 requests more than NICA fusion. On the other 
hand however it increases the security of the system whilst also providing a more 
easily conceived and configurable framework possibly for the simple user. As 
aforementioned the maximum effect here in the performance of NICA is the 
degradation function in contrast with CASper that it does not maintain its trust to the 
user when there is inactivity or a negative authentication response and therefore at 
any time where the user’s identity could be questionable and the user has not 
‘earned’ the particular integrity. 
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Given that both approaches- NICA fusion and CASper operate with good 
performance in general, it is a matter of selection between the levels of security and 
transparency expected and required. Given the different requirements that different 
stakeholders may have both approaches and understanding the difficulties in 
establishing a ‘work-for-all-and-always’ setting, the less the variables that contribute 
in the configuration of such a mechanism the more user-friendly an approach is and 
possibly more easy to tune to a person’s requirement given the experience of the 
user with their interaction with the device. It is seen that CASper offers a simplified 
approach and a more consistent approach regarding performance under different 
levels of usage and timed events. Also closely matching the PIN settings as for 
example how long before the device is locked, it provides a user friendly 
configuration approach that is closer to user perception and culture.  
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8 Conclusions 
Mobile devices have posed many questions in regards to their security provision 
given their ubiquitous use for the home user and business. This research is 
concerned with an examination into user authentication and has made a contribution 
on identifying the security requirements and how these can be addressed through 
non-traditional means. Building upon the requirements and prior art a framework was 
proposed and examined as a more robust means to authentication – providing 
continuous authentication whilst trying to maintain usability to the user. Whilst testing 
performance and applicability of the examined framework it sought approaches to 
improving upon the originally envisaged approach in terms of security and 
transparency as well as realising operational considerations. The following sections 
discuss the outcomes, achievements and limitations of the research. 
8.1 Achievements of Research 
This research addresses the subject of user authentication looking to suggest a 
more robust solution to current user authentication provision on mobile devices. 
Through the process of proposing, modelling and evaluating a new approach to user 
authentication the following achievements have been met. 
• An investigation in the security issues and authentication alternatives on 
modern mobile devices 
The study established the need for better securing mobile devices due to the 
increased risk they carry nowadays. The alternative suggestion of biometric 
authentication was presented to improve upon the insufficiencies of secret 
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knowledge techniques and particular techniques that can enable a more user-
friendly and convenient approach was identified. Biometric fusion was also 
identified as a more confident process in establishing user’s identity (Chapter 
2). 
• Investigation into the user’s perspective regarding security provision and 
alternatives means to authentication (Chapter 3) 
 
Using a focus group this study acquired the perception of users which was a 
key issue as there are the ones that are the end receivers in any 
authentication approach. The study with the end users gave an insight that 
reflects the literature as well by identifying that users so much denoted the 
desire for more enhanced authentication when usage of the device requires it 
as well though privacy concerns regarding biometric profiles. Given the time 
of the study, it is expected that the desire for enhanced authentication will 
become higher as the sensitivity of access is increasing while privacy 
concerns decrease as the techniques are more and more deployed in 
everyday life e.g. face recognition in airports, fingerprint scanners in schools. 
 
• Investigation into the  different security requirements of data and services 
(Chapter 3) 
 
The need for moving away from one level of security fits all approach; it was 
established that different types of services carry different risks and therefore 
security requirements. By identifying the latter and the different requirements 
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that stakeholders may have risk assessment models were proposed. The 
models proposed can be closely linked with the authentication seen in this 
study which allows for tying the security of each access with particular 
authentication requirements and therefore providing a level of differentiation. 
 
• Consideration of the authentication topologies and potential trade-offs 
(Chapter 3) 
 
The study identified topologies that a biometric system could use in order to 
operate looking at server and device based topologies and analysing the 
counter benefits and pitfalls whilst establishing the practicalities that may 
burden or allow for such implementation with device and network capabilities 
as well as cost. As there are several concerns so much in terms of privacy as 
well as control of the volume of the data and how this can be addressed by 
the operators so much in terms of cost as well as operationally it was 
important to consider these issues in such system. 
 
• Proposed and practically evaluated a framework for transparent and 
continuous authentication through a user trial by developing an operational 
prototype(Chapter 4) 
 
Building upon the identified requirements this study presents a framework-
NICA, as means to more robust authentication by transparently establishing 
user trust throughout the operation of the device. By developing an 
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operational prototype of the NICA framework a user evaluation utilising the 
latter was conducted and the user acceptance was acquired. The response 
was positive in terms of how the users would be open in utilising such system 
which was important to establish for the future of such system. 92% of the 
users felt that the use of such system would provide a more secure 
environment. In regards to system convenience using a 0-5 Likert Scale, 41% 
of the users considering the system very convenient (with rating 1&2) 
however as limitations existed on the transparency achieved given the time 
limitations and biometric algorithm performance (commercial or build-in) 33% 
of users rated the at 3 in regards of convenience with the rest 16% 
considering the system inconvenient.  However it gave an important insight on 
how such framework could operate and the feedback of users given its use.  
 
• Evaluation of the proposed framework though a series of simulations (Chapter 
5) 
 
Looking to evaluate the framework further to the practical evaluation the study 
modelled NICA with a simulation approach under different scenarios of usage. 
Different settings regarding primarily the framework timed-event settings were 
tested to examine its operation and practicalities. Best performance with 
scenarios of high usage were given using compact timed-events as 
authentication would occur more often with average integrity achieved being 
3.2 for an authorised user with close to 0 intrusive requests. Regarding 
accessing protected services under the same scenario a 25 intrusive requests 
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on an intense scenario of 52 protected services access per hour was 
achieved. Impostor tests showed good performance with 0.0068% false 
access under the same aforementioned scenarios. Simulation of the 
examined framework led to identifying difficulties and pitfalls in the system 
configuration and also led to modifications that improved on the framework 
transparency. 
 
• Investigate the incorporation of fusion in the proposed framework and 
proposed new framework models(Chapter 6) 
 
The study examined how the deployment of fusion can improve on the 
performance of the framework through proposing new approaches on the core 
authentication mechanism. Simulation results demonstrated that given high 
usage of the device fusion permits for higher trust of the user to be achieved 
whilst maintaining security against an impostor. An improvement to 3.8% 
average integrity was achieved and an improved 9.9 intrusive requests out of 
52 protected service access. A further improvement in the handling of how the 
integrity gets modified during protected service access further improved the 
performance of the system when using fusion at 4.8 intrusive requests out of 
52 protected service accesses. Regarding impostor access the performance 
was kept at high security compared to NICA with similar results with minimal 
improvement. Given the high complexity and subjectivity that exists in the 
usage of the device, difficulties in configuring such framework to always fit the 
requirements of each user were identified.   
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• Proposed a new framework approach to improve on the configuration 
limitations and pitfalls 
 
An alternative approach to the core authentication mechanism is proposed – 
CASper, which uses a binary control of the integrity to mitigate any misuse 
particular in areas of inactivity whilst simplifying the configuration of the 
framework. In an effort to counteract the complexities of time settings that 
derive from users and usage, CASper is seen as a more easily configurable 
approach whilst maintaining the performance as well as improving the security 
that NICA provides. CASper achieved kept the convenient aspect by 
generating on the similar scenarios 5.6 intrusive requests out of 52 and 
achieved a better security aspect with 0.27 false access by an impostor to a 
protected service compared to 0.78 that of NICA fusion.  Closely matching the 
PIN settings as for example how long before the device is locked, it provides a 
user friendly configuration approach that is closer to user perception and 
culture whilst maintaining good convenience and offering a more secure 
approach.  
8.2 Limitations  
The study focused in examining an alternative in user authentication on mobile 
devices. Although the research met its objectives a number of limitations were 
imposed upon the outcomes of the work. 
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The performance of biometric solutions in particular applications require a good 
performance in a non-exclusive setting for capturing of biometric samples which 
have not yet established. For these kinds of systems to be put in place there are 
need to be algorithms that can support transparency with good error rates are they 
are core in the good performance of such system. As such the practical evaluation 
was largely affected by the poor performance enforcing a far more intrusive 
experience than the envisaged one. 
The system was tested so much with real users as well as simulative scenarios. The 
former was restricted as aforementioned so much by the algorithms as well as the 
restrictive timings and therefore could not have a much representative result of the 
system its perceived operation. The latter gave a further and better insight to the 
performance however still the data sets used as basis in this study do not provide 
necessarily the best basis for today. It could have been useful and more insightful to 
be able to have real data of current smartphone users of different areas and interest 
in device usage as well as being able to run a pre-longed user study with real users. 
8.3 Future Work 
As seen in the practical evaluation as well as the simulation, biometric performance 
plays such significant role in its operation. Whether that is a no-yes decision or as in 
NICA fusion and CASper part of the authentication algorithm, the system cannot 
operate transparently without confident biometric decisions. This is affected both 
from the strength of the algorithm as well as the quality of samples. Continuation of 
previous work (Clarke et al, 2011; Karatzouni et al, 2007) and further research could 
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seek into pursuing the improvement of the techniques when acting in a transparent 
manner.  
Further scope exists in further examining the operation of the framework. For 
example introducing a pre-processing engine could be a benefit as an addition to the 
system in these cases where it provides feedback regarding the quality of samples to 
the authentication algorithm. As such inappropriate samples do not get utilised or get 
little weight in the process and the confidence in decision becomes part of the 
decision algorithm. Furthermore the performance of biometric algorithms could also 
be weighted in the decision in the same way that the particular biometrics are. As 
such the confidence levels may not necessarily attributed based on the type of the 
biometric but based on the EERs of a particular algorithm. Simulating how the above 
may improve the confidence in which the system may operate could be beneficial. 
So much form a home user as well as a business user so that further analysis can 
be done regarding the usability of such system as well as possibly identifying 
patterns in the use of the device. More particularly future research could seek to 
apply the system in practice for a prolonged period of time and oversee the 
applicability of the approach in an everyday scenario. Furthermore experiments to 
assess impostor scenarios with real users in order to test how deliberate efforts of 
misuse can ‘cheat’ the operation of the framework could be of benefit. Although the 
simulation data were based on real usage could not substitute real data. As such 
practical evaluations could also produce data sets that could be tested also 
consequently in a simulative environment. As such future research could seek to 
contact practical evaluations of the examined system so much in artificial 
 
237 
 
Conclusions 
 
environments to test impostor access as well as prolonged use of the system for a 
period of time. Restrictions exist in such approach as there are issues of privacy and 
there must be particular restrictions in the type of data that can be collected and 
analysed. Artificial settings would be easier in practice however they pose timing 
restrictions that would burden the amount of results that can be obtained.  
This research addressed the issue of inter-process security and the differing 
requirements of various services and data access. Future research may look to 
address intra-process security by looking at the particular requirements and models 
that can serve this issue. 
8.4 Authentication in Modern Mobile Devices 
The modern mobile device is going continue to evolve so much as means of 
communication as well as business. A device that gains grounds everyday into 
people’s lives opens new ways for services to be implemented and data to be 
accessed for purposes of personal ease, work, revenue, entertainment etc. Given 
the capabilities of the modern devices however the risk that the device carries 
regarding storage and access also increases, imposing an important identified 
requirement for enchasing the security provision.  
This research looked at this changing landscape and by identifying and assessing 
the differing requirements and needs, examined options for more robust 
authentication whilst analysing, further developing and updating a proposed solution. 
Suggesting continuous and transparent authentication as more enhanced and fitted 
approach to current and future devices, established its acceptance from a user’s 
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perspective as well as the possible ability to secure the device in a user-friendly 
manner with biometric solutions that are believed as more confident means to 
confirm user identity. 
In conclusion given the modern device it is essential that future authentication should 
not only seek improve in terms of creating a stronger lock to accessing the 
information but also a more appropriate lock that corresponds to the sensitivity of the 
data accessed and while they are being accessed. 
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Abstract 
 
The increasing range of data and services accessible from mobile devices, such as 
cellphones and PDAs, leads to questions about the adequacy of security provision, 
particularly in relation to authentication of the user.  In this context, this paper 
describes the findings from a focus group that was conducted to examine four 
research questions: whether users recognise a need for security on their current 
devices; how they perceive the current authentication facilities, and whether they use 
them; whether they envisage a need for greater security provision in the future; and 
their perceptions of alternative authentication methods and the ways in which they 
could operate.  The overall results showed that users envisage a need for enhanced 
security as their usage of the device changes to incorporate more sensitive functions.  
Furthermore, from the options discussion, a preference towards the use of biometric 
authentication was expressed by the majority of the participants. 
 
Keywords:  Security, authentication, mobile, cellphone, PDA. 
 
Introduction  
 
Mobile devices such as cellphones and PDAs are becoming more sophisticated tools, 
with data processing, storage and communication capabilities getting closer to the 
functionality of desktop computers.  As a consequence, the information that can be 
accessed through and stored on them is becoming more sensitive. This has already 
been witnessed with other forms of mobile device (e.g. laptops) and as a result they 
now represent a recognised area of risk.  For example, 53% of respondents in Ernst  & 
Young’s Global Information Security Survey 2005 identified mobile computing as the 
issue that raises the major security concerns (Ernst & Young, 2005). Furthermore, in 
another survey amongst 2,035 IT professionals, 80% of respondents identified their 
main security fear as employees misplacing or losing the device, as well as not using 
appropriate security settings (Red Herring, 2006). Against this background, a concern 
can be raised regarding the ability of current security measures to safeguard the 
device.  Significant amongst these is the user authentication method, which for current 
phones and PDAs is principally achieved by the use of Personal Identification 
Numbers (PINs).  However, questions can be raised about whether this method will 
remain sufficient, and (if not) what methods users may be willing to tolerate in its 
place. 
 
The purpose of this research was to assess views and attitudes regarding the 
authentication requirements on mobile devices. In order to achieve that, a focus group 
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was conducted, in order to provide a forum for users to express and exchange their 
perspectives. The next section presents the objectives and methodology of the 
research. This is followed by the main discussion, relating to the results obtained, 
leading to overall conclusions in the final section.  
 
Research objectives and investigative methodology 
 
The focus group was conducted in September 2006, and lasted around 100 minutes.  
The composition of the participant group is outlined in Table 1, including a mixture of 
end-users, representatives from the mobile industry, researchers in the area, and 
representatives from the educational technology and university perspectives.  In 
addition to these, invitations had also been issued to other industry-based 
representatives, but unfortunately (despite some initial follow-up) these did not lead to 
final participation.  
 
 
Participant Background / Basis for inclusion 
1 Representative from a UK mobile network operator. 
2 Creator of a web resource that tracks mobile technologies and trends 
3 Project student, addressing public understanding of biometrics 
4 Project student, conducting user trials and evaluation of biometrics 
5 Academic, active in the mobile security domain 
6 Learning technologist, commencing research into educational uses of mobile 
devices 
7 Psychologist, with research interests in use of mobile technologies 
8 Representative from university ICT department, responsible for campus 
deployment of mobile devices. 
9 Academic with interest in human factors of technology. 
10 Male mobile phone user 
11 Female mobile phone user 
12 Female mobile phone user 
 
Table 1 :  Summary of focus group participants  
 
All of the participants were regular end-users of mobile devices, and in many cases 
conversant with the features and facilities of smartphone devices.  As such, they were 
able to offer perspectives with firsthand knowledge of the more advanced features and 
facilities that are likely to become the baseline standard in a few years. 
 
A number of research questions were created to form the framework of the discussion, 
addressing the main areas of interest around the objectives of this research on user 
authentication. A list of the question as well as a brief justification behind them 
follows. 
 
1. Do participants recognise a need for security on their current devices? 
 
This question aims to investigate whether users consider their current usage of 
mobile devices to merit protection, with particular emphasis being given to 
whether or not user authentication is an important requirement.  The general 
expectation, based upon prior survey work (Clarke et al. 2002; Clarke and Furnell, 
2005) was that many participants would not view their own need for security to be 
particularly high.   
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2. How do participants perceive the current authentication facilities, and do they use 
them? 
 
The intention here is to focus participants’ attention specifically towards the PIN-
based techniques that are dominant upon current devices, exploring opinions 
about the general nature of the method the extent to which they are used in 
practice.  The investigators’ expectations here were again partially informed by 
the earlier research, such that it was anticipated that many participants would not 
be using the current facilities at all (in part based upon their reasoning from 
question 1).  
 
3. Do participants envisage a need for greater security provision in the future? 
 
Anticipating that some participants would be unlikely to prioritise a need for 
authentication based upon their current usage of the device, this question asks 
them to consider the range of emerging and future applications of mobile devices 
that may interest them.  From this, they are asked to reassess their views on the 
requirement for authentication, in view of the increased sensitivity of data or 
services that may then be involved.   
 
4. How do participants perceive the potential alternative methods of authentication 
and the ways in which they could operate? 
 
Assuming that the preceding question would highlight a requirement for further 
protection, this question aims to elicit opinions about alternative mechanisms 
(such as token and biometric approaches), and methods of applying them. 
 
 
Although some expectations had been formed as a result of previous research, the 
participants were not led towards any particular viewpoints during the discussion of 
each question (nonetheless, the conclusions drawn from the first two questions proved 
to be generally as anticipated, thus justifying the progression towards the subsequent 
discussion issues).  A discussion guide was formed and followed during the session 
that would provide the background and the context for the research questions to be 
answered. The session was video recorded in order to capture any non-verbal 
information that could provide further input (i.e. reactions to a certain view) or help to 
quantitative appraisal of answers (i.e. show of hands as an answer).   
 
Focus Group Results 
 
The focus group session began with some background discussion about the 
participants’ use of their mobile devices, with consideration specifically directed 
towards mobile phones and PDAs, rather than laptops or single-function devices such 
as media players.  This section begins with brief comments in relation to this usage, 
before proceeding to discussion of the main findings, based around the research 
questions.  It should be noted that, due to overlaps in the related discussions, research 
questions 1 and 2 are discussed within a single subsection, whereas the extent of 
discussion arising from question 4 has led to it being split over two subsections.  All 
of the sections are supported by direct quotes from the participants in order to 
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evidence the views expressed.  In all cases, the quotes are exactly as spoken, although 
in some cases segments have been omitted for brevity (denoted by ‘…’) and in other 
cases the authors have added wording in brackets in order to provide clarification. 
  
Background of attendees on the use of mobile devices 
 
The majority of participants indicated that their usage of mobile devices had not 
changed in recent years, and focused mainly upon traditional functionality such as 
telephony and text messaging. Even where some considered a mobile device as a 
necessity to their everyday lives, the main driver tended to be communication. 
 
“If I left the house without it I would feel a little bit naked. It’s like you  
can’t get in touch with people” 
 
“A lot of people are using it more and more. I’m aware of that…but 
personally…for me it’s just a communication tool…that’s it” 
 
“I never actually use any of the features, I just text and that’s it …  
Occasionally I use the camera phone feature a bit” 
  
Although some participants stated that they had used services such as downloading 
content (e.g. ringtones) or video conferencing, this was mainly for experience’s sake 
rather than an ongoing usage. Nevertheless a minority (mainly owning high-end 
devices) used them for accessing e-mail or browsing the web on a more regular basis, 
including in a business context: 
 
“I mean if I had to lose this [device] at this point in time … I would be 
completely lost, because I run my diary, I basically run everything that 
I do with this kind of thing” 
 
The potential for greater adoption of services was also identified by some attendees, 
suggesting that the usage of the device is likely to change in the future.  
 
Current need for security and use of the available security mechanisms 
 
Surveys have repeatedly reported that although users store a great amount of sensitive 
information on their devices, little attention is given to protecting them using the 
available security mechanisms (Pointsec, 2005; Kucan, 2003). It was therefore 
important to see how users assess their own security requirements based on their use 
of their device. 
 
The main discovery was that participants did not feel at risk as their usage was limited 
to services that do not involve storage or access of highly sensitive information.  
 
“As a general user who is only using it for personal use, there’s no 
data on there that I class that sensitive” 
 
 “I use this [Pocket PC] just for access to the exchange server and 
nothing else…So the issue of security hasn’t arisen with this yet, but 
probably will do at some stage” 
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“I think it depends from which context you are using it in, cause the 
security you are going to need in it, is going to depend on the 
sensitivity of the data…the only thing that I got that is sensitive is 
friends’ phone numbers and address details” 
    
As participants did not generally recognise a current security requirement it was 
interesting to assess how they perceived the nature and adequacy of current 
authentication methods. Today’s mobile devices are mainly protected by the use of 
PINs.  However, previous research has suggested that users often perceive these to be 
an insufficient and inconvenient method, and consequently do not use them (Clarke et 
al. 2002; Clarke and Furnell, 2005). Similar views were also expressed by the 
participants, as only a third of them claimed to use PIN protection at switch on and 
only one used a PIN in standby mode.  Meanwhile, the rest did not use any protection 
at all. Some based their decision not to do so on the fact that they did not perceive 
their current usage would pose any concern (which follows from the views in the 
previous section): 
 
“Passwords and that kind of stuff, I’ve just never done it. I think the 
thing is with me that obviously because I just text and I don’t do 
anything else, from a sensitive point of view there is no information 
that I perceive is valuable enough to be worth worrying about” 
 
“I’m not sure that anybody would want to steal my information, I 
don’t perceive myself to be that important” 
 
However, even those that did make use of the mechanism expressed concern as to the 
level of security that it could provide in some contexts: 
 
“I suppose for accidental loss or whatever, that will be fine because 
people are not going to guess your keyword or your PIN code or 
whatever. However PIN codes and things are limited … basically 
something that can be attacked in numerous ways” 
 
Although the sensitivity of information played a role, other comments mentioned 
traditional downsides of PINs such as forgetting them, and a viewpoint from many 
participants was that the PIN can only protect them if their phone is switched off (i.e. 
if someone acquired the device when already switched on they would find no 
requirement for reauthentication).  The following comments were typical in relation to 
PINs: 
 
“ I think any security that is going [to] lock me out every now and 
then…is the reason I don’t use PINs now cause I always forget my 
PIN… 
 
“I never turn my phone off so if I lost it, it would be on anyway”  
 
“I’ve used them before. It’s simple to use, it’s just…I don’t see any 
point using it myself cause I never turn my phone off” 
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These views underline the fact that PIN-based point-of-entry authentication is 
perceived to provide limited protection.  A further factor that may have influenced 
attitudes towards security and use of current facilities was the fact that none of the 
participants had experienced a security incident: 
  
“No, that’s probably why I’m not so that worried about the security. 
I’ve never actually lost my phone, only ever dropped it when I’m drunk 
and reset it and things like that but never lost the phone” 
 
As such, it was perhaps not surprising to find that the general view was negative when 
asked about paying more for a device in order to increase security.  The following 
comments were typical, suggesting that even if they considered paying, the protection 
itself was not the direct driver: 
 
“No, not even for a second” 
 
 “Well I don’t know. If my phone had a fingerprint scanner on it, I’d 
think that was cool so yeah I’d pay more”. 
 
Overall, therefore, it was clear that participants did not currently perceive a significant 
need to protect their devices. Even though this view was basically formed due to the 
limited usage of their devices, it was also partially informed by attitudes towards PIN-
based authentication, which participants felt was not sufficient (and thus making use 
of it would hardly add any further protection for their devices). 
 
Perceptions of future security requirements and responsibility 
 
As the participants’ limited security requirements were expected, an objective was to 
assess how future adoption of more sensitive services might affect their opinions.  The 
majority certainly agreed that using more data-centric and sensitive services would 
increase their desire for protection:  
 
“If you are using it from a business context, obviously you know the 
more important the data then the stronger security is going to be 
needed.” 
 
“Although I don’t use my phone for an awful lot more than texting at 
the moment, as phones get more sophisticated and easy to use etc … 
I’m going to start using it for mobile banking or whatever the nature 
of the data that I’m gonna be using is going to become more sensitive 
definitely” 
 
Another aspect that was highlighted was the fact that stronger security would 
desirable in certain uses of the phone, as the danger of misuse would be increased. 
 
“For example, if I make a local call … maybe I’m not that worried … 
But certainly when I want to start dialling international numbers or 
something maybe I do want to make sure that it’s stronger 
authenticated. Maybe when I start to accessing documents that sit in a 
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specific area of my device which is business documents then I want to 
be authenticated” 
 
This view came in agreement with previous work by some of the authors that has 
suggested that linking the level of security to the service access would be a way of 
enhancing protection based on the sensitivity of the data (Clarke and Furnell, 2006).  
From this perspective, the question was explicitly posed as to whether it would be 
desirable to have distinct levels of security in order to be authenticated depending 
upon the service or data use. The general thought was that it could be a positive way 
to enhance security, but only if that was applied in a manner that maintained 
convenience: 
 
“I don’t want to have strong security for texting, but I do want to have 
some security for mobile banking, so different levels of security 
definitely would be the way to do it”  
 
“It depends how you put it. How many levels? I would be happy with 
one or two. Right now I’m using my phone. Do I want to enter a text 
message? All right, next level. Do I want to browse the Internet? 
Another level . . . one level or two levels would be fine. But getting it 
too far, it would be ‘all right which level do I need? I need access 3 or 
access 5?”  
 
The idea of using their device to access more sensitive information led some 
participants to reassess the possibility to pay for additional security:  
 
“When you start becoming more aware about stuff [dangers/threats] 
like that, you start realizing what you are doing with the phone as 
well. I think then you realize, actually I like the idea of [a network 
operator] providing higher security and I’ll pay for that” 
 
Nevertheless there was also the view that the even future would impose more fears, 
there would be an expectation of security provision from the side of the services that 
are being offered, rather than the device itself:  
 
“The type of data that I use my mobile phone with, and will use in the 
future, won’t be very different from the one that I use in my PC 
anyway. It will just be a different access device. So I expect, if I’m 
going to be using data that are sensitive from a personal level, it will 
only be with services that I expect to be secure anyway. I wouldn’t 
necessarily pay extra for that because that is their whole point of 
existence” 
 
Proceeding from this, it was interesting to see who participants generally considered 
to be responsible to provide security in the first place.  Faced with this question, less 
than a third felt that it should be their own responsibility to ensure the security of their 
device. In terms of accessing services, the responsibility for security was felt to lie 
with a service provider (in order to secure the access and the data), rather than looking 
to protect the device itself in a more robust way: 
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“But then you are accessing bank accounts details that you’re just 
using the mobile or whatever device you are using to access something 
somewhere else so the security is there…Responsibility for bank 
details should be with the banks, so they look after your confidential 
detail and security for your own device should be yourself” 
 
The idea of making the network provider responsible for securing access to services 
and information was not viewed positively, again reflecting the fact that participants 
would prefer a distinction in the different roles. 
 
“Not only you are trusting them with your password details but also 
that implies that they are never going to make a mistake, that they are 
never not going to pass your username and password on to somebody 
else. If I’m going to authenticate myself and log myself into a 
particular server, I actually want control of that. As much as I hate 
passwords, I want to have control over who I login with” 
   
“Having my network provider say ‘Oh don’t worry, we’ll authenticate 
you to the bank’, that’s something that I want them separately. You 
just give me network access, I’ll deal with the bank, don’t worry about 
it” 
 
Given that most of the participants would prefer additional protection to be on their 
side rather than relying on the provider, it is relevant to consider the form(s) that this 
could take.  As such, the next discussion topic proceeded to consider alternative 
authentication methods. 
 
Views & attitudes towards alternative methods of user authentication 
 
As alternatives to the PIN, participants were asked to consider two approaches – 
tokens and biometrics - and the way that they could be applied in the context of 
mobile phones. 
 
Participants were not receptive to using tokens.  Considering the device to be a token 
itself, the idea of needing to have something else to access it was not well-received: 
  
“My first opinion would be that is just something else to lose…you still 
have the same issues with the token, because somebody could pinch 
the token, or I would lose it more likely” 
  
“It’s also the annoyance. Unless it’s something you wear all the 
time… if I want to make a phone call I also have to take my watch or 
my key ring or whatever” 
 
Unlike tokens, there was relatively high acceptance of the potential to use biometric 
techniques. As previous work has shown, users are starting to be more open to 
biometric techniques and consider their use in order to enhance security (Clarke et al. 
2002). When the participants were asked which biometrics they would like to see 
implemented on mobile handsets and would be more willing to use, the majority 
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agreed that fingerprints would be adequate enough to safeguard the device, while at 
the same time seeming convenient: 
  
“Personally I’d use fingerprint, it’s easy…” 
 
“I think fingerprint recognition would be fine on a phone…the average 
person who’s gonna steal this, even if they do know how to fake the 
latex and so how to fake the finger, why would they bother? Just to 
break into somebody’s mobile phone?”  
 
Others were more open to techniques that could be linked to their normal use of the 
device or be derived from the features already existing on the device. 
 
“There’s a Korean phone that does facial recognition. I don’t know 
how successful it is” 
 
 “Voice as well…obviously when you are talking” 
 
Despite the fact that different kinds of biometrics were suggested by the attendees, 
fingerprint scanning was the most popular. As the technique is one of the most well-
known biometrics, the question was posed as to whether this preference was linked to 
the greater knowledge of the technique in comparison with other approaches. The 
responses were mixed, with the general view being that it is just more convenient than 
other options.  However, one participant also observed that it is a matter of culture, as 
many of us feel familiar with fingerprinting as a result of seeing it used in crime 
movies and the like. It was conjectured that other approaches would achieve similar 
acceptance on mobile devices if they were similarly familiar from other contexts: 
 
“If … in order to get into the school, you needed to have your iris 
scanned then it would be like: ‘All right, I had my iris scanned all my 
life, I don’t mind really’” 
 
In respect to the fingerprint versus other techniques, an argument that was made was 
the fact that biometric approaches that could depend on the use of the device are not 
applicable throughout all users as each one differs in their usage. As such biometrics 
like fingerprints can provide a common solution. 
 
“I only use it for voice, he [another attendee] only uses it for texting. 
It’s a mobile so one way or another you will have to hold it in your 
hand to actually use it so fingerprint is the most appropriate from that 
perspective” 
 
This view underlines the fact that as no approach fits all needs, whether that is PINs 
or certain biometrics.  Thus instead of providing one solution that some users are not 
willing to use, having a flexible mechanism that could conform to each user’s needs 
while at the same time fulfilling the different security requirements would be a more 
appropriate approach.  This is again compatible with the previous proposals from the 
authors (Clarke and Furnell, 2006)  
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Another issue raised in the discussion of biometrics was that of privacy, which has 
traditionally been presented as one of the factors that make people cautious about 
using the technology (Cavoukian, 1999). However, in terms of influencing preference 
towards certain techniques, privacy was not of much concern for the group. Most 
attention was given to the lack of accuracy and the excessive effort that biometrics 
(especially those based upon behaviour) may require, but also in certain techniques 
that they felt they could be less secure in their application on mobile phone:. 
 
“The thing is even though it’s a telephony device, the one I would be 
more uncomfortable using is voice, because anyone else can hear it” 
 
“And having any background noise affects voice recognition” 
 
“My problem I found is the signature recognition. I didn’t like the 
voice recognition but as we were saying earlier for mobile phones that 
will be the most acceptable really. But the signature recognition I had 
problems with. My signature is never the same five times in a row, so I 
would get locked out of my mobile phone if I did that” 
 
“You can see…It’s something about seeing an iris…if it went wrong 
and I was locked out … I’d feel out of control” 
 
On that basis, although acknowledging the level of security that biometrics can 
provide, participants would have little tolerance of getting falsely rejected and being 
locked out of the device: 
 
“If it always let me through I’d be prepared to put up with that [false 
acceptance errors], because it’s still a greater level of security that I 
use now and it’s still not bothering me….I’m prepared to let the 
mistake happen as long it’s not for me, as long as I am always let 
through” 
 
Transparent & continuous authentication versus traditional point-of-entry methods 
 
With the issue of personal convenience still in mind, participants were asked to 
consider whether authentication can run in the background without the user having 
explicit knowledge about when it was taking place or needing to make explicit effort 
to provide authentication details. This has been suggested not only to overcome issues 
of intrusiveness that PINs or biometrics such as fingerprints could pose, but also to 
provide a continuous authentication solution versus the point-of-entry verification of 
PINs that was attributed a lack of protection by the attendees. Asked how they would 
feel about such a mechanism, attendees offered varying responses: 
 
“I would like it cause if it doesn’t interfere with you and there is no 
different reason anyway so there is no problem is it?” 
 
“I don’t have a problem with this in a sense that I don’t worry about 
the device monitoring me, but I will probably if something pops out 
and say ‘No, you are not who you say’. Soon as it does that switch it 
off and then switch it on again” 
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 “That will be annoying…it would be like ‘Oh it thinks it’s not me’” 
  
“Will it be a bit like when your battery is lowering gives you a 
warning? ‘Cause how would you know? You make three mistakes or 
there are three different things in the background” 
 
The negative views were mainly due to fears that false rejections could cause 
potential inconvenience by interrupting legitimate use of the device.  There was also 
concern that the casual use of a mobile phone would not permit this type of 
authentication, as it would be difficult to acquire a consistent biometric profile at all 
times, again raising the issue of rejection rates: 
 
“It’s okay if you use it at your desk or something maybe but…I mean 
the nature of the mobile phone is that you don’t generally use it like 
that. If you are sitting in a train or in a car or you are walking and you 
want to do something …I can’t imagine that the way that I use it that I 
could be following a pattern. I’d get that three exceptions every five 
minutes kind of thing…I would feel uncomfortable” 
 
Despite the potential intrusiveness, there was also the view that it would be preferable 
to have explicit authentication so that the user is always conscious of the procedure: 
 
“I don’t like the idea of any form of machinery interacting with me, 
without me giving it express permission that it may.  I just don’t like it, 
full stop” 
 
Nevertheless that was not an issue for the majority of the participants. It was 
interesting enough that the main issue was usability and convenience, and less the 
issue of privacy that is often brought up in relation to biometrics. More focus on 
privacy came when the group was asked to give their opinion on how such an 
approach should be implemented - specifically in terms of the authentication taking 
place locally in the device or in the network (and thus where the biometric profile 
would need to be held):  
 
“My concern is where would the fingerprint, let’s say like signature, 
where would be stored? Would that be stored on the phone, so if 
somebody stole my phone they have my signature which is signed on 
the back of your bank cards and my fingerprint obviously? What then 
can people do with the information…obviously if someone knows how 
to hack into a phone could they use the information?” 
 
As seen above the fear of having a device lost or stolen would discourage the idea of 
keeping the profile on the phone. On the other hand, there was also a view that storing 
the profile in the network would pose not only issues of control (moving from the user 
to the provider) but also the issue of who handles that information when it is on the 
side of the provider.  In that context there were negative views about storing profiles 
in the network: 
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“Would you really want your biometric data stored on the inside of a 
company that’s possibly got people, dodgy people breaking into it 
already?” 
 
Aside from trust towards the provider, two more issues were raised by the attendees in 
respect to the remote storage of the profile. First was the issue of immediacy of access 
and availability:  
 
“Potentially everything can be stored in the network. There is a trade-
off between responsiveness and security….Especially if you are not in 
coverage all period of time and you want to look up someone’s name, 
address or whatever in your address book you haven’t got it…There’s 
got to be some balance between security that happens on the network 
and immediacy you have on the person” 
 
Similar to the issue of immediate access, participants indicated that they would not 
like to have explicit interaction with the provider in order to get authenticated. The 
preference was towards achieving authentication locally.   
 
“I’d like to use that information even when I don’t interact with the 
network operator. Because I can certainly use authentication as well, 
so I can’t think that it can be just the network operator” 
 
Conclusions 
 
This research recorded the views and attitudes of mobile phone users towards security 
on mobile phones.  Most participants in the focus group did not see a significant need 
for security on their current mobile phones. However, the possibility of using their 
mobile phones for more than just calls and short messaging was recognized. The 
members of the focus group that used their mobile phones for more advanced tasks 
acknowledged that some form of security is important. 
 
This was also reflected in the current use of authentication mechanisms.  Most 
participants either did not use any authentication mechanism, or only used a PIN 
request at power up time, and were generally concerned with the inconvenience of 
current mechanisms.  However, they were also receptive to the view that future, more 
sensitive uses of their device would necessitate greater use of security, and were 
therefore open to the consideration of alternative authentication methods. 
 
Taking into consideration the concerns regarding the convenience of authentication 
mechanisms, it is not surprising that most participants were positive towards the use 
of biometrics and specifically fingerprinting.  However, some privacy concerns were 
raised, particularly as to what exactly gets stored and where it gets stored.  Others 
were concerned about being monitored continuously, especially if unaware of the fact. 
 
This research supports the researchers’ view that further work towards a 
comprehensive framework for authentication on mobile devices is indeed necessary. 
Furthermore it provided valuable insights into user perspectives on these matters. 
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Abstract 
The increasing capability and functionality of mobile devices is leading to a corresponding increase in the need 
for security to prevent unauthorised access.  Indeed, as the data and services accessed via mobile devices become 
more sensitive, the existing method of user authentication (predominately based upon Personal Identification 
Numbers) appears increasingly insufficient. An alternative basis for authentication is offered by biometric 
approaches; which have the potential to be implemented in a non-intrusive manner and also enable 
authentication to be applied in an ongoing manner, beyond initial point-of-entry. However, the implementation of 
any authentication mechanism, particularly biometric approaches, introduces considerations of where the main 
elements of functionality (such as the processing of authentication data, decisions making, and storing user 
templates/profiles) should reside.  At the extremes, there are two alternatives:  a device-centric paradigm, in 
which the aforementioned aspects are handled locally; or a network-centric paradigm, in which the actions occur 
remotely and under the jurisdiction of the network operator.  This paper examines the alternatives and 
determines that each context introduces considerations in relation to the privacy of user data, the processing and 
storage of authentication data, network bandwidth demands, and service availability.  In view of the various 
advantages and disadvantages, it is concluded that a hybrid approach represents the most feasible solution; 
enabling data storage and processing to be split between the two locations depending upon individual 
circumstances.  This represents the most flexible approach, and will enable an authentication architecture to be 
more adaptable to the needs of different users, devices and security requirements. 
Keywords 
User Authentication, Biometrics, Mobility. 
INTRODUCTION: 
The mobile networking landscape has changed significantly over the last decade with a transition from large form 
factor telephony devices to small multi-purpose multimedia communications devices. The recent introduction of 
Third Generation (3G) technologies has provided the underlying mechanism for a wide variety of innovative data 
orientated services, with approximately one million users every day adopting these new features (Best, 2006a). 
At the same time, the level of functionality can be seen to be significantly expanding, with devices today having 
similar processing and memory capabilities to PCs of a few years ago.  
 
This transition imposes serious security considerations for mobile users, especially as incidents involving mobile 
devices and the disclosure of personal and corporate information are appearing within the media more frequently 
(Vance, 2006; Noguchi, 2005). One survey in the UK reported that within six months more than 54,000 mobile 
handsets were simply left on the back of London cabs, and another survey reported UK mobile phone theft 
accounted for 45% of all theft (Leyden, 2005; British Transport Police, 2006).  
 
In this context it is relevant to consider the degree to which related security measures are already provided and 
utilised. It is widely recognised that authentication can be achieved by utilising one or more of three fundamental 
approaches: something the user knows (password); something the user has (token) and something the user is 
(biometric) (Nanavati et al. 2002). Currently, the most widely deployed authentication methods are passwords 
and PINs - secret knowledge approaches that rely heavily upon the user to ensure continued validity.  For 
example, the user should not use the default factory settings, share their details with others, or write the 
information down. However, the poor use of passwords and PINs has been widely documented (Pointsec, 2005; 
Clarke et al. 2002), and many mobile users do not even use the security which is available. Similarly to secret 
knowledge techniques, token based approaches fundamentally rely upon the user to remember something, with 
the token needing to be physically present in order to access the device.  However, it is considered that this does 
not lend itself particularly well to the mobile device context either. The most likely scenario is that users would 
simply leave the token within the mobile handset for convenience.  
 
In contrast to the other methods, the third approach to authentication does not rely upon the user to remember 
anything – it just requires them to be themselves. Such techniques are collectively known as biometrics, and it is 
here that the most suitable alternatives for going beyond the PIN may be found. Biometrics have been suggested 
to be able to provide a more secure approach to authentication as the technique relies upon unique personal 
identifiers of the person. Therefore a user is not required to remember anything, and at the same time they cannot 
be lost or forgotten. 
 
However, in order to establish an authentication mechanism for mobile devices - especially when biometric 
approaches are utilised, careful consideration is needed to address the trade-off between a network-centric versus 
device-centric implementation, with issues such as performance, privacy and mobility being essential to the 
adoption of a new approach. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the technical and perceptual issues that are 
involved in the implementation of the either approach and propose a solution that takes the best advantage of 
both. To this end, the basic characteristics of the two paradigms are presented in section 2, followed by a 
discussion of the resultant trade-offs in section 3. Section 4 then presents the proposed hybrid paradigm, leading 
to overall conclusions in section 5. 
 
AUTHENTICATION TOPOLOGIES FOR MOBILE DEVICES: 
The topology of an authentication mechanism is an important factor to consider at the outset of the design 
process. With numerous stakeholders (such as network operators, corporate IT administrators and end-users) the 
ability to provide identity verification in a manner that maintains both security and privacy, and considers the 
operational impact upon the mobile device is imperative. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to maintain all 
these services for all stakeholders, and a trade-off exists between different security and privacy issues depending 
upon what the system is trying to optimally achieve. Although to date identity verification has been performed by 
the device itself this might not be the best approach to take when considering the number of issues that may result 
from both a security and usability perspective.  
A Network-Centric Approach 
 
A network-centric approach will direct all the key computational tasks and storage to the network. The physical 
placement of the authentication mechanism within the network could be with the network operator, corporate IT 
administrator, or third-party providing managed authentication services. As illustrated in Figure 1, the mobile 
device itself will act as the biometric sample capturing device and be able to respond to a decision sent from the 
server to permit or restrict access to a user. 
 
Depending upon the device, its processing capabilities and security requirements, it could be possible to partially 
split the biometric process, where the data extraction phase is conducted on the device and classification on the 
network. This would assist in reducing the amount of traffic sent across the network. Nevertheless however, the 
focus of this paradigm is on all major computational and memory requirements being resident on the network 
rather than the device. 
 
Figure 1 A Network-Centric approach Figure 2  A Device-Centric approach 
A Device-Centric Approach 
 
In a device-centric approach the whole biometric process is completed on the device. All the information, 
algorithms and management controls required for the authentication process are stored upon the device. 
Furthermore, all the processing required to perform the verification also takes place on the device.  Figure 2 
illustrates an example of such an approach.  
TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN THE PARADIGMS: 
The two approaches described above have several advantages and disadvantages from both social and technical 
perspective. The principal areas to establish the trade-offs that exist are: 
 
• User privacy 
• Storage and processing of biometric 
samples 
• Network bandwidth requirements 
• Network availability 
• Mobility and roaming 
•
The following sections address and discuss these issues in turn, examining in detail the trade-offs between the 
two potential topologies.  
User Privacy 
 
When considering which topology to deploy, resolving the issue of user privacy is essential for widespread 
adoption. This becomes even more important when the topology is looking to utilise biometric techniques as the 
underlying mechanism. Recent years have seen widespread media attention directed towards biometrics, due 
largely to their inclusion within passport and national identity card schemes (Gomm, 2005). Unfortunately, and 
for some legitimate reasons, this attention has been somewhat negative towards the benefits of the technology, 
focussing instead upon privacy concerns (Porter, 2004; TimesOnLine, 2004). It is therefore important to ensure 
the authentication mechanism is designed in a fashion that is sensitive to privacy concerns. 
 
The principal issue focuses around the biometric template and sample. In whichever biometric technique that is 
utilised, these elements represent unique personal information. Unfortunately, unlike other forms of 
authentication (such as secret knowledge or tokens, which can be simply changed if lost or stolen), it is not 
possible to change or replace biometric characteristics - they are an inherent part of the person. Therefore, once 
lost or stolen, they can remain compromised and no longer be reliably used. As such, the creation and storage of 
a biometric template or profile on either the device or the network leads to significant responsibility for the user 
or the network provider respectively.  
 
Public opinion regarding biometrics has been problematic, not least because of the proposed national and boarder 
control schemes that are in implementation in many countries. These call for a centralised repository of biometric 
information for all nationals, but the ability to secure such databases from external attack and effectively manage 
authorisation to protect data from internal misuse is no small undertaking. Despite the safeguards that one can 
apply, there will always be the potential for vulnerabilities due to both human factors and technical mis-
configurations.  Such vulnerability, and moreover the lack of confidence that it engenders, was also raised in a 
focus group that took place in order to acquire users’ views and attitude towards security on their devices 
(Karatzouni et al. 2007), where participants voiced the concern over security and trust:  
 
“…would you really want your biometric data then stored on the inside of a company that’s 
possibly got dodgy people, people breaking into it already…” 
 
“And even in the network [I] don’t think it’s all that secure either, because there is always the 
rogue employee somewhere, who is in the pay of an attacker” 
 
These quotes demonstrate a major fear for the security of the information held remotely. Apart from the 
technicalities that might be overlooked, there are also examples of carelessness taking place that has led to severe 
incidents. An illustrative example occurred within an Orange call centre, where employees that had been granted 
access to full customer records (including information such as bank details) were sharing their login credentials 
with other staff (Mobile Business, 2006). This removed any ability to effectively monitor who and when they had 
access to information. The increased fear of identity theft and fraud makes people even more cautious about their 
personal information, and how and where they provide it.   
 
Recent discussions in the UK regarding a national ID card scheme has suggested that people are not very 
comfortable with providing their biometric information to a centralised system (Lettice, 2006). As such, a device-
centric implementation is arguably more favourable from the user's perspective. In such a case, the profile will be 
stored on their personal device giving no third-party access to the biometric template or samples. This approach 
is able to satisfy peoples’ desire for privacy preservation by giving them direct responsibility for its protection. 
However, introducing such responsibility also brings concerns about how reliable and aware the end users will be 
in safeguarding their devices. As previously mentioned, several surveys have demonstrated that, despite the 
storage of sensitive information in handsets, and despite the earlier cited evidence of loss and theft, users still 
disregard the use of the available security measures. This is an important consideration to the choice in topology, 
as no further protection will be available once the device is stolen. On the other hand, one could suggest that as 
the fear of misuse becomes greater, the importance that each subscriber will attribute to the device will change 
respectively. For instance, storing personal identifiers in the device might lead people to consider their device to 
be comparable to other forms of important information and ID, such as, passports, credit cards, and car keys.  
Such linkage could potentially change people’s perception and attitude toward the security and protection of their 
devices.  
 
However, there was also a concern raised in the focus group expressing a fear of storage on the device and 
potential misuse. 
 
“…my concern is where would the fingerprint, let’s say like signature, where would be stored? 
Would that be stored on the phone, so if somebody stole my phone they have my signature which is 
signed on the back of you bank cards and my fingerprint obviously? What then can people do with 
the information…obviously if someone knows how to hack into a phone could they use the 
information?” 
 
It is certain that a biometric database will always constitute an attractive target, making it a more valuable target 
than a device involving only one person. It would be necessary in such cases to establish regulations and policies 
for the security of the database and biometric templates, and mandate continuing adherence to them. A central 
system, though, has an advantage that the system can monitor such activity and try to prevent it, thereby 
providing a more uniform and controlled protection space, than storage in the device.  
 
People have different views towards the storage of such information as concerns are raised over the security in 
each storage solution and how potentially easy a breach of confidentiality is. A recent study conducted by the 
authors’ research group attempted to assess public perceptions of biometrics, and performed a survey involving 
209 respondents (Furnell and Evangelatos, 2007).  One question asked people about their concern regarding the 
theft of their biometric data and the potential of using them to cheat a system. The responses are illustrated in 
Figure 3.  
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Figure 3 Concern that biometric information could be stolen 
 
As seen from the figure, the majority of the respondents expressed some level of concern about the security of 
their data, with only 4% not having any fear of misuse. The same survey also asked where respondents would 
prefer their biometric data to be stored. Forty percent supported the network option whereas only seventeen 
percent agreed on the device (as illustrated in Figure 4). Interestingly, 18% would prefer their biometric 
templates to be stored in a smartcard. This is analogous to a device-centric approach, as the smartcard must 
remain with the user, but represents a significant enhancement in physical and logical security of the information.  
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Figure 4 Subscriber preferences on storage of biometric profiles 
 
Privacy concerns that exist for the network implementation could be reduced by ensuring only the biometric 
templates are stored and not any form of raw data. Several studies have taken place to overcome that issue, 
looking to protect the storage of biometrics using techniques such as distortion of the template. It is also notable 
that the creation of biometric templates is based upon vendors’ own proprietary formats. As such, one biometric 
template from one vendor will not operate with another vendor's product, as the format and characteristics used 
to authenticate people differ. This will reduce the potential harm caused by a stolen biometric sample to systems 
that only utilised that specific vendor's product. The one-way property of creating biometric templates also 
ensures they cannot be reversed engineered. 
 
Storage and Processing Requirements  
 
While the privacy issue represents a challenge of user trust and perception, there are also technical-level 
considerations in terms of the storage and processing of biometric data.  These will again differ according to the 
chosen topology. 
 
Consideration needs to be given to the storage of the initial biometric template and also the samples that are 
subsequently used in the process of verification. For current PIN-based approaches this is not an issue, but the 
storage demands of biometrics are more significant.  Issues of storage might exist in both topologies, with 
individual devices potentially having limited onboard storage, while the network-centric approach may need to 
cope with the storage of data for high volumes of users. 
 
Different biometric techniques require differing levels of storage memory.  Techniques such as face recognition 
(where multiple images might be needed from different angles in order to achieve a high consistent outcome), or 
voice verification (where sound files need to be stored), usually require higher storage capacities. Furthermore, as 
the proposed authentication mechanism aims to take advantage of a number of different techniques, the device or 
network will need to store more than one template per user, which could potentially become more demanding. 
Figure 5 illustrates typical template sizes from a number of more common biometric technologies. 
 
Source: International Biometric Group, 2002 
Figure 5 Typical sizes of biometric templates 
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Given the memory available on current mobile device, it can be seen that the storage requirements would not 
prevent a device-centric implementation. The most demanding approach is voice scanning which can reach the 
requirements of close to 10KB.  Therefore in general terms, storage of biometric templates in a device-centric 
paradigm does not present any difficulty. However, given the variability in devices and functionality, some care 
must be taken to ensure that this proposed authentication mechanism is able to operate with all hardware devices, 
including legacy devices which might have smaller storage footprints. 
 
In terms of processing capabilities, the network-centric approach has an advantage in the sense that devices 
themselves may have relatively limited capabilities. Indeed, this may actually represent a fundamental obstacle to 
establishing a device-centric solution. Whereas laptop-level devices may have the capabilities required to process 
biometric data, the processing power in handheld devices is still limited. Algorithms that are utilised in biometric 
verification tend to be intensive, as they are based upon complex data extraction and pattern classification 
techniques (and indeed the impact of this additional processing on the battery of the mobile device would also 
have to be carefully considered).  The process of enrolment and verification will place a serious demand upon 
resources on many mobile devices. In order to achieve transparent authentication, verification of the user needs 
to be completed without affecting the user's ability to use the device (e.g. no impairment to other running 
applications).  It would not be satisfactory for the device to pause or hang for a few seconds every time 
verification was being performed.  However, as with the storage footprint, different biometric techniques require 
varying levels of processing capacity. It is therefore not necessarily infeasible to consider at least some 
biometrics operating in a device-centric paradigm. Indeed, signature recognition, fingerprint recognition, 
keystroke analysis and facial recognition have all been developed for mobile devices (PDALok, 2006; NTT 
DoCoMo, 2003; Clarke and Furnell, 2006; Omron, 2005). 
 
Over time, the processing constraints are likely to be overcome as the capabilities of handhelds continue to 
advance.  However, from an implementation perspective, a network-centric paradigm would still potentially be 
easier to deploy and offer a wider range of possible biometric techniques. Again, however, consideration needs to 
be given upon the scalability of such an approach - multiplying individual authentication requests by high 
volumes of users does place a significant demand upon processing. 
Bandwidth Requirements 
 
A particular consideration in the context of the network-centric approach is the network bandwidth that will be 
required for the transmission of user authentication data. A device-centric approach has no such implications, as 
at most it will only be required to perform its normal authentication of the device to the network. By contrast, the 
network-centric approach will require network bandwidth to send biometric samples to the network, and receive 
authentication decisions back. Communication across the network will also result in a latency occurring between 
the initial authentication request and the resulting decision. 
 
Typical bandwidth rates in practical 3G network scenarios are 220-320 kbps for UMTS and 550-1100kbps with 
HSDPA, although the theoretical rates are a lot higher (3G, 2004). An average 3G portal page, for example, has a 
size of 40 Kbytes and should theoretically take less than a second to load. However, in reality the actual 
throughput results in an 8-20 second delay. A usability study has shown that users are willing to wait for at least 3 
seconds for a page to appear (Gissin, 2005). This willingness to wait is an important consideration in designing 
the authentication protocols and mechanisms. Forcing users to wait too long before being given access would 
result in a negative perception, particularly when the approach is meant to be transparent. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, biometric templates can range from as little as a few hundred bytes up to 
10Kbytes. These templates contain the unique data that is derived after pre-processing (thereby extracting the 
required features). The option of the device performing this procedure would be one way to decrease the 
bandwidth requirements, as the data sent would be far smaller than the raw sample. However, the ability to 
perform pre-processing on the device will depend upon the individual biometric technique and the processing 
capabilities of the device. If pre-processing can be implemented on the device it can be assumed that the size of 
the data being communicated is similar to those presented in Figure 5. A simple computation will show that the 
largest template of 10Kbytes will require time of 0.36 sec for the lowest given throughput on UTMS (220 kbps). 
It must be considered though that this might well become larger depending upon the network condition at the 
time and also takes no consideration of the time taken for the network to actually perform the authentication. 
Beyond latency for individual users, the issue of scalability needs to be addressed. Large volumes of users 
sending biometric sample data across the network might have significant impacts upon network resources and 
increase the level of delay experienced. For example, last year one of the largest operators in the UK accounted 
over 15 million subscribers (Richardson, 2005). If just 10% of them used such a service, we would be talking 
about 1.5 million users requesting authentication from the network. Of course the burden of the network will 
depend upon the authentication frequency and this will vary across users as the different use of their device will 
result in more or less authentication requests.  
 
At first glance one might suggest that current 3G networks (and certainly future networks) would be able to cope 
with the requirements.  Although this might not be wrong in principle, an investigation of the network 
consumption does reveal somewhat surprisingly high volumes. Based upon the figures of 1.5 million users Figure 
6 illustrates the bandwidth required per day for three different types of biometric approach. 
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Figure 6 Average biometric data transfer requirements (Based upon 1.5 million Users) 
As illustrated in the chart, for voice scan, even a minimum request for authentication of five times results a 
required data capacity of 75Gbytes for the network provider, whereas with up to twenty requests per day this 
raises to 300Gbytes. In comparison however, a video stream application, (one of the standard 3G applications), 
has bandwidth consumption close to 200Kbps for each user (Bruce, 2006). In a population of 1.5 million 
subscribers that represents 37Gbytes to be transferred every second. That said, there is a real cost associated with 
sending data across a network and there will be at least an indirect cost, given that the operator may otherwise be 
able to use the bandwidth to support revenue-generating services.  
Availability Requirements  
 
A factor that plays a significant role in a network-centric topology is the establishment of availability. In a fully 
device-centric approach all aspects required to perform the authentication are self-contained locally within the 
device. However, having the authentication process relying upon the network makes a key assumption that the 
network is available at all times to facilitate the process. In practice, there are various reasons why network 
connectivity might not be available, such as loss of coverage, network overload, or server malfunction. The 
inability to perform an authentication request as and when required will have a significant impact upon the 
authentication mechanism and its perceived usability. 
 
Of course, if the authentication request is associated with a network-based application or service then one could 
reasonably argue that there is no inconvenience, as the service would not be able available anyway. What would 
be less acceptable, however, would be reliance upon network availability in order to access applications or 
features that would otherwise be entirely local.  For example, opening a document, accessing contacts, or using 
Bluetooth to connect to another device, might all require authentication, and this would have a real and 
unacceptable impact if the process were to rely upon the (unavailable) network.  
 
Participants in the focus group were asked to consider this issue and overall there was a negative opinion on 
always requiring access from the network.  The following viewpoint was typical: 
 
“I find it difficult that it might be possible just even to interact with the network operator, because 
I’d like to use that information even when I don’t interact with the network operator." 
 
It can be suggested that apart from the technical issues that can occur, it seems rather inconvenient to require 
authentication from the provider. The inconvenience does not only relate to the access of local functionality and 
applications, but also the general concept - that in order to access any service the user will be obliged to 
explicitly go through the network provider. This places a burden of inconvenience upon the user, network 
provider and the authentication mechanism. One of the focus group members specifically summed up the issues 
surrounding the availability of network resources: 
 
“There is quite a lot stored in the network. Potentially everything can be stored in the network. 
There is a trade-off between responsiveness and security….Especially if you are not in coverage 
all period of time and you want to look up someone’s name, address or whatever in your address 
book you haven’t got it. So that’s completely rejected by the operators. There’s got to be some 
balance between security that happens on the network and immediacy you have on the person... 
there isn’t a simple answer to this sort of question” 
Mobility and Roaming  
 
A network-centric approach would enable personal mobility (Thai et al. 2003) - the ability, in principle, to get 
authenticated on any mobile device and have all subsequent use of the device billed to their account. Having the 
verification coming from the network, the subscriber will be able to use the system from various devices, without 
any swapping of SIM cards. The device-centric approach lacks such convenience as the storage and 
authentication of the user is linked to the specific device.  
 
Conversely, however, when considering the issue of roaming, the device-centric topology is more appropriate as 
authentication of the user can be performed on the device wherever they might be in the world. A network-centric 
topology would experience significant increases in latency and have to transverse a far larger open network. 
Unless the local network provider supported the authentication mechanism and had a local version of the 
biometric template (which would not be likely due to privacy) this increase in delay would again have an impact 
upon the authentication mechanism which would need to be considered. 
 
Also, what happens when roaming is not available? In such a situation, the user will have no way to be 
authenticated as no access to the provider’s network will be available, restricting if not completely preventing 
any use of the device. There is also the consideration of cost. A home network operator implementing the 
authentication mechanism might be prepared to bear the cost of network consumption. However, this may not be 
the case for a roaming network, raising questions of who covers the cost. Currently the charges for roaming are 
very high, although this is expected to reduce in time (Best, 2006b). A device-centric approach would overcome 
this issue as no reliance upon external resources is required.  
DISCUSSION:  
The prior analysis has shown that comparing the device- and network-centric topologies introduces a varied and 
complex range of considerations, with each approach offering advantages and disadvantages in different 
contexts. Attempting to base a solution entirely around the device can introduce processing limitations, whereas 
bandwidth and the requirement for connectivity may represent practical constraints for a network-based 
paradigm. In addition, both approaches may introduce their own privacy-related concerns.  
 
Based on the issues arising from both potential architectures, it can be argued that no single approach can cover 
all aspects that are required for the practical implementation of the proposed authentication framework.  In order 
to try to overcome the troublesome aspects of each implementation, it is suggested that a hybrid approach would 
be more appropriate. Although complicating the underlying authentication system, it would provide a basis for 
overcoming the disadvantages of both topologies, while retaining their key advantages, so that the aims and 
objectives of the authentication mechanism can be met. 
 
In such an approach both storage and processing would be potentially split over the device and the network, 
compromising between the issues of device processing capabilities, network availability, and privacy. The nature 
of the split in the authentication mechanism will depend upon the individual requirements of the user in relation 
to privacy and access, and the device in terms of which biometric techniques it can support locally. There will be 
therefore a number of hybrid approaches that could exist, each covering different issues on different scenarios for 
different users. For example, in order to deal with the issue of device processing and privacy, there could be the 
option to store all of the templates in the device, but place the processing functionality on the network. This 
would satisfy privacy concerns but at the same time discharge the device of any excessive processing tasks. 
Cryptographic measures could be used to protect the data in transit and during processing. Depending upon the 
device capabilities, pre-processing can be performed locally when possible, so that the biometric samples that are 
being sent over the network are kept as small as possible. 
 
The specific nature of the hybrid system will closely depend upon a wide variety of factors that have been 
discussed in this paper. In order to remove the concerns surrounding network availability it is suggested that at 
least one authentication technique will always remain on the local device. Although this technique might not 
provide the level of security strong network-based biometrics might, it will be able to provide an effective means 
of authenticating short term usage of local applications and functions. 
In devices with more possessing capacity, the hybrid approach would also be able to provide the ability to split 
the biometric templates, having the most intensive and demanding biometric techniques on the network and the 
others with fewer requirements on the device. Another basis for determining this split could also be the 
uniqueness attributed to them for privacy issues.  
 
This hybrid authentication paradigm must incorporate a level of intelligence so it is able to understand when and 
how the security requirements can be attributed, and how the framework needs to adapt between different 
authentication techniques to handle those requirements. For example, if a user sends a text message or makes a 
local voice call then the operation need not be considered that critical, whereas accessing an mCommerce service 
or making an international call would demand more protection. The authentication mechanism should recognise 
this and select techniques that are appropriate to the context. 
CONCLUSION: 
With the growing popularity and functionality of mobile devices, the personal and financial cost of the device 
being misused or abused is increasing. As such, the ability to ensure and maintain identity verification of the user 
is imperative. Unfortunately, when considering the different types of authentication mechanism currently 
available, none satisfy the requirements for all users across all mobile devices. This situation is only complicated 
when you consider the dynamic and varied environment within which mobile devices operate, with varying 
functionality, processing and memory capabilities, differing network access technologies and a number of 
possible stakeholders all interested in the device. 
 
Having discussed in some detail the advantages and disadvantages of network- versus device-centric paradigms, 
it was concluded that no single approach could achieve the desired aims. Therefore this paper has proposed the 
principle of a hybrid version that is able to encompass the advantages of both systems and assist in mitigating the 
key disadvantages. Future research will assess the viability of such an approach via the design and practical 
implementation of an associated architectural framework. 
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Abstract. The evolution of mobile networking has opened the door to a wide 
range of service opportunities for mobile devices, increasing at the same time 
the sensitivity of the information stored and access through them. Current PIN-
based authentication has proved to be an insufficient and an inconvenient 
approach. Biometrics have proven to be a reliable approach to identity 
verification and can provide a more robust means of security, as they rely upon 
personal identifiers. Amongst various biometric techniques available, 
keystroke analysis combines features that can offer a cost effective, non-
intrusive and continuous authentication solution for mobile devices. This 
research has been undertaken in order to investigate the performance of 
keystroke analysis on thumb-based keyboards that are being widely deployed 
upon PDA’s and Smartphone devices. The investigation sought to authenticate 
users whilst typing text messages, using two keystroke characteristics, the 
inter-keystroke latency and hold-time. The results demonstrate the approach to 
be promising, achieving an average EER=12.2% with the inter-keystroke 
latency based upon 50 participants. Uniquely to this tactile environment 
however, the hold-time characteristic, did not prove to be a reliable feature to 
be utilised. 
1 Introduction 
The proliferation of mobile devices and mobile networking has introduced new 
challenges for the protection of the subscribers’ assets. The security risks are no 
longer associated only with safeguarding the subscriber’s account. With the 
introduction of 3rd generation mobile networks, the services and information 
accessible through mobile handsets has increased in sensitivity, as micro-payments, 
mobile banking and location-based services are all now a reality for the mobile world 
[1]. Statistics show that mobile theft in the UK accounts 45% of all theft [2], a fact, 
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which when combined with the information that can be stored on mobile handsets 
and the attraction that high-tech devices can pose, presents a further concern for 
enhanced security.  
Current authentication, principally achieved by PINs, is not enough to 
substantially safeguard today’s mobile handsets and the data accessed through them. 
As a secret knowledge technique it has several well established drawbacks, such as 
being shared, written down or kept at factory default settings [3]. Furthermore, as 
survey results demonstrate, subscribers consider it an inconvenient method and as 
such tend not to use it in the first place, leaving their device completely unprotected 
[4]. This is not only limited to the general public, as the Mobile Usage Survey 2005 
reveals, only 2 thirds of the IT managers surveyed have enabled password security in 
their mobile devices, despite acknowledging the amount of sensitive business 
information that is stored upon them [5]. 
Of the two remaining authentication approaches - tokens and biometrics, the 
latter can offer a more viable approach. Token-based authentication implemented to 
date by SIM cards does not provide any protection for the user as it is unlikely to be 
ever removed from the device. Biometrics could provide an enhancement on the 
current security, as authentication is based upon a unique characteristic of a person. 
This fact introduces a unique level of security that other approaches are unable to 
accomplish, as it relates the process to a person and not to the possession of 
knowledge or a token. A biometric approach that can provide a cost-effective and a 
non-intrusive solution for mobile handset authentication is keystroke analysis, a 
technique which is based on the typing dynamics of a user.  
The purpose of this research is to investigate the feasibility of keystroke analysis 
on thumb-based keyboards based on text messaging input, looking to apply this 
technique as an authentication method for mobile handsets that offer that unique 
tactile interface. The paper proceeds with section 2 describing the unique 
characteristics utilised in keystroke analysis and provides an overview of keystroke 
analysis studies to date. Sections 3 and 4 describe the methodology and results of the 
study. A discussion of the results, placing them in context and areas for future 
research are presented in Sections 5 and 6. 
2 Keystroke analysis 
 
Keystroke analysis is a behavioural biometric that attempts to verify identity based 
upon the typing pattern of a user, looking at certain physical characteristics of their 
interaction with a keyboard. Considerable research has been undertaken on the 
method since first suggested by Spillane [6] in 1975, with studies identifying two 
main characteristics that provide valuable discriminative information: 
 
 Inter-keystroke latency, which is the interval between two 
successive keystrokes, and 
 Hold-time, which is the interval between the pressing and releasing 
of a single key 
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The majority of the studies to date have investigated the feasibility of keystroke 
analysis on full QWERTY keyboards [7 – 10], showing good results for both of the 
characteristics mentioned. In general, the inter-keystroke latency has demonstrated 
better discriminatory characteristics for classification in comparison to hold-time.  
As in all biometrics the method to assess the performance of keystroke analysis, 
is by using the False Acceptance Rate (FAR), which indicates the probability of an 
impostor being granted access to the system, and the False Rejection Rate (FRR), 
which represents the degree to which a legitimate user is rejected. A trade-off exists 
between these rates, in terms of increasing security (and therefore increasing user 
inconvenience) and increasing user convenience (and thus decreasing the security). 
The point at which those two rates cross is referred to as the Equal Error Rate (%) 
and is used as a more objective means of comparing the performance of different 
biometric techniques. 
 The underlying classification algorithms utilized in keystroke analysis were 
traditionally statistically based [7, 8, 10]. However, advancements in neural networks 
have shown this technique to be more successful. A summary of key literature and 
results within the domain of keystroke analysis on PC keyboards is illustrated in 
Table 1.  
Table 1. A summary of literature & results on keystroke analysis on PC keyboards 
Study Users Input Inter-key Hold-time Approach FAR (%) FRR (%) 
Umpress & 
Williams[7] 17 Alphabetic  Statistical 11.7 5.8 
Joyce & 
Gupta [8] 23 Alphabetic  Statistical 0.3 16.4 
Brown & 
Rogers [9] 25 Alphabetic   Neural N. 0 12 
Obaidat & 
Sadoun [10] 15 Alphabetic   Neural N. 0 0
Ord & 
Furnell [11] 14 Numerical  Neural N. 9.9 30 
Although continuous research on keystroke analysis has been conducted since 
the 1980’s, it was not until more recently that the method was assessed on interfaces 
provided on mobile phones where the tactile environment considerably differs. A 
series of studies accessed the method on regular mobile phone keypads with 
promising outcomes, achieving an EER of 8% based on numerical input [12]. 
Nevertheless, the performance of keystroke analysis for other tactile environments 
such as thumb-based keyboards is undocumented. Thumb-based keyboards 
constitute an interesting gap in research as they provide the extensive interface of a 
PC keyboard and the thumb-based properties of a mobile phone.  
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3 Methodology 
 
This study looked into the feasibility of authenticating a user whilst typing text 
messages. Two different types of analysis were conducted in the context of this 
research: static analysis utilising the inter-keystroke latency and pseudo-dynamic 
utilising the hold-time characteristic. A total of fifty participants took part in the 
study, involving the largest population of participants for a study such as this and 
enabling more statistically significant results to be concluded. The participants were 
asked to enter thirty messages, with each message specifically designed to ensure 
that certain requirements are met.  
 For the static analysis six varying sized keywords were included in the text 
messages providing a static classification component. The varying nature of the 
static keywords permitted an evaluation of the word length versus performance. 
Thirty repetitions of each keyword were included, to ensure enough data for 
classification. The words selected are listed in Table 2, along with the number of 
inter-keystroke latencies that they involve and the number of samples used for 
training and testing after outliers were removed (a standard procedure for keystroke 
analysis studies [7-15]. 
Table 2. Keywords used for inter-key latency 
Keyword # Inter-keystroke 
latencies 
#Samples after 
outliers’ removal
Training Set Testing Set 
everything 10 27 18 9 
difficult 9 26 18 8 
better 6 27 18 9 
night 5 27 18 9 
the 3 26 18 8 
and 3 27 18 9 
Fig. 1. An XDA IIs thumb-based keypad               Fig.2. Screenshot from experiment software 
Literature has showed that attempts to perform dynamic analysis on keystroke 
dynamics [13, 14] did not yield satisfactory results. As such an attempt was made to 
utilize a static component – the recurrent letters, in a dynamic form of analysis. The 
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pseudo-dynamic analysis was based upon the hold-time of the six most recurrent 
letters in the English language – ‘e’, ‘t’, ‘a’, ‘o’, ‘n’ and ‘i’  - an adequate number of 
repetitions of which were included within the messages.  
The text messages were entered using an XDA IIs handset that deploys a 
representative example of today’s thumb-based keyboards, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
In order to capture the keystroke data, appropriate software was developed using 
Microsoft’s Visual Basic .NET, and deployed on the handset. A screenshot of the 
software is illustrated in Figure 2. As usual in keystroke analysis studies, corrections 
were not permitted in case the user misspelled a word as this would undesirably 
interfere with the data [7]. Instead, the whole word had to be retyped in the correct 
form. Although it would be preferred to collect the data during multiple sessions, as 
a more indicative typing profile of the users could be captured, the data collection 
was performed in a single session, to maximise the number of participants that 
completed the study. 
4 Results 
4.1 Inter-keystroke latency 
An initial analysis of the input data showed a fairly large spread of values on the 
inter-keystroke latencies. Even though smaller keywords were expected to give a 
greater consistency in the typing pattern because of their length and commonality, 
that was not the case. Additionally, the difference between the values of the different 
users was not large. These factors put a burden on the classification algorithm, as 
they make the classification boundaries between users very difficult to establish 
successfully. Figure 3, illustrates the mean and standard deviation for the larger 
keyword ‘everything’ for all users as an example of the problem. 
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Fig. 3. Mean & Standard deviation for keyword everything 
A number of analyses were undertaken, using Feed Forward Multilayer 
Perceptron Neural Network (FF-MLP) as it had demonstrated better performance in 
previous studies over other techniques [10, 12, 15, 16, 17]. Different network 
configurations were tested, looking for optimum performance. The best results 
achieved were for the keyword ‘everything’ with an EER of 23.4%. This was 
somewhat expected as the larger keywords contain more keystroke latencies and 
subsequently more discriminative information.    
As illustrated in Table 3, the results show the FRR is much higher from the FAR 
which can be explained by the large number of impostors (49) extensively training 
the network versus the one authorised user. Furthermore, the number of samples 
assigned to the testing of the classification was small, resulting in the FRR 
encountering large steps in its transitions when being evaluated. 
Although the error rate is fairly high, there were cases of users reaching an EER 
below 10% with the best case of user 1 achieving an EER of 0.3%, showing the 
ability to classify some users. The rest of the keywords resulted in higher error rates, 
with the error increasing as the length of the keyword was reducing. The best results 
for each keyword are illustrated in Table 3.  
Table 3. Best results for each keyword 
Keyword  FAR (%) FRR (%) EER(%) 
everything 12.8 34.2 23.5 
difficult 13.2 43.0 28.1 
better 18.0 43.1 30.5 
night 21.3 45.8 33.5 
the 23.7 41.5 32.6 
and 24.3 43.6 33.9 
The average results of different networks showed minimal change in the EERs, 
although individual performances did vary. This suggests that the network does not 
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optimise for individual users but rather forces a standard training scheme upon the 
user. To overcome this problem a different approach was utilised by Clarke & 
Furnell [12], which provided an improvement in performance through optimising the 
number of training epochs. A gradual training technique was performed, training the 
network for an extensive number of epochs but periodically evaluating the 
performance. The results showed a noticeable decrease in the error rates with best 
case achieving an EER of 12.2% for the larger keyword. The summary of the gradual 
training results are presented in Table 4.  
Table 4. Gradual training results for all keywords 
Keyword  FAR (%) FRR (%) EER(%) 
everything 15.8 9.1 12.2 
difficult 16.8 12.0 14.4 
better 23.5 14.4 18.9 
night 24.2 14.4 19.3 
the 29.3 19.5 24.4 
and 28.7 17.6 23.1 
Noticeably, for the keyword “everything”, 20 users achieved an FRR of 0% with 
a respective FAR below 10%, with the best user achieving an FAR of 0.7% and FRR 
of 0%. The list of best and worst case users for all keywords are illustrated in Table 
5. The results underline the requirement for different training intensiveness for each 
user, and that the inter-keystroke latency offers the discriminative data to classify 
users in the specific tactile interface.  
Table 5. Best & worst case results from gradual training 
Best Case Worst Case Keyword  
User EER (%) User EER (%) 
everything 2 0.4 6 32.4 
difficult 11 1.3 46 34.1 
better 49 1.6 27 34.2 
night 34 2.3 25 40.5 
the 26 6.4 39 45.8 
and 11 5.4 5 49.4 
4.2 Hold-time 
In contrary to the inter-keystroke latency investigation, the hold-time characteristic 
provided little discriminative information to classify users. A series of tests on 
different network configurations using all six letters (as to provide the largest 
possible input vector) resulted in an EER of around 50%, showing little classification 
performance. The same error rate was achieved using different size subsets of the 
letters with smaller input vectors (but with the advantage of more repetitions of each 
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letter) and also with a larger input vector of eight letters through the addition of 
letters ‘r’ and ‘s’, as they appear next on the reoccurrence list.  
In order to further assess the performance of hold-time, a group of only 20 users 
was utilised aiming to help the classification problem by reducing the amount and 
complexity of information presented to the network and thus assisting in the 
discrimination of authorised and unauthorised users. However, no change in the 
performance was experienced. Even when gradual training was applied, using the six 
letters set, no significant improvement was observed. Sample results from various 
tests are provided in Table 6. Even though there was a 10% decline on the EER using 
gradual training, the results are still too high to suggest that hold-time can offer any 
valuable discriminative information.  
Table 6. Sample results from various tests on hold-time 
Set  Training Users FAR (%) FRR (%) EER(%) 
6 letters normal 20 49.5 49.4 49.5 
6 letters normal 50 31.3 69.0 50.2 
8 letters normal 50 26.7 72.9 49.8 
3 letters normal 50 22.1 77.6 49.9 
6 letters gradual 50 34.2 36.8 36.8 
6 letters normal 20 49.5 49.4 49.5 
5 Discussion 
 
As the results showed the inter-keystroke latency can provide an effective means of 
differentiating between users. When based on a latency vector of 10, an EER of 
12.2% was achieved with the gradual training approach. As was expected the use of 
smaller input vectors resulted in a corresponding increase in error rates, as the 
amount of unique discriminative information and feature space reduced. 
With regards to the inter-keystroke latency, this study did not experience the very 
low rates in performance that have been found in previous studies based on regular 
keyboards. It is suggested that a number of aspects differentiate this investigation 
from previous studies. The keyboard utilised in this study provides a completely 
different tactile interface than traditional keyboards, with a more restricted keystroke 
interface, reduced distance between the keys and smaller key depth. In addition, the 
number of fingers utilised in typing has also been reduced from typically 10 fingers 
and thumbs to 2 thumbs. Both of these factors restrict the typing dynamics, as the 
combinations of the fingers in conjunction with the timing of the keystrokes and 
movement to achieve them, are reduced. This results in a smaller feature space for 
the keystrokes characteristics to reside in and subsequently making it more difficult 
to distinguish between them. Furthermore, although the layout was familiar to all 
users as it shares the same layout with a PC keyboard, some of the participants 
experienced difficulty in identifying the placement of the keys due to the different 
way of typing. 
The hold-time characteristic did not provide any real evidence to suggest that it 
can be utilised in this specific typing interface, though there are a number of factors 
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that may explain the inability of the keystroke feature. Firstly, the keys that the 
thumb-based keyboard deploys are very small related to the chunky tactile 
environment that a normal keyboard offers, restricting the interval length between 
the pressing and releasing of a key and thus not providing much differentiation in 
values. Although the hold-time has performed well on regular keypads [12], the keys 
were larger than the keyboard used in this experiment and the method of calculating 
the hold time was different. In the study by Clarke & Furnell [12], the hold-time was 
defined by the first key press down until the last key release, increasing immediately 
the range of values and thus the feature space (for instance, for the character ‘c’ the 
number 1 button would need to be pressed three times). 
Furthermore in a thumb-based keyboard, fingers stay almost static due to the 
limited area. As such, the hand movement which appears in PC keyboards and may 
affect the pressing of a key is unlikely to happen in this case. What must also be 
noticed is that some participants complained about the feedback from the keyboard, 
as they could not at all cases be sure if they had pressed a key, which might have 
further complicated matters. 
6 Conclusions 
 
This research conducted a feasibility study on the utilisation of keystroke analysis as 
an authentication method in devices that offer the tactile environment of a thumb-
based keyboard. The results showed that from the two traditionally used keystroke 
characteristics, the inter-keystroke latency gave promising results in-line with 
previous studies undertaken. However, unusually the hold-time characteristic gave 
no promise of a potential use in this kind of keystroke interface, though further 
research must be undertaken to determine this conclusively. 
Future research will be conducted looking to optimise network configurations for 
the inter-keystroke latency to take into account the bias towards the network 
responding in favour of the impostor. Furthermore, the use of different keywords 
will be investigated, as will the concurrent use of more than one keyword within a 
single authentication request, the latter aspect having the potential to substantially 
improve performance. In respect to hold-time, further tests are required before 
concluding to its ineffectiveness, exploring the use of longer input vectors and 
different letter subsets.  A future experiment will also look to utilise different thumb-
based keyboards that offer a slight different tactile environments than the one utilised 
in this study. Additionally, future work will seek to investigate the performance of 
the technique in environments representing more practical situations, thereby 
providing more balanced results. Factors such as the user's interaction with the 
handset whilst they are walking and their physical condition (e.g. tired or stressed) 
can be investigated for their impact upon performance.  
This study has demonstrated promising results for the use of keystroke analysis, 
using a significantly large number of participants than previous studies. Although the 
accuracy of the method does not compete in distinctiveness with other biometrics 
such as fingerprints, the nature of keystroke analysis in that it can provide a 
monitoring authentication mechanism, transparent to the user (which is not feasible 
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for many other techniques) is a positive attribute. If used regularly and in 
conjunction with other transparent authentication techniques, keystroke analysis can 
be an effective means of providing a more enhanced level of security.  
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ABSTRACT 
Mobile devices have become a ubiquitous computing device, with over a third of the world’s population 
now owning a device. The nature of the device has expanded far beyond its original inception as a 
telephony device, now capable of accessing and storing a wide-variety of information. Given this 
increased access, the ability to effectively provide security has become increasingly important. Key to 
these is authentication of the user to the device. 
Unfortunately current authentication methods such as the PIN are found to be severely lacking in 
providing any level of security beyond initial point-of-entry, with the level of protection being provided 
here arguable insufficient. This paper proposes the application of biometric techniques in a transparent 
and non-intrusive fashion to enable continuous and user convenient authentication of the user. The 
proposed mechanisms seek to adapt current classification algorithms in a manner that trades off a small 
degree of security for larger improves in the robustness and user acceptance of the approach. 
KEYWORDS 
Biometrics,     Authentication,     Mobility 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing capabilities of mobile handsets and networks have enabled the creation of a wide 
range of data-centric services. The volume of information that can be stored and accessed 
through mobile devices have become enormous. This has raised significant concerns regarding 
the sensitivity of the information for both individual and more particularly organisations. A 
recent study by Gartner reports 80% of organisations’ critical information is stored on mobile 
devices [1]. It can be therefore suggested that providing appropriate protection against 
unauthorised access to information becomes significantly important.  
A significant component of the device security consists of user authentication. The current 
authentication facility in mobile handsets is primarily achieved by the Personal Identification 
Number (PIN). Unfortunately PINs, being a secret-knowledge technique, have a number of well 
documented drawbacks: security relies on the user and therefore bad practices from the latter 
significantly diminishes the security that PINs provide [2].   
An alternative solution towards more robust authentication is biometrics, which as they are 
based on personal identifiers; they closely relate the authentication credentials to the user and 
thus are able to provide more robust trust to the authentication decision. Biometrics are 
beginning to constitute a significant impact on the authentication market and their adoption is 
increasing every year for a range of industries and applications where authentication and 
identification of a user is required. Their application has already taken place on mobile handsets 
and it is estimated that in general mobile biometric solutions are going to contribute $268 
million towards total mobile identity and access management market by the year 2011 [3].  
To date however, all authentication approaches, including biometric approaches, have focussed 
upon establishing point-of-entry authentication of the user. Although this is imperative to 
establish at the beginning of a session, unfortunately no further verification of the user is 
undertaken until the device is switched off again. With the increasing reliance upon mobile 
devices, few devices are now actually even switched off, removing any protection point-of-entry 
solutions offer. The ability to provide non-intrusive authentication in a transparent fashion, 
without the explicit interaction of the user will assist in establishing the identity of the user 
throughout the session. Of the three authentication approaches: secret-knowledge, tokens and 
biometrics, only the latter really provides an effective mechanism to achieve this. Through the 
careful application of particular biometric techniques it could be possible to not only increase 
security but do so in a user convenient manner. It is important however to utilise techniques that 
lend themselves towards transparent application. Although in principal many techniques do the 
ability to achieve this in practice is somewhat restricted. This paper discusses the issues 
involved in deploying several key biometric techniques in a transparent fashion and proposes a 
mechanism to achieve this. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a background in biometric authentication 
with section 3 discussing the application of specific techniques to a mobile device. Section 4 
discusses the issues that restrict the envisaged application, examining the modifications required 
to enable transparency. The conclusions are given in Section 5.  
2. BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION 
Biometrics as defined by the International Biometric Group (IBG) is the automated use of 
physiological or behavioural characteristics to determine or verify identity [4]. The operation of 
biometrics is based on a process of establishing the level of similarity between two samples: a 
reference template stored in the system that was acquired during enrolment and a new acquired 
sample provided by the user each time that authentication must take place. A typical biometric 
system is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. A typical biometric system 
Each time a new sample is fed into the system the distinct features are extracted and then 
subsequently compared to the reference template. This extraction differs per technique in order 
to preserve privacy of the stored information, as well as to improve performance. Even though 
biometrics can be provide more robust security, the result of the comparison is a function of 
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similarity between the two samples and as such can lead towards two principle error rates that 
affect the performance of the system: 
 
• False Rejection Rate (FRR), which corresponds to the rate at which a legitimate 
user is falsely being denied access to the system, and 
 
• False Acceptance Rate (FAR), which represents the rate at which an impostor 
getting accepted by the system 
 
Although biometric performance is the outcome of a number of factors such the feature 
extraction, the algorithms used to perform the comparison and also environmental conditions, 
the principal contribution towards good performance is the distinctiveness of the characteristics 
utilised. This distinctiveness varies amongst the different biometric techniques; especially 
between behavioural and physiological biometrics as the latter tend to be much more distinct 
than their behavioural counterparts. An overview of a number of biometrics of interest follows 
addressing the above issues as well as presenting how each technique operates.  
2.1. Face Recognition  
The facial structure carries a distinct geometry which can be utilised to discriminate between 
users. There are different ways that face recognition is performed. Traditional approaches make 
use of distances formed between specific key points of the face such as the points of the eyes, of 
the side of mouth and the nose etc [5, 6]. Though more recent techniques tend to examine the 
holistic view of the face’s geometry concurrently utilising a number of characteristic attributes 
[7]. Although that makes them more demanding in terms of processing, it at the same time 
makes them more efficient. In all the above techniques the representation of the face is 2-
dimensional which appears to be very sensitive to varying illumination, posing or facial 
expressions [8]. More recent research has focussed upon 3D representations in order to improve 
tolerance to the aforementioned variations. 
2.2. Voice Verification 
Voice verification seeks to differentiate between people based on their way of speech. Voice 
scanning is looking to extract discriminative information from a person’s voice by examining 
the dynamics of his speech.  In that way, the technique does not rely only on the sound of a 
word or phrase that someone could closely replicate, but it takes under consideration the overall 
dynamics which can not be rendered by mimicking the voice of the legitimate user. Voice 
verification can operate in three fashions:  
 
• Text – dependent : the user is authenticated based on predefined keywords  
• Text – prompt : the used is authenticated based on a challenge scenario 
• Text – independent : the user is authenticated regardless what they say 
Although all three have been extensively researched only the two first have been applied 
successfully.  
2.3. Signature Verification  
This technique utilises the uniqueness of a persons signature to verify a user’s identity. 
Although its first application was to only look at the final result of the user’s signature, newer 
approaches utilise other characteristics in conjunction to improve against forgery. As such a 
number of dynamics on the user’s handwriting are taken into consideration; for example, 
pressure, speed, direction and the number of the strokes [5, 9]. In that way even if the final 
result appears to have the same signature characteristics in regards to actual image of the 
signature, the dynamics that would be involved can not be counterfeit and as such the 
measurements would be substantially different. Most of systems nowadays utilised the 
dynamic approach of the technique.  
2.4. Keystroke Analysis  
Keystroke analysis is a biometric that tries to discriminate between users based on the way they 
type in a keyboard. Two features of the overall keystroke dynamics are traditionally utilised as 
they appear to carry more discriminative information. These are: 
 
• Inter-key Latency: the interval between two successive keystrokes 
• Hold Time: the interval between pressing and releasing a key 
 
The technique has not reached the performance of other mainly physiological characteristics, 
however it has been thoroughly researched as its nature enables authentication to be performed 
with great transparency to the user. A downside that exists is with respect to the large amount of 
training data that the technique requires in order to classify between users, however given time 
to collect this issue is reduced. Keystroke analysis although had been extensively researched for 
regular keyboards it was not until recently that was assessed for keypads deployed in handsets 
where the tactile environment differs. The performance of the technique on mobile handsets has 
showed promising results by research undertaken by the authors in the past [10, 11]. 
3. BIOMETRICS FOR MOBILE DEVICES  
There are a range of biometric techniques currently that have the potential to be utilised within a 
mobile context but each of them has certain trade-off in terms of cost and performance as well 
in regards to the option to operate transparently. Table 1 lists techniques that their application is 
feasible on a mobile device as well as a number of criteria important for their selection.  
Table 1. Potential biometric techniques for mobile devices 
Biometric technique Sample acquisition 
capability as standard? 
Accuracy Non-intrusive? 
Ear shape recognition  High 
Facial recognition  High 
Fingerprint recognition  Very high 
Handwriting recognition  Medium 
Iris scanning  Very high 
Keystroke analysis  Medium 
Service utilization  Low 
Voice verification  High 
Gait verification  Unknown 
It can be seen that techniques that share the highest accuracy are at the same time more intrusive 
to the user. As such there will always be a trade-off and a balance to be sought towards 
satisfying both aspects of security and convenience. However there are a number of techniques 
that can operate transparently without further hardware requirements which can significantly 
reduce cost. Furthermore the aim of achieving transparent authentication imposes the 
requirement for approaches that are based on the regular use of the device so that no explicit 
interaction is required. In that basis the techniques to utilise should be also based on integrated 
hardware in current and future devices, which is used during normal usage of the device. As 
such feasible examples of techniques that this might be achieved by - based on current 
capabilities of the devices, are: 
 
• Voice Verification: Capture voice samples during a voice call. 
 
• Face Recognition: Utilise the front camera of the handset during a video conference call 
or furthermore capture snapshots during a normal interaction of the user with his phone 
as their will be facing the front of their phone. 
 
• Signature Recognition: Capture samples while a user utilises an editor in order for 
example to keep notes. 
 
• Keystroke analysis: Capture samples while a user is typing text messages or writing a 
document.  
 
• Service Utilization: Monitor the interaction of the user with the device based for 
instance on application use, frequency and timing of use etc. (Service utilisation has not 
yet be developed as an explicit biometric yet) 
 
However, the effective application of the above techniques is not simple in the manner desired, 
as issues arise when looking to apply them in a mobile environment and moreover transparently.  
 
4. EFFECTIVE APPLICATION ISSUES  
Even though the biometric techniques discussed previously have a number of real world 
applications, their application in the envisaged manner within a mobile environment is restricted 
due to the way that the sample is captured and how the classification algorithms are 
implemented. Furthermore, although the nature of the approaches has the potential for 
transparency, current implementations of them are based on well defined point-of-entry 
conditions. The following sections will examine the issues that restrict their application and also 
the methods by which the techniques can be adapted to transparent application.  
4.1. Face Recognition  
The use of the technique to date has typically focussed upon very well defined environments, 
with controls on the illumination, facial orientation and distance from the capture device. In a 
mobile device these conditions are far more variable with authentication needing to take place 
under a wide-variety of different environmental conditions. The implementation of the 
technique in a transparent fashion will only seek to complicate these requirements further. The 
user will not be explicitly asked to pose as the sample is captured and could suffer from a 
number of bad variables such as poor lighting due to time of day or location, having a 
significant difference in facial orientation as the user is looking away from the mobile device.  
In order to overcome the above issue of transparency and thus improve the tolerance of the 
technique to variations, two options are available. Firstly to undertaken research looking to 
improve the classification algorithms and remove the dependence upon these factors. Secondly, 
look to adapt current classification algorithms in a fashion that achieves transparency. This 
research proposes to opt for the latter choice, as research into improving classification 
algorithms has and will continue to take place and designing a process that adapts existing 
approaches rather than designing a single mechanism provides more flexibility. Unfortunately, 
when looking to adapt currently algorithms, the process is essentially trading with the FAR and 
FRR of the system: typically trading less security (higher FAR) in favour of a higher level of 
robustness and user acceptance (lower FRR).  
The proposed method of adapting existing algorithms is to move away from a one-to-one 
comparison of an image with a template, and replace the template with a series of images that 
represent various facial orientations of the authorised user. In this way, existing pattern 
classification algorithms can still be applied, however the approach should overall be more 
resilient to changes in facial orientation. As under this proposed mechanism, each sample will 
effectively be compared to a series of images stored within the template, the number of 
verifications performed will increase. This will therefore introduce an increased likelihood that 
an impostor is accepted by an appropriate similarity with at least one of the series of images. 
Under this proposed system, the FAR will only ever be as good as the original FAR of the 
algorithm being used, with more realistically an increase in the FAR being experienced (as 
illustrated in equation 1). Conversely however, under this proposed system the FRR will at 
worst equal that of the previous FRR, but more realistically will be lower (as illustrated in 
equation 2). 
FARnew  H FARold  (Equation 1) 
 FRRnew  I FRRold  (Equation 2) 
The advantage of trading of the FAR and FRR in facial recognition is two fold: 
1. Facial recognition approaches have quite distinct characteristics and experience good 
levels of performance in terms of FAR and FRR. Indeed, facial recognition systems are 
often used in identification systems as well as verification systems. The use of them for 
verification does not require such distinctiveness. 
2. The relationship between the FAR and FRR is not linear but non-linear, with small 
changes in the FAR typically resulting in larger changes in the FRR.  
It is therefore possible to take advantage of these properties to provide a little less security for a 
larger improvement in the robustness and usability of the approach. 
4.2. Voice Verification  
Although voice verification can be performed using one of three types of input, the only 
effective solutions to date have been based on the text-dependent and text-prompted inputs. 
Unfortunately neither of these approaches can offer transparency to the verification process as 
the user would be required to repeat predefined or real-time generated words prompted from the 
system. The text independent approach is the ideal solution to the issue of achieving 
transparency, enabling the system to analyse the voice of the user while they use voice 
applications and extract the distinct features regardless of what the user says. However, to date 
this technique has not managed two achieve satisfactory classification results as the inputs into 
the classification algorithm tend to be too variable.  
Similarly to the proposed mechanism for facial recognition, it is not the purpose of this solution 
to further the research being undertaken within the voice verification domain, of which there is 
much. Instead through modifying the method by which existing algorithms are used the 
objective of transparency can be achieved. The solution proposes to utilise the combination of 
three existing technologies: 
1. Voice Verification – Text-dependent mode. To perform voice verification on single 
static phrases or words. 
2. Voice Recognition. To perform recognition of the words being spoken. 
3. Database. To provide a mechanism of indexing and storing the words and voice 
templates. 
The use of voice recognition would enable recognition of the spoken word/phrase and can 
subsequently index them in a database of words spoken. Given a carefully designed enrolment 
process, the database of indexed words would be sufficiently large for a text-dependent voice 
verification approach to then be applied to the static word. The process of enrolment and 
verification is illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
 
Figure 2. Voice Enrolment Process 
Figure 3. Voice Verification Process 
Through applying the algorithms in this manner the system is able to take advantage of strong 
performance experienced by text-dependent voice verification. The possible disadvantage is the 
enrolment database of index words not being sufficiently large to enable static classification to 
take place – none of the phrases spoken in practice appear in the enrolment database. Given the 
one-to-one verification that takes place (versus a one-to-many) it is not anticipated that the level 
of security will be affected either positively or negatively, however the transparency and 
subsequent usability of the approach should improve significantly. 
4.3. Signature Recognition  
In order to achieve the objective of transparency, a requirement exists to authenticate a user, not 
based upon their signature (as this would need to be obtained intrusively) but based upon 
written words a user might scribe using the stylus on the touch-sensitive screen. In essence, it is 
not signature recognition that is required but handwriting verification. 
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The move towards dynamic signature classification has assisted in the ability to measure unique 
characteristics of how a user writes rather than simply the final image. This places less reliance 
upon the uniqueness of the final signature (and the word in this particular scenario). Therefore, 
although two written words might appear to look the same (a fairly trivial task) it is highly 
unlikely there were written in an identical fashion.  
Unfortunately, current systems can only deal with simple one-to-one comparisons and in order 
to achieve transparency, the system would need to be equipped with the ability to verify a user 
by whichever word they scribed. Implementing a design approach, similar to voice verification, 
where a database is utilised to index written words during enrolment would assist in providing a 
dictionary of previously scribed words within which to perform verification.   
This approach would also suffer from the same disadvantage as voice, in that a previous sample 
must be stored in the database for verification to be performed. However, with carefully 
designed enrolment processes, this problem can be minimised. It will also theoretically not 
affect the security, however initial prior research undertaken by the authors have already 
demonstrated good performance of this approach, indeed with it providing better security than 
when used in its traditional signature recognition mode [12].  
4.4. Keystroke Analysis  
Keystroke analysis even in a text-dependent mode is one of the weaker forms of biometric 
authentication, suffering from large variations in typing characteristic leading to worsening 
levels of security and user inconvenience. Utilising keystroke analysis in text-independent mode 
has not resulted in performance rates that would be useful in practice. It is therefore necessary to 
utilise the static (text-dependent) mode of operation and seek to apply current algorithms in a 
fashion to achieve transparency. 
For the transparent use of the technique a similar approaches to the above could be used, by 
indexing the words typed by the user. Studies in the past have been performed by the authors 
utilising for reference a number of keywords likely to occur in text messages. The results 
showed promising results indicating that such approach could be effectively used for achieving 
transparency [10, 11]. Nevertheless due to the less distinctive nature of keystroke features it is 
suggested that a large index of words must be utilised and the use of more than one word in 
each verification in order to further improve the verification decision (as illustrated in Figure 
4). 
 
Figure 4. Fusion model for keystroke analysis 
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The modification proposed to this approach will not negatively affect the security provided, as a 
one-to-one based verification is still being performed. It should however improve the robustness 
and importantly achieve transparency.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The changing nature of mobile computing imposes the requirement for enhanced and robust 
security. Biometrics can address this issue and provide more trust with respect to the user’s 
identity. Furthermore, if implemented correctly they can provide a mechanism to transparently 
and thus continuously maintain trust of the user.  
However, such application is yet restricted due to current implementations and mechanisms 
have been proposed that focus upon the integration of technology and the use of the more static 
characteristics. Through the manipulation of security and user convenience, techniques can be 
applied in a transparent fashion. 
Further research is required however to assess to what degree these proposed mechanisms will 
improve user convenience and importantly at what cost to security. 
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Abstract. The mobile device has become a ubiquitous technology that is 
capable of supporting an increasingly large array of services, applications and 
information. Given their increasing importance, it is imperative to ensure that 
such devices are not misused or abused. Unfortunately, a key enabling control 
to prevent this, user authentication, has not kept up with the advances in device 
technology. This paper presents the outcomes of a 2 year study that proposes 
the use of transparent and continuous biometric authentication of the user: 
providing more comprehensive identity verification; minimizing user 
inconvenience; and providing security throughout the period of use. A Non-
Intrusive and Continuous Authentication (NICA) system is described that 
maintains a continuous measure of confidence in the identity of the user, 
removing access to sensitive services and information with low confidence 
levels and providing automatic access with higher confidence levels.  An 
evaluation of the framework is undertaken from an end-user perspective via a 
trial involving 27 participants. Whilst the findings raise concerns over 
education, privacy and intrusiveness, overall 92% of users felt the system 
offered a more secure environment when compared to existing forms of 
authentication. 
1 Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a considerable increase in the power and capabilities of 
mobile devices, with the users of today’s smartphones and PDAs having access to a 
far richer range of features and functionality than they enjoyed a few years ago.  
Although offering a number of clear benefits, this transition poses serious security 
considerations for mobile users. With the ability to access and store a wide variety of 
more sensitive information, the need to ensure this information is not misused or 
abused is imperative. Whereas the replacement cost arising from loss or theft might 
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previously have been the principal risk associated with mobile devices, unauthorized 
access to its data could now be a far more significant problem (introducing threats 
ranging from personal identity theft through to serious corporate loss and 
increasingly liability).  
Given the changing nature of the mobile device and network, it is necessary to 
consider whether the current authentication on mobile handsets is capable of 
providing the level of security that is necessary to meet the changing requirements. 
Even with increasingly large amounts of literature suggesting that secret-knowledge 
techniques are ineffective (Lemos, 2002; Denning, 1999), the Personal Identification 
Number (PIN) is still the most widely used approach on mobile devices. The 
increasing requirement for protection is evidenced by a survey of 230 business 
professionals, which found that 81% considered the information on their PDA was 
either somewhat or extremely valuable. As a result, 70% were interested in having a 
security system for their PDA (Shaw, 2004). 
Looking beyond secret-knowledge, two other forms of authentication are 
available, namely tokens and biometrics.  However, only the latter are able to 
realistically provide more secure mechanisms for user authentication. Tokens rarely 
authenticate the user, but rather authenticate the presence of the token; with the 
assumption being the legitimate user is in possession of the token.  Moreover, its 
application within a mobile device context would require a user to remember both 
the device and token or more commonly simply leave the token in situ within the 
device (e.g. the use of the SIM card). However, given the evolving nature of mobile 
devices, simply replacing one authentication mechanism with another is arguably not 
sufficient. Rather, only through an analysis of the requirements can an effective 
solution be proposed. 
This paper presents the results from a two-year study investigating and proposing 
a new user authentication approach for mobile devices. The paper begins by 
presenting the research undertaken to develop and understand the requirements in 
order to derive the objectives of the system. Section 3 then broadly describes the 
proposed framework; in particular, focusing upon the key processes that enable 
security and usability. Section 4 presents the end-user trial of the system, with the 
final section describing the conclusions and future work. 
2 Analysis of stakeholder requirements 
 
In order to establish an understanding of stakeholder requirements, a qualitative and 
quantitative research methodology was undertaken. Stakeholders were largely 
divided into two groups: end-users of mobile devices and managers of mobile 
devices/networks (e.g. network operators, system administrators). It was determined 
that the end-user group, representing the principle stakeholder group, it would be 
assessed both qualitatively through a survey and quantitatively through focus-group. 
It was felt, due to the specialist nature of the other group of stakeholders and getting 
sufficient access to them, a quantitative focus-group based methodology would be 
most appropriate. To this end, two activities were undertaken: 
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1. A survey of end-user attitudes and opinions towards current and future 
forms of user authentication technologies. A total of 297 participants took 
part in the survey and complete published results can be found in Clarke & 
Furnell (2005). 
2. A focus group activity involving all stakeholders. A total of 12 participants 
took part and a series of questions were put forward regarding current 
authentication and the security requirements of current and future services. 
In order to maximise the usefulness of the focus group, this activity was 
devised based upon the analysis and findings of the survey. Detailed 
information on the focus group and its outcomes can be found in Karatzouni 
et al. (2007). 
 
In summary, the survey found that 34% of the 297 respondents did not use any 
PIN security. In addition, even for those respondents who did use the PIN at switch-
on only, 85% would leave their handset on for more than 10 hours a day, thereby 
undermining any security the PIN might provide. Interestingly, however, it would 
appear that users do have an appreciation of security, with 85% of respondents in 
favour of additional security for their device.   
Within the focus group these findings were not so evident, with the end-user 
group finding it difficult to understand why such protection was required. Whilst this 
was somewhat expected given current usage (with most end-users simply using their 
device for telephony or texting); the few enterprise-level users of devices (using 
advanced features such as email and corporate network access) that participated in 
the focus group understood and agreed with the need for better protection. Moreover, 
once the possible future uses of the mobile devices were explained to end-users (for 
instance micro-payments and accessing back accounts), they also understood the 
need for better security. From the other stakeholder groups, it became evident that 
existing controls were not sufficient, with system administrators particularly 
concerned regarding the increasing integration of mobile devices within their 
organisations network and the effective control and management of them. 
When taking the feedback into consideration and reflecting upon all the other 
requirements, such as: varying hardware configurations and processing capabilities 
of mobile devices; network versus device centric operation; an enormous end-user 
population of approximately 2.7 billion (GSM Association, 2008); privacy of end-
user data (particular biometric based); it became evident that a flexible authentication 
scheme would be preferable. As no single authentication technique would be suitable 
for all situations it would be far more appropriate to provide a suite of authentication 
techniques within an appropriate framework that could provide an overall 
authentication approach for mobile devices. 
From the analysis of stakeholder requirements, it is envisaged that a successful 
authentication mechanism for mobile devices must address a number of 
requirements: 
 
 to increase the authentication security beyond secret-knowledge based 
approaches; 
 to provide transparent authentication of the user (within limits) to remove the 
inconvenience factor from authentication; 
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 to provide continuous or periodic authentication of the user, so that the 
confidence in the identity of the user can be maintained throughout the life of 
the device; 
 to link security to service provision, so that for instance the risk associated with 
sending a text message and accessing a bank account can be understood and be 
incorporated with the decision making process ; 
 to provide an architecture that would function (to one extent or another) across 
the complete range of mobile devices, taking into account the differing hardware 
configurations, processing capabilities and network connectivity. 
 
From these requirements a Non-Intrusive and Continuous Authentication (NICA) 
system was devised.  
3 Non-Intrusive and Continuous Authentication (NICA) for 
mobile devices 
 
NICA operates by utilising a combination of secret knowledge and biometric 
techniques within a flexible framework. The framework operates by initially 
establishing a baseline level of security, using secret knowledge approaches, which 
progressively increases as the user interacts with their device and biometric samples 
are captured. Although user authentication will begin rather intrusively (e.g. when 
the device is switched on for the first time), with the user having to re-authenticate 
periodically, the system will quickly adapt, and as it does so the reliance upon secret 
knowledge techniques is replaced by a reliance upon biometrics – where the user will 
be continuously and non-intrusively authenticated. The result is a highly modular 
framework that can utilise a wide-range of standardised biometrics, and which is able 
to take advantage of the different hardware configurations of mobile devices – where 
a combination of cameras, microphones, keypads etc can be found.. 
3.1 Proposed Framework 
Architecturally this system could take many forms, but it is proposed that a number 
of key components would be required, such as an ability to capture and authenticate 
biometric samples, an intelligent controller, administrative capabilities and storage of 
the biometric profiles and authentication algorithms. Although principally conceived 
around a client-server topology, the system also has the flexibility of operating in an 
autonomous mode to ensure security is maintained even during periods with limited 
or no network connectivity. Figure 1 outlines the functional components of the 
architecture.  
The client-side includes all of the components illustrated in Figure 1 and the 
server-side architecture includes all but the input and output components (the Data 
Collection engine, Security Status and Intrusion Interface). The implementation of 
the architecture will differ depending upon the context that a device is being used 
within. For instance, in a standalone implementation the device has no use for the 
Communications Engine – as no network exists to which it can connect. Meanwhile, 
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in a client-server topology the components required will vary depending upon the 
processing split between the server and client. There are numerous reasons why a 
network administrator may wish to split the processing and control of NICA 
differently, such as network bandwidth and availability, centralised storage and 
processing of the biometric templates, and memory requirements of the mobile 
device. For example, in order to minimise network traffic, the network administrator 
may require the host device to authenticate user samples locally, or conversely, the 
administrator may wish the device to only perform pre-processing of input samples 
and allow the server to perform the authentication, thus removing the majority of the 
computational overhead from the device, but still reducing the sample size before 
transmitting across the network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  NICA Architecture 
3.2 Security and usability processes 
The principal objective of the system is to maintain the level of security required 
commensurate with the services being provided by the device and to achieve this in a 
user friendly and convenient fashion. To this end, two key processes operate to 
ensure this: 
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 Authentication Confidence Level  Alert Level 
 
The Authentication Confidence Level (AuCL) process assists in ensuring 
security through maintaining a continuous level of confidence in the identity of the 
user. It is a sliding numerical value between -5 and +5 (these values are merely 
suggestions rather than definitive values), with -5 indicating low security, 0 a normal 
‘device switch-on’ level, and +5 indicating a high security level. The confidence 
level is modified depending upon the result of authentication requests and the time 
that has elapsed between them. The magnitude to which the AuCL is modified is 
dependent upon the authentication technique – recognising that a difference exists 
between strong biometrics such as face and fingerprints and weaker biometrics such 
as keystroke analysis. A protection mechanism also exists to ensure a user utilising a 
weaker biometric is unable to achieve high levels of confidence. This confidence 
level is then associated with the services and information the device is capable of 
providing, so that a user who already has sufficient confidence to access a service is 
automatically provided access. However, should a user request access to a service for 
which they currently do not have sufficient confidence for, a subsequent intrusive 
authentication request will be made.  
The Alert Level is the second of the key security processes working at the core of 
this framework. Its purpose is to ensure continuous identity verification of the user in 
a transparent and therefore convenient fashion. There are six levels (depicted in 
Table 1) with the level of authentication security being increased until the device is 
locked (requiring an administrative password or PUK code from a cellular network 
provider). The number of stages was determined by a compromise between requiring 
a good level of user convenience and better security. Through mixing transparent and 
intrusive authentication requests into a single algorithm it is intended that the 
majority of authorised users will only experience the transparent stages of the 
algorithm. The intrusive stages of the algorithm are required to ensure the validity of 
the user by utilising the stronger authentication tools before finally locking the 
device from use. 
The Alert Level algorithm is inherently biased toward the authorised user, as they 
are given three non-intrusive chances to authenticate correctly, with two subsequent 
additional intrusive chances. This enables the system to minimise inconvenience 
from the authorised user perspective. However, due to the trade-off between the error 
rates, this has a detrimental effect on the false acceptance rate, increasing the 
probability of wrongfully accepting an impostor every time an authentication request 
is sent. With this in mind, for an impostor to be locked out of the device they must 
have their authentication request rejected a maximum of 5 consecutive times. 
However, this is where the companion process, the AuCL, has a significant role. The 
probability of an impostor continually being accepted by the framework becomes 
very small as the number of authentication requests increase. This would indicate 
that the impostor will be identified correctly more often than not (even if not 
consecutively as required by the Alert Level), reducing the AuCL value to a level 
where the majority if not all of the services and file access permissions have been 
removed – essentially locking the device from any practical use. In a practical 
situation, it is likely an impostor will be able to undertake tasks with a low risk, such 
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as, a telephone call or sending a text message, for a short period of time before the 
system locks down. However, all of the key sensitive and expensive services will be 
locked out of use. By permitting this limited misuse of the device, it is possible to 
achieve a much higher level of user convenience at minimal expense to the security. 
Table 1. Escalation of the alert level 
Alert Level  NICA Authentication action 
1 Perform transparent authentication using the most recent data in input 
cache.  
2 Perform transparent authentication using remaining data in input 
cache. 
3 Perform transparent authentication using the next available user input. 
4 Issue an intrusive authentication request using a high-confidence 
method. 
5 Issue a further intrusive authentication request using a high-confidence 
method. 
6 Successive authentication failure invokes a system lock. 
3.2 NICA prototype 
A proof-of-concept prototype was developed in order to assess the effectiveness of 
the proposed framework. The prototype, based upon the client-server model, 
comprised of four software systems: 
 
1. Authentication Manager – providing the entire server-side operational 
functionality, including, biometric profiling, authentication and data 
synchronization. 
2. Administrative Console – containing all the administrative and system 
settings, and providing a visualisation of active devices and their 
operational status. 
3. Client-Side Interface – providing the simulated mobile handset 
functionality, data capture and intrusion control. 
4. Databases – an SQL server containing all the server-side databases. 
 
The hardware utilised for the prototype included a Samsung Q45 that acted as the 
Authentication Manager, Console Manager and contained the databases. The nature 
of these components meant they could be deployed in separate systems. The clients 
were deployed on a Sony Vaio UX1 and HP Mini-Note 2133 running Microsoft 
Vista and XP platforms respectively. Whilst these client devices are classed as 
mobile devices, they do not represent the traditional mobile handset that the 
framework was devised for. The decision to utilise these platforms over mobile 
handsets was largely due to development constraints within the timeframe of the 
funded project – as mobile platform development would have had to been 
undertaken using unmanaged code in C++, rather than rapid prototyping languages 
such as Visual Basic. 
Having undertaken a thorough examination of biometric technologies and the 
commercial products that were available, it was determined that few suitable 
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commercial biometric solutions existed for integration within NICA. The principal 
reason for this was the lack of available Software Development Kits (SDKs), with 
vendors preferring to design bespoke solutions for customers rather than license their 
biometric solutions for development. The project therefore identified some facial and 
voice verification algorithms developed in MatLab and sought to modify these for 
use within NICA (Rosa, 2008) These were accompanied by keystroke analysis 
algorithms previously created by the authors (Clarke and Furnell, 2006). It was 
considered that these biometric approaches would provide the appropriate variety of 
transparent and intrusive authentication required for the proof-of-concept. 
4 End-user trial of NICA 
In order to evaluate the approach, a user trial was conducted that ultimately involved 
27 participants. The trial activity was split to two phases: 
 
 Enrolment Phase: The participants used the prototype to provide face, voice and 
keystroke biometric samples that would be subsequently used to create their 
biometric profiles and also define two cognitive questions. A simple to use and 
intuitive interface was used to capture the samples. 8 samples for face, 9 for 
voice and 15 for each cognitive response they gave (which they were asked to 
provide 2) from which keystroke information was extracted. The enrolment 
process took no more that 15 minutes per person and at the end the participants 
were asked to complete the first questionnaire that looked to assess their 
experience. 
 
 Usability Phase: Each participant was asked to follow a series of steps that would 
force an interaction with the device while the authentication prototype was 
running on the background. This would enable for biometric samples to be 
captured transparently as well as force access to services set to be of high 
security in order to test the operation of the alert level algorithm and the 
authentication mechanism in general. In order to ensure that the participants 
would have something to do during the ‘usability’ phase of the trial, and to 
ensure that contexts would occur in which different aspects of the prototype 
could be utilised, each user was asked to work through a given set of tasks such 
as using Instant Messenger, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel and an Internet 
Browser. The length of this phase varies as each user took different periods of 
time to interact with the device and complete the tasks. The average time of this 
phase was 45 minutes and on average over 60 biometric samples were captured 
from each participant during the usability phase of the trial.  After completion of 
the scenario, the user was asked to fill in a questionnaire assessing their 
experience and the system.  
After that, the participants were asked to play the role of an impostor on the 
same device using the profile of another person and through using the same 
steps see how quickly the system would recognise that they were not the 
legitimate users.   
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The results from the evaluation overall demonstrated a positive opinion of the 
authentication system, with 92% of the users considering that it offered a more 
secure environment in comparison to traditional forms of authentication. The 
participants were also asked to evaluate how convenient the system was in a scale of 
1 to 5, the results of which appear in Figure 2. Although the responses were mixed, a 
slight skew towards the system being convenient exists on average. It is worth noting 
that through observation of the evaluation, participants’ opinions were affected by 
the delays that occurred on the system while trying to manage all the processing. 
These occurred in some cases where applications might have been initialising 
concurrently and thus giving extra overhead to the system with NICA running in the 
background. This was a function of the prototype and a real system would not have 
such significant delays. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Perceived convenience of the NICA prototype 
Furthermore the above views were also affected by the transparency of the 
system which was not always ideal. The lack of robust biometric algorithms caused a 
lot of transparent authentication requests to fail, prompting some of the users to 
experience more intrusive requests that they would normally get. Unfortunately the 
biometric techniques being utilised were largely developed in-house due to a lack of 
availability of commercial algorithms. In order to mitigate the errors a manual 
trimming of the threshold was taking place during the experiment in order not to 
allow the lack of accuracy from the biometric algorithms to affect the performance of 
the actual system. Nevertheless, what also happened in the experiment was that the 
scenario included access to a number of protected services in a small amount of time 
causing even more intrusive requests to occur but not necessarily having the chance 
to build the required confidence in the user while authenticating them transparently. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to have the participants use the system for a 
prolonged period of days, so therefore the experimental study had to artificially 
include a number of steps to fully evaluate the prototype. It is likely this artificial 
environment likely resulted in a more negative attitude towards the system than what 
would have occurred in practice. The responses of the participants with regards to 
the transparency of the system are illustrated Figure 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Perceived intrusiveness of the new authentication system 
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With regard to the individual techniques that were utilised, there was a slight 
preference towards voice verification and keystroke analysis. From verbal feedback 
from participants there was a strong preference to techniques that did not require 
much explicit user interaction and were not very time consuming. As such, cognitive 
responses as an intrusive means of authentication were not very popular. The same 
occurred with face recognition as the algorithm utilised in the prototype required 
more time than other techniques to perform the authentication and the user also had 
to keep facing the camera until a sample was captured. At the same time voice 
verification (in its intrusive form) appeared to be more preferable as the user only 
had to repeat a small phrase with a subsequent quick response from the NICA server. 
Although many of the above were affected by the robustness of the algorithms 
utilised it still provides an insight that users prefer to have a higher level of security 
with the least overhead in their interaction. Usability and convenience were stronger 
preferences than security. 
  Regardless of the aforementioned problems regarding the convenience of the 
system, the majority of the users (70%) registered a preference to the use of 
transparent and continuous authentication as a protection mechanism. Although 
many of the participants suggested that the requests were too frequent the idea of 
being constantly protected and specifically having extra security for highly sensitive 
information was very appealing to them. As such, 81% of the users said that they 
would use such system in practice as they would feel more protected than using 
traditional means of authentication. Although the remaining 19% stated they would 
not use it, their justification was that although they believed the system would offer 
higher security they do not perceive that their current use of their mobile device 
actually required a higher level of protection as they do not store or access personal 
information. This was actually an opinion that had arisen on a number of occasions 
during discussions with stakeholders. A body of users exist for which the mobile 
device is only (and will remain only) a telephony-based device. They have no desire 
to use it for any other purpose and as such do not perceive the need for additional 
security. 
When the evaluation came to the participants acting as impostors it must be noted 
that although a number of users were not very positive when acting as the authorised 
user, their opinion became more positive when they saw the performance of the 
system reacting to an impostor. When the participants were asked whether the 
system managed to detect them and locked them out in a timely manner, 81% said 
yes. When the users where asked on how secure the system was their answers were 
very positive with 86% leaning to being secure or very secure. 
5. Conclusions & Future Work 
The research has resulted in the development of an operational proof-of-concept 
prototype, which is not dependent upon specific hardware and is functional across 
Windows XP and Vista platforms.  It is able to operate in both client-server and 
standalone modes, and has successfully integrated three biometric techniques. 
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The evaluation of NICA clearly demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of 
the proposed system. It is evident from the findings that such a transparent and 
continuous system has real merit and a large proportion of the participants felt it 
would provide the additional security they desire for their mobile devices. 
Unfortunately, with almost half of the world’s population having a mobile device, it 
is difficult to establish an approach that satisfies all users. NICA has specifically 
considered this and developed a flexible approach that can utilise a variety of 
biometric and other authentication techniques and through a series of operational 
settings that can vary the level of security both transparent and intrusive being 
provided. Through this flexibility it is hoped the majority of users will be able to find 
a suitable mixture of settings and techniques they prefer and desire. 
Whilst the prototype and subsequent evaluation has illustrated a number of key 
findings, it is important to highlight that if the system was operating within 
specification (i.e. the performance of the biometric techniques was good and the 
operational performance of the server was managed rather than everything operating 
for a single server) the nature of the transparency would mean few users would ever 
experience intrusive authentication.  During the evaluation, however, the framework 
was configured to perform authentication on a more frequent basis than normal in 
order to ensure that sufficient judgments were made during the trial session.  This 
was done in order to ensure that participants would see the full extent of the system 
in operation, but the consequence was that they also encountered more intrusive 
authentication requests than would normally be expected. In some trial sessions, 
these requests were too frequent and time consuming, and participants therefore 
formed a more negative impression of the prototype. 
The study has accomplished its overall aims of developing a next generation user 
authentication system. It has taken into account stakeholder considerations of 
usability, flexibility and convenience and provided a system that can improve the 
level of security in a continuous and transparent fashion – moving beyond traditional 
point-of-entry authentication. Whilst the prototype has a number of operational 
shortcomings, it is not anticipated that any of these would actually prevent a NICA-
type approach from being operationally viable in the future. The project has also 
identified a host of additional avenues that require further consideration and 
research. In particular future work will focus upon three aspects: 
 
1. Transparency of biometric techniques – Developing biometric approaches that 
will not only operate in point-of-entry mode but in a transparent fashion with 
varying environmental factors. 
2. Privacy of biometric samples – the importance of this data is paramount and large 
adoption of any biometric system will only occur when such issues can be 
resolved to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. 
3. Developing a risk assessment and management strategy for mobile devices. Given 
the wide-stakeholder group, varying responsibilities from general users to 
network operators and system administrators, it is imperative that an approach is 
designed so that the level of risk associated with a particular service request can 
be better understood and therefore protected.  
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The authors have already begun to consider the issue of transparency with respect to 
facial recognition, signature recognition and keystroke analysis (Clarke et al., 2008; 
Clarke and Mekala, 2007; Clarke and Furnell, 2006) and will continue to address 
other key biometric approaches. 
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Abstract 
 
The mobile device has become a ubiquitous technology that is capable of supporting an 
increasingly large array of services, applications and information. Given their increasing 
importance, it is imperative to ensure that such devices are not misused or abused. 
Unfortunately, a key enabling control to prevent this, user authentication, has not kept up with 
the advances in device technology. Although frequently reported as weak and insufficient, 
Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) are still the predominant form of authentication. 
Moreover, this form of authentication is point-of-entry only; thus failing to re-establish the 
authenticity of the user beyond power-on. This paper proposes the use of transparent, 
continuous biometric authentication of the user: providing more secure identity verification; 
minimising user inconvenience; and providing security throughout the period of use. It is also 
recognised that not all services, applications and information have the same security 
requirements and the paper proposes an approach for establishing what level of security to 
provide based upon individual services and applications. The Personal Security Model (PSM), 
Simple Risk Assessment Model (SRAM) and Organisational Risk Assessment Model (ORAM) 
are three techniques for establishing the security requirements for individual services and 
applications based upon the responsible stakeholder (i.e. end-user or organisation) and their 
associated level of knowledge. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The mobile networking landscape has changed significantly over the last decade, with a 
transition from large form factor telephony devices to small multi-purpose multimedia 
communications devices. The recent introduction of Third Generation (3G) technologies has 
provided the underlying mechanism for a wide variety of innovative data orientated services, 
with approximately one million users every day adopting these new features (Best, 2006).  
 
By providing functionality that extends beyond telephony, the mobile device has evolved from 
being a simple telephone to become a necessity that people utilise every day, for a variety of 
applications. This level of functionality can be seen to be significantly expanding, with devices 
today having similar processing and memory capabilities to PCs of a few years ago. Indeed, 
their combination of portability and capability means that handsets such as smartphones and 
PDAs are likely to have an increasingly significant role as mobile computing and network access 
devices. 
 
This transition poses serious security considerations for mobile users. With the ability to access 
and store a wide variety of more sensitive information, the need to ensure this information is not 
misused or abused is imperative. Whereas the replacement cost arising from loss or theft might 
previously have been the principal risk associated with mobile devices, unauthorised access to 
its data could now be a far more significant problem (introducing threats ranging from personal 
identity theft to serious corporate loss and increasingly liability).  
 
Given the changing nature of the mobile device and network, it is necessary to consider whether 
the current authentication on mobile handsets is capable of providing the level of security that is 
necessary to meet these requirements. Interestingly, it can be seen that although devices have 
undergone several generations of improvements in technology and functionality, the mechanism 
used for providing identity verification has not changed or even been modified. Even with 
increasingly large amounts of literature suggesting secret-knowledge techniques are ineffective 
(Lemos, 2002; Denning, 1999), the Personal Identification Number (PIN) is still the most widely 
used approach on mobile devices. 
 
Looking beyond secret-knowledge, two other forms of authentication are available, namely 
tokens and biometrics.  However, only the latter are able to realistically provide more secure 
mechanisms for user authentication. Tokens rarely authenticate the user, but rather 
authenticate the presence of the token; with the assumption being the legitimate user is in 
possession of the token.  However, given the evolving nature of mobile devices, simply 
replacing one authentication mechanism with another is arguably not sufficient. Rather, only 
through an analysis of the requirements can an effective solution be proposed. This paper 
establishes the need for flexible and multi-level security for mobile devices, to meet the 
demands for all stakeholders (end-users, network operators, system administrators).  Section 2 
provides an overview of the existing security provision of mobile devices and section 3 
introduces the need for multi-level and continuous identity verification. Section 4 proceeds to 
propose a series of mechanisms for establishing the level of security that should be attributed to 
different services – moving authentication away from the device and point-of-entry towards 
continuous verification tied to service and application usage. 
 
2. Current security provision for Mobile Devices 
 
As the range of data and services expands, it is increasingly desirable for users to protect their 
devices via appropriate authentication methods.  The dominant method for achieving this on 
current devices is the use of 4-8 digit PINs, which can be applied to both the device and the 
user’s Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) - a removable token containing the cryptographic keys 
required for network authentication. 
 
The PIN is a secret-knowledge authentication approach, and thus relies upon some knowledge 
that the authorised user has. Unfortunately, such techniques have long-established drawbacks, 
with weaknesses often being introduced as a result of the authorised users themselves.  These 
are most clearly documented in relation to passwords, with bad practices including the selection 
of weak (guessable) strings, as well as sharing details with other people, writing them down and 
never changing them (Lemos, 2002; Morris and Thompson, 1979). A survey assessing 
authentication and security practices on mobile handsets found that 34% of the 297 
respondents did not use any PIN security (Clarke & Furnell, 2005). In addition, even for those 
respondents who did use the PIN at switch-on only, 85% would leave their handset on for more 
than 10 hours a day, thereby undermining any security the PIN might provide. Interestingly, 
however, it would appear that users do have an appreciation of security, with 85% of 
respondents in favour of additional security for their device.  The increasing requirement for 
protection is further evidenced by a survey of 230 business professionals, which found that 81% 
considered the information on their PDA was either somewhat or extremely valuable. As a 
result, 70% were interested in having a security system for their PDA, with 69% willing to pay 
more for a PDA with security than one without (Shaw, 2004). 
 
 
With the aforementioned evolution of mobile device functionality and access, the requirement 
for additional and/or advanced authentication mechanisms is becoming more apparent. The 
original specifications for security in third generation (3G) networks identified the importance of 
authenticating users in the more advanced environment that would be provided.  Specifically, it 
was stated that “It shall be possible for service providers to authenticate users at the start of, 
and during, service delivery to prevent intruders from obtaining unauthorised access to 3G 
services by masquerade or misuse of priorities” (3GPP, 2001).  The reference to performing the 
authentication during service delivery is particularly interesting, and a potential interpretation is 
to use more advanced techniques that would enable periodic or continuous re-verification of the 
user. However, it is notable that the introduction of 3G handsets to date has not witnessed any 
large-scale advancement over previous authentication approaches.  Having said this, a small 
number of operators and handset manufacturers have identified the need to provide alternative 
authentication mechanisms. For instance, NTT DoCoMo’s F505i handset comes equipped with 
a built-in fingerprint sensor (NTT DoCoMo, 2004). However, although fingerprint technology 
increases the level of security, the technique remains point-of-entry only and intrusive from the 
perspective of the user. 
 
 
3. An Analysis of the Security Requirements on Mobile Devices 
 
Another observation in relation to the current point-of-entry authentication is that it tends to 
assume that all services, applications and information accessible on the device are of equal 
value, and do not require any further access control restrictions.   However, it can be argued 
that different services and data require different security provision.   
For example, the protection required by a text message is substantially different to that required 
by a bank account. Figure 1shows a representation of how current authentication schemes deal 
with security, keeping a single level of security for all services. Figure 2Error! Reference 
source not found. shows how the threat derived from each service could add another 
dimension to the way in which the security level is defined. Each service carries a certain risk of 
misuse, and this ought to be a factor in deciding the appropriate level of security.   
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Figure 1: Current Security Assessment 
  
Figure 2: Proposed Security Assessment 
 
The level of security is more appropriately assigned to each service, so that each service or 
function can independently require a certain level of authentication (and consequently trust in 
the legitimacy of the user) in order to grant access to the specific service.  In this way, more 
critical operations can be assigned greater protection, leaving less risky operations to a lower 
level of trust.   
 
It can also be argued that the level of security within a service or application is likely to change 
during the process, as key stages will have a greater risk associated to them than others.  In 
order to carry out a specific task, a number of discrete steps are involved, which may not carry 
the same level of sensitivity (i.e. some processes are more critical, whereas others are simply 
operational steps that assist in the completion of the desired task).  A simple example that 
illustrates this notion is the procedure of accessing an email inbox. The user access the inbox 
and at that instance there is not a real threat involved as the operation cannot lead to any 
misuse in its own right (see Figure 3 (a)). Even if the next step is to create a new message and 
start typing the content, no additional risk exists. However, the security implications actually 
start when the user is pressing „Send‟ as it is at this point that the adverse impacts from 
impostor actions would actually begin. By contrast, in Figure 3 (b), the user again accesses the 
inbox, but tries to access the saved messages instead. This time the requirement for greater 
protection occurs earlier in the process, as accessing the saved messages could affect 
confidentiality if an impostor reads them.  
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 Figure 3: Variation of the security requirements during utilisation of a service 
 
It can be foreseen that each operation has different sensitivities and as such each step of the 
process changes the threat and therefore the risk level. However, within the context of this 
paper only the issue of inter-process security is addressed, establishing appropriate levels of 
security for each service and application rather than the device as a whole.  Intra-process 
security will be addressed as part of further research. 
 
In order to apply individual security levels to applications and services there is a need for threat 
assessment to classify the security risks associated with them, from both organisational and 
individual perspectives. From this classification, a security level could be attributed to each type 
of service, and subsequently to the level of trust required in the legitimacy of the user.   
 
Within this research a number of usage scenarios were identified based upon current and 
potential future usage of mobile devices. These scenarios assist in the design of a threat 
assessment template, examining the security risk that each service encompasses and an 
associated severity level. A criterion used to classify the different usage scenarios is the way 
that each service utilises network connectivity. As such the services and functions can be split 
into those requiring the network, those requiring traditional cellular services, and those that 
operate locally on the device. This separation also assists in understanding what forms of 
authentication can be subsequently applied; device-centric or network centric techniques. Table 
1 presents a listing of potential services and functions that can be accessed via a mobile device. 
  
Cellular Non-Network  Network 
Voice Call Contacts E-mail 
SMS Calendar Instant Messaging 
MMS Tasks Data Synchronization 
Video Call  Word Processing Browsing Information 
Voice Mail Camera use Downloading Web 
New 
Message 
Access 
 Inbox 
Type 
Message 
Send 
Message 
Access 
 Inbox 
Access 
Saved 
Messages 
Read 
Saved 
Messages 
Delete 
Saved 
Message 
(a) Sending a Text Message 
 
      
(b) Reading & Deleting Text Messages 
Content 
Fax Multimedia access Ticketing 
Push-to-Talk Data synchronization 
Location-based services 
(Pull) 
Conferencing Control of devices Video-on-Demand 
Value-added services Business Applications TV streaming 
 Identification Documents Micro-payments 
  E-learning 
  E-health 
  Business Applications 
  Information Services (Pull) 
  Adult services 
  Gaming 
  Gambling 
  Electronic Currency 
  Voting 
Table 1: Examples of Usage Scenarios 
 
The classification of risk for each service and application would change to fit the requirements of 
each party, whether it is an organisation or an individual. However, it is important to remember 
that this research is looking for an approach that is usable for all stakeholders – organisations of 
all sizes and individuals. The complexity of the risk assessment process therefore needs to 
change depending upon whether it is being completed by a professional within an organisation 
or a normal member of the public. 
 
4. Risk Analysis for Mobile Devices 
 
In order to determine the level of authentication required for each service, it is appropriate to 
consider the implications arising from misuse.  This in turn requires a means of assessing the 
risk in a particular context.  Risk analysis techniques have been developed and widely utilised 
by organisations to ensure they take account of the threats and vulnerabilities against their 
systems.  However, rather than consider the full range of risks associated with mobile assets, 
this paper presents a method for establishing the level of trust required in the identity of the user 
wishing to access the application or service. It is recognised that mobile devices are often 
owned by individuals and used to store business data (or vice versa).  With this in mind, the 
required security can be defined by responsibility in one of three ways: 
 
1. The organisation is wholly responsible for the device and all applications, services and 
business processes that operate on it. 
2. The end-user is wholly responsible for the device and all applications and services that 
operate on it. 
3. Both organisation and end-user take partial responsibility for particular applications, 
services and business processes that operate on it. No specific apportioning of 
responsibility is assumed. 
 
Similarly to risk assessment, it is the responsibility of the appropriate party (or parties) to define 
the trust level required for each application, service or business process. What actually needs to 
be assessed will largely depend upon whether the device is being used for business or personal 
purposes. For example, it is envisaged that, for personal purposes, the user is likely to utilise 
the applications and services that are available and provided on the device by the network 
operator. The range of applications and services will largely depend upon the device, and 
therefore be fairly static. For business purposes, the range of applications and services 
operating on the device will include all of the default functionality (similarly to personal users), 
but also operate a wider range of third party and bespoke applications. It is therefore important 
to ensure an organisation has the ability to add applications and services.  
 
The level of trust can be established in several ways. Recognising the different requirements of 
a personal user versus an organisation, the following alternative models are proposed: 
  
 Personal Security Model (PSM) to be undertaken by a personal user.  
 Simple Risk Assessment Model (SRAM), to be undertaken by either the personal user, 
the organisation, or a combination of both. 
 Organisational Risk Assessment Model (ORAM), to be undertaken by organisations 
incorporating the mobile device functionality into their current risk assessment 
methodology and tools.  
 
Figure 4 illustrates the 3 models, with an increasing reliance upon formal risk assessment 
methodologies as one moves towards organisational use. 
 
 
Figure 4: Risk Assessment Models 
 
Personal Security Model (PSM): Although risk assessment methodologies are traditional tools 
used by businesses to identify the level of risks, such an approach is not so viable for the end-
user. It would place a significant burden upon novice users, as specialist knowledge and 
procedures are required. The PSM approach offers a simple means of assigning risk to a 
service or application. Based on the knowledge and also the personal use of the device, an 
individual user will simply set a risk/security level to each service or application, without any 
further analytical view of impact. Figure 5 illustrates an example of the PSM model using a 
low/medium/high rating for attributing the security to each service.  
 
Organization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual User 
 
PSM SRAM ORAM 
Level of Risk Assessment 
Knowledge 
Low High 
 Security Level 
Service Low Medium High 
SMS    
Voice Call    
Video Call    
Email    
Electronic Currency    
   
…     
    
 
Figure 5: Example of PSM 
 
 
The type of value that is attributed to each of the services is also left flexible, with further 
research required to evaluate different approaches.  However, as an illustration, potential 
solutions could include: 
 
 Numeric scale (e.g. 1 (low) to 10 (high)) 
 Likert scale (e.g. Strongly disagree – Strongly agree) 
 Boolean response (e.g. Yes – No) 
 
Recognising that many end-users may not even be willing to go this far in terms of explicitly 
assessing their own needs, it is also conceivable that a default profile could be established for 
the standard services on a device, which the user could then tune if inclined to do so (i.e. in a 
similar manner to aspects such as the security settings in other contexts, such as web 
browsers). 
 
Simple Risk Assessment Model (SRAM): This model can operate in one of three ways 
depending upon where the responsibility resides for undertaking the assessment (.i.e. with the 
personal user, the organisation, or both).   
 
SRAM represents a more focused risk analysis tool than the PSM, useful for more security-
aware mobile device users. It follows a risk analysis process, but focuses only upon mobile 
devices. Personal users who feel PSM does not provide the granularity required in the process 
will be able to utilise this model and follow a simplified risk analysis process. Organisations not 
versed in risk analysis, or lacking related expertise, will also be able to follow this model. In 
addition, taking into account that the responsibility of the device might reside with more than one 
party, this model also permits the choice of which stakeholder has the responsibility of assigning 
risk to each service or application. 
 
In order to determine the sensitivity levels, each service can be analysed in terms of the typical 
consequence that would potentially result from breaches of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability in each usage context.  The consequences considered have been adopted from a 
standard risk analysis methodology, namely CRAMM (Barber and Davey,1992), and are 
classified as follows: 
 
 Disruption  Financial loss 
 Breach of personal privacy  Legal liability 
 Embarrassment  Threat to personal safety 
 Breach of commercial 
confidentiality 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the application of the SRAM model. As with the PSM model, the values to be 
attributed to the services can vary depending upon what is most appropriate to the 
circumstance.   
 
Service 
Commerci
al 
confidentia
lity 
Person
al 
privacy 
Disrupti
on 
Embarrassm
ent 
Financi
al loss 
Legal 
liabilit
y 
Person
al 
safety 
SMS Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Voice Call Low Low High Low Low Low Medium 
Video Call Low Low Medium Low Medium Low Low 
Email High Medium High Medium Low 
Mediu
m 
Low 
Business 
Applications 
Medium Low High High Medium High Low 
Calendar Low Medium Medium Low Low Low Low 
Data 
synchronizat
ion 
High Low Medium Medium Medium High Low 
…
 
       
 
Figure 6: Example of SRAM 
 
Organisational Risk Assessment Model (ORAM): Many organisations already have formal 
risk assessment strategies in place, with relevant expertise to conduct them.  As such, this final 
model simply permits them to integrate mobile devices, and the applications and services 
accessed by them, into their existing risk analysis processes. 
 
The three models can be used independently and assist in providing the flexibility required when 
dealing with differing stakeholder responsibilities. The rating of each service is completed 
irrespective of the risk assessment process and therefore each party can use the process that 
best matches their requirements and ability. As such, even in the case of both the business and 
the user having a responsibility for the contents of the device, each one will be able to attribute 
security levels to the services that refer to them.  
  
Although the use of any of these methods introduces a degree of subjectivity into the process 
(particularly with larger ranges of options) this method is widely utilised and accepted in risk 
assessment techniques. Therefore, as long as an informed person within the organisation is 
undertaking the assessment, it will be as good as any other form of risk assessment. This 
assumption however cannot be made for the personal user, who is likely to have little (if any) 
experience of risk assessment. It is therefore important that we more carefully define how the 
end-user will assign values. In order to minimise the subjectivity of responses, it seems prudent 
to minimise the number of options available to the user, with more clearly defined meanings for 
each option. Given each personal user will experience a standard list of applications/services on 
their device, this additional information regarding the impact of each choice can be built-in to the 
process by the network operator. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
Enhanced identity verification is imperative to protect today’s ubiquitous and powerful mobile 
devices. Although many advances have been made in handset technology and the networks 
that support them, little has changed in the way we verify the user’s using them. Moreover, it is 
no longer a matter of simply replacing one point-of-entry authentication approach with a more 
powerful approach. Instead, a more fundamental understanding of what we use the mobile 
device for is required so that effective controls can be put in place to protect the assets 
appropriately. 
 
This paper has argued the need to adopt continuous, multi-level authentication of the user, tied 
specifically to the services and applications that are used. Possible approaches for establishing 
the required level of protection (considering both the services and the skills of the stakeholders) 
have been proposed.  This work forms an integral part of on-going research into developing a 
non-intrusive and continuous authentication architecture for mobile devices. Future work will 
involve implementing the risk assessment mechanisms and developing an open-source 
architecture for integrating the enhanced authentication technologies. 
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Appendix C – Briefing and evaluation pack for the user trials 
User ID:______________ 
An Evaluation Study into  
Flexible and Transparent User Authentication for Mobile Devices 
Introduction 
As the capabilities of mobile devices continue to evolve they introduce additional demands in terms of 
security. An issue that has traditionally been poorly served is user authentication, with the majority of 
devices relying upon PINs or passwords, which people often find inconvenient and hard to remember. 
This project has sought to develop technologies to increase the level of security being provided whilst 
minimising inconvenience. 
The purpose of this evaluation is to establish the effectiveness of the technology that has been 
developed from an end-user perspective. 
Study Brief 
The study will involve two phases: 
1. Enrolment phase: This is a short session where your biometric samples are captured and 
templates created for use in the main evaluation phase. This should take approximately 20 
minutes to complete. 
2. Evaluation phase. This is the main evaluation where you will test the usability of the 
technology by going through a series of scenarios; such as writing a word document, chatting 
on Instant Messenger and surfing the web. You will be asked to complete a short 
questionnaire upon completion of this phase. This phase should take approximately 45 
minutes to complete. 
 
The whole study should not take more than 1.5 hours to complete from start to finish for which you will 
receive £15. You will only receive payment upon successful completion of both phases of the study. 
Who can take part? 
Participants need to have at least a basic understanding of how to use the applications used in the 
trial task, namely Microsoft Word, Internet Explorer, Windows Messenger and Outlook email. 
Right to withdraw 
Whilst we value your participation in the study, we appreciate your right to privacy. All biometric data 
collected for the study will be forensically removed from all mobile devices and computers upon 
completion of the study (in August 2008). You also have the right to withdraw from the study at any 
time during the process. Please note that withdrawing your participation will forfeit any payments.  
Further information 
For further information, or to withdraw from the study, please contact: 
Miss Sevasti Karatzouni (skaratzouni@plymouth.ac.uk) 
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For further information on the study, please visit our website: www.cisnr.org/nica   
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CONSENT FORM 
 
FACULTY OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Full title of project: 
Flexible and Transparent User Authentication for Mobile Devices 
 
Name of researcher: 
Steven Furnell/Nathan Clarke/Sevasti Karatzouni 
 
 Please Initial Box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
Name of Participant    Date   Signature 
 
 
Name of Researcher   Date   Signature 
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Phase 1 – Enrolment 
 
The purpose of this phase of the study is to obtain your biometric samples so that templates can be 
created for use in the main evaluation. In order to achieve this, you will be asked to complete two 
exercises:  
 
1. Undertake the system’s welcome and enrolment session – this will capture a series of voice, 
face and keystroke samples. 
2. Write a series of dialogues in a word document – this will capture additional keystroke 
samples for use by our keystroke analysis module. 
 
After completion of the first exercise, a short questionnaire will be presented. 
 
Tasks: 
 
1. Your session supervisor will enable the application and provide the device to you. Please 
follow the instructions. Upon completion, please answer the accompanying questionnaire. 
2. Open a word document and type the three cognitive responses you chose in exercise 1 thirty 
times each. 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing phase 1  
 
Please ensure you book your second session with your session supervisor before you leave! 
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Phase 1 – Enrolment 
Questionnaire 
1. On a scale 1-5 (with 1 being easy and 5 being difficult), how difficult did you find the 
enrolment process overall? (Please circle) 
 
Very Easy    Very Difficult 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. With respect to the individual biometric techniques, how difficult did you find the enrolment 
process? (On a scale 1-5, with 1 being easy and 5 difficult) 
 
 Very Easy    Very Difficult 
Cognitive 1 2 3 4 5 
Face 1 2 3 4 5 
Voice 1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. Did you find the information provided to you on the screens sufficient to complete the tasks? 
(Please circle) 
 
Yes No 
 
4. Was the enrolment process time consuming? 
 
Yes No 
 
5. Would you be happy to complete such an enrolment process as a one-off process when first 
purchasing a new mobile device? 
 
Yes No 
 
6. Are there any other information/comments or experiences you would like to make regarding 
the enrolment process? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________  
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Phase 2 – Evaluation 
The purpose of this phase of the study is to determine the usability of the developed prototype from 
an end-user perspective. To order to achieve this, you will be given a “typical scenario” in which you 
have to interact with a number of common applications and services whilst the authentication system 
operates in the background. 
In order to facilitate this “typical scenario” you will be working and communicating via the computer 
with a second participant. After completion of this phase, a questionnaire will be presented asking 
questions about your experience. You will then be asked to repeat this “typical scenario” but playing 
the role of an impostor (i.e. in order to see if, and how quickly, the system can detect you!). This will 
enable us to establish an understanding of both usability and security of the system. 
Tasks: 
In all cases, where an application is required to start and no information is provided, please 
navigate to it using voice command. 
 
1. Using File Explorer navigate to My Documents and open the Word document named 
Contacts.doc 
 
2. Using the contact information, start MSN Instant Messenger using the mouse and open a 
dialogue with the contact you retrieved from Contacts.doc. 
 
3. Exchange greetings with the contact and introduce yourself. Spend a couple of minutes 
discussing what programmes you are studying and what you like (or dislike) about Plymouth.  
 
4. Open Internet Explorer and navigate to Google. Spend a few minutes looking for various 
hotels in Las Vegas for 5-10th August 2008. Try and find the 3 cheapest options. 
 
5. Return to Instant Messenger and discuss with your contact what you have found. Decide 
between you which you feel would be the best option. 
 
6. From the Favourite’s list in Internet Explorer, click-on the travel agent link and place the 
booking information into the form. 
 
7. Using File Explorer navigate to My Documents and open the Excel document named 
Expenses.xls. Enter the costs of the hotel on this spreadsheet. 
 
8. Create a new Word document. Put a title of Biography and save it to My Documents. Now 
complete a short biography of yourself. No more than 2 or 3 paragraphs that describe your 
academic and/or professional experiences. You may also include you hobbies and other 
interests. 
 
9. Open Outlook and click on new email. Put “Biography Information” in the subject field and 
include the email of your contact (you can retrieve this from Contacts.doc). Attach your 
Biography.doc to the email and send it. 
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10. You should also receive a Biography statement from your contact. Open it and review the 
statement. Check the grammar and spelling and send the edited document back to your 
contact using email. 
 
Please now complete the following questionnaire 
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Phase 2 – Evaluation 
 
Usability Questionnaire 
 
1. On a scale 1-5, how intrusive or transparent did you feel the new authentication system was? 
 
Very Intrusive    Very Non-intrusive 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. Do you feel the system is providing a more secure environment than traditional/normal forms 
of authentication? 
 
Yes No Don’t Know 
 
3. Did you think the intrusive authentication requests were? 
 
Easy to use  Difficult to use Indifferent 
 
4. On a scale 1-5, how convenient did you feel the new authentication system was? 
 
Very 
Convenient 
   Very 
Inconvenient 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
5. Do you have any preference towards any of the authentication techniques utilised? 
(Please circle all that apply) 
 
Face Recognition  Voice Verification  Keystroke Analysis 
 Cognitive 
 
6. Do you dislike any of the authentication techniques utilised? 
 
Face Recognition  Voice Verification  Keystroke Analysis 
 Cognitive 
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7. Was there anything you particularly liked or disliked about the system?  
 
Liked:____________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Disliked:__________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Having now experienced transparent and continuous authentication; which of the following 
authentication systems would you prefer to use in practice? Please tick. 
 
Standard password or PIN 
Token-based authentication (e.g. having an access card for the device) 
Transparent & Continuous Authentication 
None 
Other Please specify:_______________________________________________________ 
 
9. Can you explain your response in question 8? 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Are there any changes or improvements you could suggest? 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
11. Assuming you required a level of security for your mobile device; would you use such a 
system in practice? 
 
Yes No 
 
Any why? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________  
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Phase 2 – Evaluation 
 
Impostor Questionnaire 
 
1. Was the system able to identify you were an impostor in a timely manner? 
 
Yes No 
 
2. Were you able to access any personal information before the system locked? 
 
No Information    All Information 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. How usable did you find the system when acting as an impostor? 
 
Very Un-usable    Very Usable 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. Did you feel the system locked you out in a timely manner? 
 
Yes No 
 
 
5. Having now played the role of both authorised user and impostor, how secure do you feel the 
system is? 
 
Very Secure    Very Insecure 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. Any further comments or observations regarding the system? 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for your time! 
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APPENDIX D (Electronic): Code & Full Simulation Results  
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